[Full Text] "Seizing Parliament Is Equivalent to Treason" Yoon Suk Yeol Sentenced to Life... Full Summary of the Insurrection Judgment

“Even a President Can Be Guilty of Insurrection Aimed at Disrupting the Constitutional Order”
Limits of Martial-Law Powers Clearly Defined
Investigative Authority of Both Prosecution and CIO Recognized… Indictment and Evidence Held Lawful
Militar

Yonhap News Agency

I will now explain the reasons for the judgment and pronounce the sentence. The prosecution indicted the defendants on the grounds that, after the declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024, the police attempted to restrict access to the National Assembly, operated arrest teams, and tried to secure control of the National Election Commission.

The defendants committed insurrection by staging a riot with the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order. The ringleader, defendant Yoon Suk Yeol, is guilty of the crime of being the leader of an insurrection, and the remaining defendants fall under the category of engaging in major duties in an insurrection. The indictment also alleges that, in the course of committing the crime of insurrection, the defendants abused their authority and obstructed the exercise of the rights of their subordinates, thereby committing the crime of abuse of authority and obstruction of the exercise of rights.

(1) I will first address the issues related to investigative powers. Although the question of whether a sitting president can be investigated is, in essence, a matter concerning the scope of presidential immunity from criminal prosecution, this court finds that an investigation itself is permissible. The reasons are as follows. There are differing views, ranging from the position that no investigation whatsoever is allowed, to the view that only arrest is prohibited, to the view that all forms of investigation are possible.

Upon examining various constitutional provisions and precedents, it appears that our Constitution drew reference from the Constitution of Taiwan. Taiwan uses the term "impeachment" in a different sense and its courts do not allow investigations. Japan, on the other hand, although its provisions differ from ours, uses the term "prosecution" and has expressed opinions on the permissible scope of investigations. Under our Constitution, presidential immunity from criminal prosecution exists to ensure the smooth performance of presidential duties, not to restrict all investigations that may be unrelated. Therefore, this court's position is that the mere act of investigation does not, in itself, violate presidential immunity from criminal prosecution.

The next issue is whether the prosecution may initiate an investigation into the crime of insurrection. This court finds that it can. The reason is that, under the Public Prosecutors' Office Act, prosecutors are, in principle, only allowed to investigate abuse of authority, but there is an exception clause that permits them to initiate an investigation if there is a direct connection to the offense in question. A Supreme Court precedent was handed down in the course of this trial, which resolved this issue. In this case, the allegation of abuse of authority for which Yoon Suk Yeol was reported appears to be connected to the crime of insurrection and related offenses, and thus a direct connection is recognized, both factually and normatively. Therefore, this court finds that the prosecution is allowed to investigate the crime of insurrection.

The Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) may also investigate the crime of insurrection. Under the CIO Act, the CIO is, in principle, only allowed to investigate abuse of authority and is barred from investigating insurrection. However, by way of exception, it may investigate crimes that it comes to recognize in the course of an investigation, provided that those crimes are directly related. The meaning of "directly related" is the same as discussed earlier in relation to the prosecution's authority. The question is whether the crime was recognized in the course of an existing investigation. The CIO provisions differ from those applicable to the prosecution. Some argue that, based on the wording, it should be interpreted to cover only crimes newly discovered while a CIO investigation is already underway. This interpretation appears consistent with the legislative intent of granting the CIO priority investigative authority and aligns with the literal meaning of the statute.

This provision appears to have been modeled on the usual provisions of special prosecutor acts, under which a special prosecutor may, by way of exception, deal only with related crimes recognized upon commencing the special investigation. On this basis, some argue that the CIO Act must be applied in the same way. However, if this argument is followed, it would mean that the CIO must, in all cases, transfer to the prosecution any crime for which it lacks investigative authority, a conclusion that is difficult to accept. Unlike a special prosecutor, who conducts a time-limited investigation, the CIO is a permanent institution with the general function of investigating related crimes and establishing the substantive truth. Therefore, rather than imposing a blanket restriction, it is preferable to interpret the provision as including crimes recognized by the CIO, so long as doing so does not violate the law or unduly impair the defense rights of suspects and victims.

In this case, the existence of a direct connection is recognized, and there is a strong normative need as well. Accordingly, it is reasonable to recognize the CIO's investigative authority over the crime of insurrection. Meanwhile, the defendants argue that the CIO's investigation was unlawful because, although the CIO in substance lacked investigative authority over insurrection, it used the inclusion of insurrection in a complaint for abuse of authority as a pretext to investigate. The record shows that this argument is not entirely without basis. However, it is difficult to accept the defendants' position as is, given that the police also conducted an independent investigation, that the CIO and the police formed a joint investigation headquarters, and that the police transferred investigative authority to the CIO in certain respects. Above all, this controversy is of limited significance. Even if the CIO lacked investigative authority, the prosecution decided to indict based on materials other than the records transferred by the CIO, and thus the indictment cannot be deemed unlawful on that ground. Even if the evidence collected by the CIO were excluded, this court finds that the evidence gathered by the prosecution and the police alone is sufficient to support a conviction. Therefore, no issue arises regarding the lawfulness of the indictment or the admissibility of evidence in connection with the CIO's investigative authority.

(2) The court also rejects the controversy over illegally obtained evidence relating to military secrets. The reasoning for this conclusion is set out in detail in the written judgment.

(3) Under these circumstances, based on the lawfully admitted evidence, the following facts are recognized. I will briefly emphasize only the key points. As to the background of this case, defendant Yoon Suk Yeol believed that the government had no effective means to respond to the opposition Democratic Party and the National Assembly carrying out impeachments of government officials and cutting the budget, and he concluded that the National Assembly was disabling the functioning of the government. Yoon shared and lamented these views with Kim Yonghyun, and he expressed similar thoughts when encouraging the Special Warfare Command commander and others. Meanwhile, it appears that Kim Yonghyun, together with the head of the Defense Intelligence Command, was suspicious of what he called a "fraudulent election" and was planning an investigation, making his own preparations for such an election investigation. Against this backdrop, when impeachment motions were brought against the Chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection and others, Yoon decided to block the National Assembly and detain opposition leaders under the form of martial law proclamation violations. He also agreed to a specific plan to secure and analyze the servers of the National Election Commission and interrogate its staff under the pretext of investigating a fraudulent election, and he decided with others to implement this plan around 22:00 on December 3, delegating the detailed planning to Kim Yonghyun. It appears that Kim did not fully disclose this plan to persons such as Yeo Inhyung. In consideration of the need to maintain security and the possibility of resistance, he did not reveal everything, and therefore he gave instructions in a way that only hinted, in roundabout terms, at what the situation was and what missions were to be carried out.

For this reason, there appear to be discrepancies in their courtroom testimonies, and the investigation seems to have faced difficulties. However, it appears that, in their own ways, all of them inferred and surmised the nature of the orders. From the perspective of these commanders, as soldiers they believed they had to obey orders, and they also harbored both the expectation and the fear that what Kim described might not actually materialize. Thus, there are aspects of their statements at the time that differ. Yet, depending on which parts are emphasized, their accounts can be viewed as approximating the truth.

They also believed that they needed the cooperation of the police and therefore summoned individuals such as Jo Jiho and instructed the police to maintain order. The subsequent details are set forth in the written judgment.

(4) In conclusion, the core of this case is that the military was sent to the National Assembly. Let me first address the main issues. The first is the process by which Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law and decided to deploy the military to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission. While there are various circumstances to consider, this court, based on the evidence and the content of Yoon's public address to the nation, finds that he came to believe that the opposition was effectively paralyzing government activities through excessive impeachment motions and budget cuts, and that he gradually became fixated on this view, ultimately deciding on December 1 to seize control of the National Assembly by force if necessary. This assessment is consistent with the overall situation.

The prosecution argued that Yoon decided on martial law not in December, but had been preparing internal and external conditions for a long-term dictatorship through martial law for about a year, and that he resorted to martial law when cornered. However, there is insufficient evidence for this. The notebook of No Sangwon does not reveal when it was written, and its handwriting and content do not suggest that it recorded matters of particular importance. The remarks that defendant Yoon made to Kim Yonghyun on several occasions over meals likewise cannot reasonably be taken as revealing specific intentions or concrete plans; they can quite plausibly be seen as mere complaints, grievances, or expressions of frustration. The measures taken under martial law were too crude and poorly prepared to have been the product of long and careful planning, and there is no substantial supporting documentation.

Next is the deployment of the military to the National Assembly. The special forces troops were ordered to force those inside to leave and to prevent those outside from entering. The Capital Defense Command troops were ordered to enter the grounds of the National Assembly. The commander of the Capital Defense Command intended to assign them the mission of guarding the vicinity of the main building of the National Assembly. All of this can be evaluated as having been carried out pursuant to the instructions of defendants Yoon Suk Yeol and Kim Yonghyun. As for the mission of the Defense Counterintelligence Command arrest team, it is a fact that Kim Yonghyun read out to Yeo Inhyung a list of 14 individuals to be arrested. This is understood to mean that all of these individuals were to be arrested. Meanwhile, the Defense Counterintelligence Command arrest teams that were actually deployed did receive orders, and at least the personnel who had already been dispatched reasonably understood that they had been assigned the mission of forming teams with police investigators and others to first arrest and transport Woo Wonshik, Lee Jaemyung, and Han Donghoon. This is the court's finding.

The most important point is the background to defendant Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of martial law and his decision to send troops to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission. As explained earlier, this court finds it fully established that Yoon's purpose was to send the military to the National Assembly to blockade it and to arrest the leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties, thereby preventing members of the National Assembly from convening to deliberate or vote, in other words, to paralyze the activities of the National Assembly so that it could not function properly for a considerable period of time. The reasons are that the martial law proclamation included expressions such as "eradication of anti-state forces in the National Assembly," and that the martial law ordinance outright prohibited National Assembly activities and political activities, stipulating that violations would be punished. The purpose of paralyzing the National Assembly is thus clear on its face, and this is further confirmed by the surrounding circumstances and the missions assigned to the troops. Furthermore, defendants Yoon and Kim did not establish any plan for when to withdraw the troops once they were deployed. In light of the fact that the withdrawal of the military and the resumption of National Assembly activities would ultimately depend on Yoon's personal decision, it is sufficient to conclude that they intended to continue, for a considerable period of time, the acts of obstructing or paralyzing the activities of the National Assembly.

(5) I will now address the legal principles. Regarding the disturbance of the constitutional order, historically, in Rome, acts that disrupted the fundamental order of the state were regarded as insurrection, and in the imperial era, even acts of treason were treated as insurrection. This tendency continued into the Middle Ages, when treason against deceased individuals was punished, but there was a prevailing belief that a king or sovereign himself could not commit the crime of insurrection. The event that changed this perception was the case of King Charles I of England. After the establishment of Parliament, conflicts arose over the collection of taxes. Enraged by a parliamentary resolution demanding that he correct his own wrongdoing, Charles I led troops into the House of Commons, forcibly dissolved Parliament, and suppressed it. He was ultimately executed for treason, and it was recognized that a king could commit treason against the state. From that time on, crimes against the state or attacks on Parliament, even by a king, came to be widely regarded as invasions of sovereignty constituting treason. Subsequently, the crime of insurrection was incorporated into the legal systems of various countries as an offense that infringes on the existence of the state. Examples from different jurisdictions are explained in the written judgment.

Among neighboring countries, there are cases in developing nations, but it is difficult to find examples where leaders were punished specifically for insurrection or rebellion. In many cases, insurrections succeeded, and when they failed, the leaders often went into exile, so investigations and trials were not conducted. For this reason, the court could not draw much reference from such developing-country cases. As for advanced democracies, it is strikingly difficult to find cases in which a president came into conflict with the legislature and then seized governing power. The reason is that advanced democracies have carefully designed institutions to prevent conflicts from escalating to such a level. They divide the legislature into two chambers, a lower and an upper house, limit the proportion of legislators who can be replaced in a single election to prevent abrupt changes in parliamentary composition, and employ mechanisms such as midterm elections to promote responsible legislative conduct. In constitutional monarchies, the monarch sometimes plays a symbolic mediating role.

Taking into account this historical development and relevant case law, it is clear that a president can also commit the crime of insurrection with the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order. The Supreme Court has defined the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order as "subjugating a constitutional institution or making it impossible for that institution to exercise its powers," and has held that this includes not only abolishing such institutions by law but also preventing them from functioning properly for a considerable period of time. Therefore, the crime of insurrection with the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order can be committed by a president, and a representative example is the use of the military to occupy a legislature or arrest its members. Deploying the military with the purpose of disabling the National Assembly so that it cannot function properly for a considerable period of time constitutes staging a riot with the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order. In particular, because the legislature, which checks the executive branch, is easily placed in a tense relationship with the executive, there can arise a strong suspicion that the head of the executive is attempting to prevent the legislature from exercising its functions by deploying the military.

(6) I will next address whether the exercise of the president's power to declare emergency martial law can constitute the crime of insurrection. The declaration of martial law, by its nature, has the character of restricting powers established by the Constitution. Because it prevents state institutions from functioning properly for a considerable period of time until martial law is lifted, it is necessary to consider whether the declaration itself constitutes insurrection. Some argue that the crime of insurrection is established only if the declaration is made with the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order. However, this court cannot accept the view that the issue should be decided solely by examining whether substantive requirements have been met. Another view holds that even under emergency martial law, it is not permitted to exercise powers that infringe on the essential functions of the National Assembly or the essence of the executive and judiciary. Our Constitution, the Martial Law Act, and related laws provide that, even under martial law, the powers of the National Assembly and the essential functions of the executive and judiciary may not be infringed. Therefore, if martial law is declared for the purpose of infringing on such functions, then, even though the declaration formally follows constitutional procedures, this court finds that the crime of insurrection with the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order is established. Accordingly, as a rule, the mere declaration of martial law does not constitute the crime of insurrection. However, if the content of the declaration reveals that it is being used to exercise powers that cannot be exercised under martial law, or that it aims to obstruct or paralyze the functions of constitutional institutions for a considerable period of time, then it is no longer an exercise of authority as prescribed by the Constitution but rather an exercise of sheer force. In such cases, this court finds that the crime of insurrection is established.

Defendant Yoon Suk Yeol and his counsel argue that the declaration of emergency martial law in this case cannot constitute insurrection because its purpose was to protect liberal democracy from a National Assembly that had become, in their view, akin to an anti-state force by obstructing the government through impeachments and budget cuts. However, this court finds that the defendants are confusing their motives and reasons with their actual purpose in acting. Any asserted legitimacy in seeking to correct a perceived national crisis remains at the level of motive or reason; it cannot be regarded as the purpose of sending the military to the National Assembly. The purpose was to send troops to blockade the National Assembly and paralyze its functions, and this must be distinguished from the use of emergency martial law and the attempt to blockade the National Assembly as the means to that end.

(7) I will now explain the criteria for establishing accomplice liability. With respect to the crime of insurrection, this court finds that mere participation in a riot is not sufficient to constitute an accomplice; the participant must also share awareness of the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order. Depending on their respective roles, such participants may be punished as leaders of an insurrection or as persons engaging in major duties in an insurrection. The crime of insurrection is a collective offense committed by many persons. Even if someone took part in the riot, this alone does not justify the hasty application of the collective offense of insurrection. The riot constituting insurrection encompasses all forms of the exercise of force, and, in the case of a martial law declaration, the declaration itself can, to a considerable extent, be regarded as an exercise of dangerous force. However, treating every degree of involvement as participation in the collective offense would run counter to the principle of legality in criminal law. Even if someone was involved, the collective offense of insurrection can only be recognized if that person shared awareness of the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order. If such shared awareness is absent, then mere involvement in the exercise of force does not establish the crime of insurrection; instead, only separate criminal provisions applicable to the specific acts in question should be examined, and liability should be limited accordingly. Shared awareness may arise from jointly planning and sharing the plan from the outset, but it may also arise during subsequent participation in the riot, or even through implicit communication. Only those who shared such awareness and participated in the riot can be regarded as having committed the collective offense of insurrection and be punished as leaders or as persons engaging in major duties.

(8) The blockade of the National Assembly and the intrusion into the National Election Commission and related acts all constitute riotous conduct, and it is reasonable to conclude that these acts had sufficient force to disturb the peace of the entire Republic of Korea, or at least of Seoul and the greater capital region. The reasons are set out in detail in the written judgment.

(9) To reiterate, the core of this case is that the military was sent to the National Assembly. I will now address the specific criminal liability of each defendant. I will begin with defendants Yoon Suk Yeol and Kim Yonghyun together. As explained earlier, once the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order is recognized, it is difficult to deny that they intended to blockade the National Assembly by deploying the military, arrest key political figures, and paralyze its functions so that it could not function properly for a considerable period of time. A riot means the highest degree of violence or intimidation. This court finds that the mere act of deploying armed troops to the National Assembly, the physical confrontations that occurred, and even the act of dispatching multiple vehicles carrying officers equipped with gear for arrests all constitute riotous conduct. Although there may have been parts in which they did not intervene individually, Supreme Court precedent holds that, even without individual involvement in each specific act, full liability for the crime of insurrection is borne. Accordingly, regardless of the extent of individual involvement in each act, this court finds that they bear overall criminal responsibility for insurrection, and, depending on their roles, they are guilty as leaders of an insurrection or as persons engaging in major duties in an insurrection.

Next, I will address defendants Jo Jiho and Kim Bongsik. They were directly informed of the deployment of the military and received instructions to maintain order. They also separately learned from Yeo Inhyung that arrest teams were being dispatched. They had prepared the deployment of riot police units even before the declaration of martial law and repeatedly restricted access to the National Assembly from the outside, temporarily relaxing the restrictions and then again imposing a complete blockade. Although they claim that these measures were taken merely to maintain order, considering that they in fact restricted the access of lawmakers and key officials, it is sufficient to conclude that, even if they did not participate in the initial planning or design of the operation, they shared awareness of the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order-namely, the purpose of defendants Yoon and Kim to blockade the National Assembly with the military, arrest political leaders, and paralyze its functions for a considerable period of time. Thus, they can be evaluated as having participated in the operation, and this court finds that the collective offense of insurrection is established with respect to them as well. Accordingly, they are also guilty of engaging in major duties in an insurrection.

As for defendant No Sangwon and the other defendants, it is apparent that they expected the declared martial law to remain in effect for at least a certain period of time. In particular, when the National Assembly, contrary to the original plan, swiftly passed a resolution to lift martial law, they discussed the situation with Kim Yonghyun and sought countermeasures. Considering that No had served as head of the Defense Intelligence Command, that he had discussed martial law in considerable detail with Kim, and that he had contemplated deploying the military, it appears that, at a minimum, after the declaration of martial law, he participated in the riot while sharing awareness that the activities of the National Assembly would be obstructed for a substantial period of time or that the Assembly's power to demand the lifting of martial law would be rendered ineffective. Therefore, the collective offense of insurrection is established, and he is also guilty of engaging in major duties in an insurrection.

As for defendant Mok Hyuntae, the chief of security at the National Assembly, it does not appear that he shared such awareness from the outset. The court has examined and discussed various circumstances, but finds no compelling extenuating or alternative explanations. Regrettably, however, the following circumstances leave the court no choice but to treat him as part of the collective offense. He carried out the orders he received, continued to restrict lawmakers' access even after receiving protests from National Assembly officials and witnessing the deployment of troops, and at least tacitly understood the purpose of his own actions. Therefore, this court finds that he is guilty of engaging in major duties in an insurrection.

Turning to defendant Kim Yonggun, there is insufficient evidence to support the allegation that he conspired with and participated in No Sangwon's plans as charged in the indictment. No Sangwon's own testimony is consistent with Kim's account. In light of these circumstances, there is insufficient evidence to establish that Kim was involved at all.

As for defendant Yoon Seungyoung, the indictment alleges that he reported to and obtained approval from Jo Jiho regarding the Defense Counterintelligence Command's plans to arrest key political figures. However, this court cannot exclude a reasonable doubt that he may in fact have misunderstood the situation and believed that the arrest teams were being dispatched to the National Assembly pursuant to the emergency martial law manual, and that he was merely responding to a request for support. In the absence of evidence that his support for the Defense Counterintelligence Command arrest teams was undertaken with shared awareness of the purpose of obstructing or paralyzing the activities of the National Assembly, the collective offense of insurrection is not established, and he is not guilty of engaging in major duties in an insurrection.

(10) Finally, I will explain the reasons for sentencing the defendants found guilty. I will begin with the common sentencing considerations. The crime of insurrection is an act that destroys the existence of the state and the functioning of the Constitution. The Criminal Act prescribes very severe statutory penalties for insurrection, to the extent that some have criticized the provision as itself being unconstitutional. Under our Constitution, such high statutory penalties are ordinarily reserved for offenses that result in grave harm, but the crime of insurrection is unique in that it provides for heavy punishment solely based on the dangerous nature of the act itself, even without actual harm, because the inherent risk is extraordinarily high. Insurrection, by disregarding lawful procedures and using violent means to disable the functioning of the National Assembly, fundamentally undermines the core values of democracy and is therefore subject to strong condemnation. Beyond these general considerations, it is particularly regrettable that the declaration of martial law and the movements of the military and police have undermined the Republic of Korea's credibility in the international community and that our society has become politically polarized, leading to extreme confrontation. Extensive investigations are ongoing into a large number of individuals, and the resulting social costs are, in the court's view, immeasurably great. Moreover, the soldiers and police officers who actually carried out the measures following the declaration of martial law have been subjected to public criticism and legal liability, and trust within the military and police regarding the propriety of obeying superior orders has been eroded. Numerous military and police personnel are under investigation and may be held criminally liable. Because of the defendants' momentary but grave misjudgment, many public officials who could otherwise have completed their careers without incident are now suffering immense hardship. Taking all of these factors into account, this court finds that such circumstances are likely to persist for a considerable period of time.

(11) I will now address the individual sentencing factors. Defendant Yoon Suk Yeol played a leading role in the offenses and involved many others. The declaration of emergency martial law caused enormous social costs, and he has not expressed any intention to apologize for this. During the proceedings, he refused to appear in court without any particular justification. However, it does not appear that he planned the offenses with meticulous care; he ordered that live ammunition not be carried in an effort to restrain the use of physical force, and no direct physical violence was actually employed. He has no prior criminal record, is 65 years old, and has served in public office for a long time.

Defendant Kim Yonghyun played a leading role in preparing the offenses, making advance plans for the deployment of troops to the National Assembly, the National Election Commission, the offices of a polling organization, and the headquarters of the Democratic Party, and appears to have separately prepared a plan for an investigation into alleged election fraud. He also played a role in encouraging Yoon's irrational decision. However, Kim, too, sought to restrain the use of physical force. He has no prior criminal record and has long served in public office.

Defendant No Sangwon appears to have discussed the overall content of the martial law measures and played a leading role. However, he is being tried in a separate proceeding, and he did not directly participate in the riotous acts themselves, such as the deployment of troops to the National Assembly.

Defendant Jo Jiho, as the chief of police, relied on the martial law ordinance to block access to the National Assembly. It is difficult to find that he acted to protect civilians; rather, he assisted the military. However, he only learned of the troop deployment on the day martial law was declared, the period of his direct control was brief, he has long served in public office, has no prior criminal record, and is in poor health, suffering from blood cancer.

Defendant Kim Bongsik personally took the lead in implementing orders to allow or restrict police access to the National Assembly. He is particularly blameworthy for ordering even the National Assembly security guards to restrict access. However, he also learned of the declaration of martial law only on that day and refrained from the use of physical force. He has long served in public office and has no prior criminal record.

Defendant Mok Hyuntae is not free from blame, having participated in restricting access to the National Assembly. However, as a commander at the rank of senior superintendent, he was in a relatively subordinate position, and, given the urgent circumstances, it would have been difficult for him to clearly assess the legality of the orders and the martial law ordinance and refuse to comply. He also quietly allowed certain lawmakers and officials to enter. He has served in public office for a long time and has no prior criminal record.

(12) I will now pronounce the sentence. Defendant Yoon Suk Yeol is sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant Kim Yonghyun is sentenced to 30 years in prison. Defendant No Sangwon is sentenced to 18 years in prison. Defendant Jo Jiho is sentenced to 12 years in prison. Defendant Kim Bongsik is sentenced to 10 years in prison. Defendant Mok Hyuntae is sentenced to 3 years in prison. Defendants Kim Yonggun and Yoon Seungyoung are found not guilty.

Defendants, please be seated for a moment. With respect to defendant Kim Bongsik, although the court has not previously revoked his bail, given the imposition of a heavy sentence, there is no other choice but to revoke his bail as of today. As for defendant Mok Hyuntae, given the three-year prison sentence and the risk of flight, the court orders the execution of an arrest warrant. As for defendant Jo Jiho, in light of his health problems, the court will not immediately revoke his bail in this courtroom.

This concludes the sentencing.