University Student Childbirth Support Fund Increased 10 Times, 'Mujanyeose' Revival Also Considered... Severe Russian Labor Shortage [AK Radio]

Significant Increase in Childbirth Support Payments for University Students
Population Expansion as a Key Objective in the Ukraine War
Consideration of Compulsory Birth Policies, Including the Introduction of a Childless Tax

Russia has decided to significantly increase childbirth support payments for university students to address its serious low birthrate problem. On the 23rd of last month, the Russian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection announced that a draft bill submitted to the parliament includes a plan to raise the scholarship paid to female university and graduate students who give birth from the current 9,300 rubles (about 130,000 KRW) to 90,000 rubles (about 1,280,000 KRW), nearly a tenfold increase. This is interpreted as a follow-up measure to President Vladimir Putin’s strong directive in December last year during a State Council meeting to increase childbirth allowances.

This increase in support payments is unprecedented even compared to Russia’s other childbirth support policies. While existing childbirth support policies in Russia mainly targeted general households, this time the focus is specifically on university and graduate students, drawing attention. Experts interpret this as a sign that the Russian government is implementing more proactive policies to boost birthrates among the younger generation.

Russia’s birthrate was at the population replacement level of 2.0 until 1989 but has steadily declined since then, falling below 1.4 last year. Experts predict the birthrate will drop to the 1.3 range this year. This is even lower than China’s birthrate of 1.6, creating a serious sense of crisis for the Russian government. Particularly, this declining birthrate trend raises concerns as it could lead to future labor shortages and economic slowdown in Russia.

As the war in Ukraine enters its third year, Russia’s population issues are becoming even more severe. According to Russian government statistics, there is currently a shortage of over 2 million workers in jobs within Russia. The partially mobilized military personnel number between 600,000 and 700,000, and war casualties are estimated at 300,000 to 400,000. Additionally, nearly 1 million men have fled overseas to avoid conscription, causing a serious population gap. The large-scale overseas migration of young men is expected to have a significant impact on the future decline in birthrates. This situation is worrisome as it could develop into a structural problem within Russian society, beyond mere population decline.

Russian soldiers deployed on the southern front in Kherson, Ukraine, are organizing self-propelled artillery shells. Photo by TASS and Yonhap News.

Russia’s population plummeted from about 220 million during the Soviet era to around 140 million after the dissolution of the USSR. This population decline directly affects Russia’s international standing. Nationalist politicians within Russia’s ruling United Russia party argue that "Russia must at least restore the population of the former Soviet Union to maintain its status as a great power." They emphasize that to compete with the United States, which has a population in the 300 million range, or China with 1.4 billion people, Russia needs a population of at least 200 million. The gap in population size could translate into differences in military and economic power, posing a major concern for the Russian government.

This population issue is also cited as a major background factor for the war in Ukraine. Most of the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia are densely populated areas. The eastern industrial centers of Donetsk and Luhansk each have populations exceeding 4 million, and the Crimean Peninsula, home to Ukraine’s largest port cities, has a population of over 2.5 million. This shows that Russia’s population acquisition strategy is reflected in its military operations. These regions are also economically significant due to their well-established industrial infrastructure.

U.S. and Western intelligence agencies estimate that since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia has forcibly relocated between 900,000 and 1.6 million Ukrainian residents, especially women and children, to Russia. There is analysis suggesting that Russian military activities focus more on relocating residents within Russia rather than territorial expansion. This is interpreted as an attempt to reabsorb the population that was between 45 and 48 million just before Ukraine separated from Russia. The fact that a large portion of forcibly relocated residents are women and children indicates that Russia’s population policy aims for long-term population growth beyond simple territorial expansion.

Within the Russian government, there are opinions that the current incentive policies alone have limitations in solving the low birthrate problem. Some propose reviving the 'childless tax' that was implemented from 1946 to 1973. At that time, the Soviet Union imposed a 6% income tax on men aged 25 to 50 and women aged 20 to 45 who had no children, to compensate for the loss of over 20 million lives during World War II. This coercive policy was considered quite effective at the time, but there are doubts about whether such an approach would be effective in modern society.

Russian President Vladimir Putin presiding over a State Council meeting. Photo by AFP and Yonhap News.

However, experts point out that unlike the closed Soviet era, overseas migration is now free, so coercive childbirth promotion policies could actually encourage young people to emigrate abroad. They predict that ending the wartime economic system and lifting sanctions against Russia to restore the economy must precede the return of emigrated men and recovery of birthrates. Considering the changing values of the younger generation regarding childbirth and parenting, experts argue that simple financial support or coercive policies alone will not solve the problem.

Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service has expressed concerns that the birthrate will fall to the 1.3 range due to the mass emigration or deaths of men caused by the Ukraine war. The prevailing view is that policy incentives such as subsidies or priority in housing purchases alone will not be enough to stop this downward trend. Ultimately, voices are growing that resolving Russia’s low birthrate problem requires the end of the Ukraine war and economic recovery to support the stable settlement of the younger generation.

Experts emphasize that solving Russia’s low birthrate problem requires a more comprehensive approach beyond short-term financial support. This includes support for work-family balance, expansion of childcare infrastructure, and creation of jobs for young people. They also stress that resolving social instability caused by the war and presenting a positive outlook for the future through economic recovery are of utmost importance. In the end, Russia’s population issue is recognized as a challenge that requires structural changes across society, beyond simply raising the birthrate.