Invasion of Cheap Chinese Equipment... Threat to Energy Security [Domestic Offshore Wind Power Crisis]④

Inverter and Submarine Cable Vulnerabilities
Exposed to Risks of Hacking, Eavesdropping, and Data Theft

There are concerns that if the domestic offshore wind power market is penetrated by foreign, especially Chinese products, it could even compromise national security. In addition to the potential cyber security risks inherent in energy projects, there are warnings that underwater resources, facilities, and defense-related equipment could fall into Chinese hands.

According to industry sources on the 4th, the most vulnerable security components in offshore wind power are inverters and submarine cables. Therefore, the prevailing industry view is that very cautious initial market design is necessary, including measures such as domestic production of these two resources.

Jeju Tamna Offshore Wind Power Complex panorama.
Photo by Asia Economy DB

An inverter is a key device required when connecting non-traditional and renewable power sources such as offshore wind and solar power to the power grid. The problem is that inverter power sources are usually connected via networks, and if the grid network is hacked, it could lead to power incapacitation. This means that it is not an impossible scenario for a certain force to hack the network with the intent of destabilizing the grid by overloading or temporarily cutting off the power supply.

Such scenarios have already materialized overseas. In the United States, there have been repeated threats to distributed power sources, including hacking of pipeline grids. In the Netherlands, a legal inspection of nine types of solar inverters in circulation for cyber security requirements revealed that none met the standards, and some had the potential to cause interference such as blackouts.

Submarine cables are also considered resources directly linked to national defense capabilities. They are vulnerable to eavesdropping and sabotage (intentional destruction of private property or labor disputes through work slowdowns). They can be exposed to potential risks of wiretapping and information theft.

Submarine eavesdropping and tapping technologies have been commercialized since the 1980s, and the possibility that information about submarine cables vulnerable to sabotage could be leaked abroad cannot be ruled out. During the cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan, submarine cable networks connecting Taiwan’s mainland and islands were damaged, with Chinese fishing boats nearby fueling controversy. When the Finland-Estonia submarine gas pipeline and communication cables were damaged, suspicions of Russian involvement arose.

The European Union (EU) has already recommended that member states gradually phase out “high-risk operators” in the European submarine communication cable infrastructure sector. The EU Commission plans to consider introducing a joint management system for submarine communication cable infrastructure as a security enhancement measure. It also recommends excluding Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from EU communication infrastructure projects. For the same reason, the UK power grid operator National Grid has also stopped using Chinese components.

Cables must be examined even more closely because backdoor chips could be installed. Recently in the United States, there was a case where a backdoor chip was installed on a container ship to extract information for China.

Concerns also grow because the submarine cable installation process involves handling security-related matters such as underwater resources, facilities, and defense-related equipment. If foreign companies such as those from China are responsible for construction, there is a risk of security data leakage.

The wind turbine installation vessels (WTIVs) used to install cables can also be potential risk factors, as they use lasers to survey underwater terrain. Since Korea’s domestic shipbuilding environment is not yet sufficiently mature, it has chartered Chinese-made WTIVs, making this a pressing reality.

Since April, five WTIVs from China’s ZTT have been used exclusively or leased in domestic offshore waters. Although these WTIVs are used under fixed-term exclusive contracts, the possibility that sensitive information could be leaked or disseminated intact upon their return to China cannot be ruled out.