[Editorial] Questions Raised by the "Kim Juae Succession"

Asia Economy first reported on the "Kim Juae succession" on February 19. The context was explored through an interview with Cheong Seong-chang, Director of the Unification Strategy Studies at the Sejong Institute ([Soh Jongseop’s Deep Interview] Cheong Seong-chang: "It is certain that Kim Juae has been designated as successor"). At that time, Director Cheong asserted, "Kim Jong Un, learning from Kim Jong Il’s example, revealed his successor early." He emphasized that this is clear when analyzing various North Korean documents and past cases.

Ten months later, on December 6, Unification Minister Kim Young-ho confirmed this. Speaking with reporters, Minister Kim stated, "Kim Jong Un’s continued emphasis on his daughter is evidence that he is somewhat rushing to demonstrate his intention for hereditary succession. Kim Jong Un himself had a short preparation period when he inherited power after Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011. Considering these factors, I believe this early appearance is taking place."

North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong Un attended the 75th anniversary military foundation day celebration on February 8th with his daughter Kim Ju Ae, according to a report by the Korean Central News Agency on February 8, 2023.
[Image source=Yonhap News]

In reality, while so-called "North Korea experts" were reluctant to acknowledge it, signs pointing to "Kim Juae as successor" have continued to emerge. First, the Rodong Sinmun referred to Kim Juae with the honorific "Respected," a modifier previously used only for Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, and Kim Jong Suk. During military parades, when participants chanted "Defend the Baekdu bloodline with our lives," Kim Juae’s face was displayed on screen. Out of 19 public appearances by Kim Juae, 16 were related to military activities. Moreover, her protocol status has steadily risen, with scenes released showing military commanders saluting her. Two years ago, North Korea also created the new position of First Secretary at the 8th Workers’ Party Congress.

At one point, it was believed that Kim Juae was the second child and that there was an older brother, but this appears not to be the case. Director Cheong stated, "Kim Juae is the eldest, and there is a second child whose gender has not been confirmed." This reflects a shift in expert opinion. As a result, analyses claiming "Kim Juae is merely a figurehead to soften Kim Jong Un’s image" lose credibility. The fact that she is the eldest, her personality reportedly resembling Kim Jong Un, and her recent public activities all serve to increase attention on Kim Juae.

The key issue is what impact this trend will have on South Korea. Most of Kim Jong Un’s appearances with Kim Juae have been at aggressive sites such as ballistic missile test launches. This suggests that North Korea’s hardline policy toward the South is likely to continue. It is also a clear signal of North Korea’s intent to further advance its nuclear and missile development capabilities. This is why the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses’ report, stating that North Korea aims to possess 300 nuclear warheads and become a mid-level nuclear power by the late 2030s, is drawing attention. At this level, North Korea’s nuclear armament goes beyond self-defense and is tantamount to exerting strong pressure on the international community with its nuclear arsenal. There is no doubt that Pyongyang will intensify its offensive posture toward the South.

If the situation does not change, South Korea may find itself swept up in a whirlwind of debate and difficult choices within a few years. Should South Korea pursue its own nuclear armament? If not, to what extent and for how long can it rely on extended deterrence from the United States? These are pressing issues that, while not yet fully at the forefront, are clearly approaching and will inevitably be raised.

Relying solely on the United States is also a source of concern. According to a public opinion poll released by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) in October, only half (50%) of respondents supported U.S. military intervention if North Korea invaded South Korea, the lowest figure since 2015 (47%). The percentage was even lower among Republican supporters. Public opinion can change at any time, and the ruling administration cannot help but be influenced by it.

The importance of self-reliant national defense cannot be overstated. The real challenge lies in how to achieve it and in possessing sophisticated diplomatic capabilities. The question remains: Are we as clear in our objectives and as committed to self-strengthening as North Korea?