[News Terms] Urgent 'Left Side of Launch' in Power Build-up and Operational Planning

'Left of Launch' is an operational concept that neutralizes an adversary's missile before it is launched. It is a strategy that uses methods such as cyberattacks and communication network disruption before the missile launch to cause the missile to fail immediately after launch, either preventing the missile from being launched or causing it to fall in an unintended location.

When dividing missile launch into preparation → launch → ascent → descent stages, it is also called 'pre-launch disruption' because the attack is carried out at the preparation stage, which is before the 'launch' stage. Since the attack is applied to the preparation stage located to the left of the launch, it is called 'Left of Launch.' Conversely, 'Right of Launch' refers to an operational concept that includes interception after launch and subsequent retaliation and reprisal.

On the 24th of last month, Chosun Central TV reported that North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un oversaw the underwater explosion test of the "nuclear unmanned underwater attack vehicle" and the simulated airburst test of a strategic cruise missile nuclear warhead. [Photo by Chosun Central TV / Yonhap News]
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The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) disclosed part of a report from the 'North Korean Nuclear Response Research TF' on the 10th, which included a nuclear war simulation. The report analyzed that if a nuclear bomb similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, were to fall in downtown Seoul, damage to buildings and casualties would occur within a radius of 3 km. KIDA pointed out that it is urgent to establish Left of Launch capabilities and operational plans to prevent this in advance.

In March 2017, The New York Times reported that North Korea launched the Musudan missile eight times in 2016, but only one launch succeeded because the United States neutralized the missiles through cyber and electronic warfare.

A KIDA official involved in the research diagnosed, "Cyber operations can be divided into defensive and offensive operations. While the Republic of Korea Armed Forces are evaluated to have considerable capabilities in defensive operations, offensive operations were found to be lacking in 16 areas." The shortcomings were pointed out as insufficient intelligence-gathering capabilities on North Korea's closed networks, lack of access routes for penetrating closed networks, inability to identify vulnerabilities in nuclear weapon delivery systems, and deficiencies in key weapon systems for vulnerability discovery.