[Reading Science] Itaewon Tragedy, Let’s Reveal the Truth Through Scientific Analysis

Sewol Ferry Fails to Reach Scientific Conclusion Amid Political Controversy, Safety Measures Not Strengthened

On the 7th, citizens are paying tribute to the victims at the memorial space set up at Exit 1 of Itaewon Station in Yongsan-gu, Seoul. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

[Asia Economy Reporter Kim Bong-su] On October 29, 2022, another major disaster occurred in Itaewon, Seoul. It was 8 years and 6 months after the Sewol ferry disaster on April 16, 2014. Incidentally, on the 27th of last month, the Korea Federation of Science and Technology Societies held a joint forum under the theme "Sewol Ferry Sinking Disaster - Scientific Disaster Analysis." At this event, experts affiliated with the Korean Society of Naval Architects emphasized a scientific approach to cause investigation and analysis. They stated that only by objectively and accurately identifying problems and causes can measures to prevent recurrence be established and further loss of life be avoided.

In the UK, when the 173,000-ton cargo ship Derbyshire sank off the southern tip of Shikoku, Japan, in 1980, after five investigations, it was concluded that the accident was caused by the collapse of the hatch cover. This led the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) to strengthen regulations by nearly doubling the required hatch cover strength from 42 kPa to 83 kPa, which significantly reduced similar accidents.

What about the Sewol ferry disaster? There is no scientifically established conclusion, and no results have been trusted or officially recognized domestically or internationally. The Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal concluded in 2014 that the cause was insufficient stability. In 2018, the Sewol Hull Investigation Committee released two comprehensive reports each pointing to two causes: the underwater collision theory (external cause) and insufficient stability (internal cause). Recently, the Social Disaster Investigation Committee also failed to reach a clear conclusion regarding the external collision theory involving submarines or other forces. During this process, experts’ opinions were ignored.

Domestic scholars, including those from the Korean Society of Naval Architects, expressed negative views on the possibility of external collision, citing the absence of traces on the salvaged hull, but these views were not reflected. On the contrary, overseas perspectives were more rigorous. The marine accident investigation agency "Brookes Bell" pointed out in 2018 that due to modification work, the Sewol’s cargo carrying capacity decreased from 1,450 tons to 987 tons, and although it needed to maintain a minimum ballast water of 1,703 tons, it carried as much as 2,142 tons of cargo, inevitably losing stability. The Dutch ship research institute "MARIN" also cited low stability indices, rudder use, and movement of unsecured cargo as causes of the accident based on model experiments conducted this year. The 2015 report by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch reached similar conclusions.

Let’s think about it. At the time of the Sewol ferry disaster, how strong was the call for accurate cause and fact-finding and for establishing countermeasures? Although there were cold and scientific critiques from experts, we ended up with vague and disorderly diagnoses and prescriptions. Because of this, despite the sacrifice of 303 young lives in their prime, it is inevitable to question whether the shipping and maritime industries have properly strengthened safety measures after the Sewol disaster.

The Itaewon 10.29 disaster must not be overlooked in the same way. To prevent recurrence of social disasters, objective and scientific cause investigation and identification, along with thorough countermeasure preparation, are essential. Systems developed so far must be actively utilized by leveraging science and technology. In this regard, it is regrettable that the Ministry of the Interior and Safety’s common disaster safety communication network, which cost over 1.5 trillion won and was created for all ministries, has become useless. It had raised great expectations as a single device enabling police, fire, administrative, and health officials dispatched to disaster safety sites to exchange information and communicate in real time, but it was not utilized at all in this disaster.

The controversy over the demolition of Seoul City’s "Digital Mayor’s Office" is also regrettable. Last year, the city announced domestically and internationally that it had dismantled a large screen installed in the mayor’s office, which provided real-time access to the Seoul city map, 32 million administrative big data records, video information from over 1,200 CCTVs across Seoul, and COVID-19 information. We need to reconsider what connection the purpose of the Digital Mayor’s Office?using advanced ICT to monitor citizen safety in real time?had with the change of mayor.