[Reporter’s Notebook]The Big Picture Is Drawn... Military Reform Hinges on the Details

Abolition of the Defense Counterintelligence Command, establishment of the National Defense Security Intelligence Agency and the Central Security Audit Group (provisional names), abolition of the Drone Operations Command, creation of the Joint Operations Command, transition of frontline security operations to hub-based mobile response, establishment of the National Military Academy and conversion of the Army, Navy, and Air Force academies into single-discipline colleges, and codification of the right to refuse unlawful orders.

These are the recommendations presented to the Ministry of National Defense on January 22 by the "Civil-Military Joint Special Advisory Committee for Overcoming Insurrection and Designing Future National Defense." The Ministry of National Defense must implement these recommendations as institutional reforms. None of these tasks can be taken lightly. However, there are both expectations and concerns about what will happen if these recommendations are adopted as policy.

In particular, the counterintelligence and security sectors are facing the most significant changes. The Defense Counterintelligence Command, which led the 12·3 Martial Law, is set to be abolished after 60 years. Security investigation functions will be transferred to the Ministry of National Defense Investigation Headquarters. Counterintelligence information and security audit functions will be assigned to the National Defense Security Intelligence Agency and the Central Security Audit Group, respectively. It is important to note concerns about potential gaps in roles due to this functional dispersion. A sophisticated system of inter-agency cooperation must be designed to mitigate these concerns. In addition, robust internal controls must be implemented to prevent the Investigation Headquarters, which will inherit investigative functions, from becoming a "second Counterintelligence Command" and growing excessively powerful.

The recommendation to abolish the Drone Operations Command, which is related to the "Pyongyang UAV Incident," also requires careful consideration. As demonstrated in the Russia-Ukraine war, drone warfare is central to future conflicts. The abolition of the Drone Operations Command is at odds with the Ministry of National Defense's recent policy of "training 500,000 drone warriors." The proposal to establish a National Military Academy is also a subject of debate, with concerns that it could lead to an expansion of the Army Academy. There are warnings that measures intended to address the insularity of military academies could actually have the opposite effect. The concurrent proposal to relocate the integrated military academy to a provincial area continues to raise concerns about weakening the competitiveness of academy admissions.

There is also a gap between the recommendations for measures to prevent military deaths and the realities on the ground. For example, the proposal to introduce an RFID-based firearms tracking system and to expand psychiatric care has been met with skepticism from the field: "Will simply knowing the location of a firearm prevent accidents?" and "How can we go to a psychiatrist as easily as an internist when there are no doctors in the frontlines?"

These recommendations have emerged at a time when the military has lost public trust due to martial law. This is also a period marked by a rapid decline in available manpower and uncertainties in the international security environment. The direction for change has been set. However, good intentions alone do not guarantee results. It is also important to listen to public opinion and engage in thorough deliberation. Hasty reforms could further erode trust. What remains is how meticulously the military can implement these changes in detail.