[Inside Chodong] Democratic Deliberation Should Come Before 'Patchwork Legislation'

Insurrection Tribunal Act Completely Renamed
Legislation Passed as Revised Bills Amid Hasty Lawmaking Controversy

The phrase "like flipping a hotteok," commonly used to criticize hasty legislation, has never felt more relevant than it does now. The Democratic Party of Korea has overturned bills it led to the plenary session and is now processing them again as "revised bills."

It is highly unusual for a "revised bill" to be processed at the plenary session stage. This is because the bill, having already passed through the standing committee and the Legislation and Judiciary Committee's review, is being altered again at the final stage. As a result, the handling of revised bills is considered more of an "emergency measure" than a standard legislative procedure. Such measures are typically used when political agreement is reached after brinkmanship negotiations just before a plenary vote, or when there are significant changes in circumstances. For this reason, the National Assembly Act imposes strict conditions: at least 30 members (or 50 in the case of the budget bill), exceeding the 20-member threshold for negotiation groups, must agree to submit a revised bill.

This time, the bills processed as revised bills were the "Special Act on Criminal Procedures for Crimes of Insurrection, Treason, and Rebellion," commonly referred to as the Insurrection Tribunal Establishment Act, and the "Amendment to the Information and Communications Network Act" dubbed the False Information Eradication Act. In particular, the revised bill for the Insurrection Tribunal Establishment Act went far beyond amending a few clauses; it essentially created an entirely new law. Even the title of the bill was completely changed to "Special Act on the Establishment of a Dedicated Tribunal and Protection of Whistleblowers for the December 3 Yoon Suk Yeol Martial Law, etc.," with no overlapping words from the original. Key details, such as the scope of application and the procedures for forming the dedicated tribunal, also changed. From the outset, when the bill passed the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, not only the People Power Party but also the pro-government Rebuilding Korea Party, as well as the judiciary and legal circles, warned of potential unconstitutionality. In response, the Democratic Party undertook two rounds of major revisions. While this was explained as a "process of public discussion," it was far from a normal legislative procedure.

The same applies to the False Information Eradication Act. Provisions banning the distribution of false information and certain clauses on defamation by stating facts, which had been filtered out by the relevant standing committee due to concerns about infringement on freedom of expression, were revived during the Legislation and Judiciary Committee's review. The bill faced harsh criticism, with not only media organizations but even the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy calling for its withdrawal. The Legislation and Judiciary Committee could not escape criticism for overriding the review authority of the Science, ICT, Broadcasting, and Communications Committee, the relevant standing committee. Subsequently, the Democratic Party hastily prepared a revised bill under the guise of "fine-tuning." As the Legislation and Judiciary Committee amended the bill from the Science, ICT, Broadcasting, and Communications Committee, the chair of the latter formally proposed the revised bill.

Regarding this series of confusions, the Democratic Party explained that it would "continue working until the last moment to draft a better bill." However, repeatedly amending bills that should have already been finalized only highlights the initial problems with the legislation. Behind these unreasonable moves lie, first and foremost, the unilateral actions of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee and the lack of coordination by the party's parliamentary leadership. More fundamentally, underlying factors include political parties exploiting anxiety and fear following last year's martial law, a parliamentary leadership obsessed with showmanship rather than negotiation and common sense, and a political sphere fixated on legislative achievements ahead of local elections. As a result, issues that should have been resolved internally within the political sphere were not, leading to the use of emergency measures such as revised bills.

Since last winter, the people of South Korea have lived through a year of tension, anxiety, and fear amid political confusion. Even with a new government in place, the political establishment continues to rely on politics that exploit fear, rather than fostering stability and peace. When will we be able to expect politics that persuade with the language of hope?