"Not All Support Martial Law...Anti-China Sentiment Is a Bigger Factor" [Who Are the Far-Right Youth?]

② How Conservative Groups Define Far-Right Youth
"Anti-China Sentiment and Rightward Shift Deepened After COVID-19"

Editor's NoteIn 2025, there was a noticeable increase in young people participating in pro-martial law rallies that shook the Korean political landscape. While politicians have labeled them as "far-right youth," some argue this is excessive stigmatization. How did these young people end up on the streets, classified as far-right? This article explores how, in 2026, our society might embrace far-right youth.

The scene of a pro-martial law rally led by the conservative university student group Jayu University around Dongdaemun on December 6, 2025. Photo by Joo-Hyung Lim

Political circles classify most young participants in pro-martial law rallies as "far-right youth." However, even within conservative university student groups, martial law remains a highly divisive issue. A significant number of university students participating in these rallies actually oppose martial law, and there are even more young people who attend because of anti-China sentiment.

The Truth Forum CEO: "Martial Law Support and Election Fraud Theories Are Controversial Even Within the Organization"

Eungoo Kim, CEO of Truth Forum

On December 30, Eungoo Kim, CEO of Truth Forum, one of the conservative university student groups, stated, "The so-called 'far-right youth' spectrum is broad. Not all far-right youth advocate for the legalization of martial law. Even within conservative university student groups, there is a fierce debate over martial law, and opinions are far from unified." Founded in 2015, Truth Forum is the largest conservative university student group in Korea, with branches at approximately 140 universities nationwide.

Kim explained, "Within the organization, there are diverse perspectives and internal conflicts regarding the martial law situation and the election fraud theory. In particular, a significant number of students who insisted on the truth of the election fraud theory to the end have left the organization." He continued, "The prevailing sentiment within the group is not to believe the election fraud theory itself, but rather that, since many people have suspicions about election fraud, the government must resolve these doubts, and the electoral system should be improved so that such suspicions cannot arise in the first place."

The election fraud theory was first raised in 2020 by Kyungwook Min, then a member of the United Future Party, claiming that the 21st general election was unfair due to Chinese interference and should be invalidated. The lawsuit to nullify the election, filed by Min, was dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2022, but some conservative groups continue to claim the election fraud theory as fact.

Kim asserted, "In fact, most of the young people participating in pro-martial law rallies, regardless of martial law or the election fraud theory, share anti-China sentiment. Many young people are alarmed about the infiltration of the Chinese Communist Party. Whether martial law was justified will be judged by history, but there is widespread agreement that the immediate threats posed by China and North Korea must be addressed."

"Anti-China Sentiment Expands After COVID-19...The Cause of Youth Rightward Shift"

Taeyoung Kang, CEO of Underscore

Anti-China sentiment runs deep among the younger generation. According to a survey conducted by Korea Research from October 13 to 15, targeting 1,000 adults aged 18 to 79, the 2030 youth generation scored the lowest in terms of favorability toward China among all age groups. Those in their 30s scored 20.9 out of 100, the lowest, followed by those aged 18-29 at 22, those in their 40s at 26.9, those in their 50s at 33.9, and those in their 60s and 70s at 36.9. The survey had a margin of error of ±3.1 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

Taeyoung Kang, CEO of Underscore, a data analysis firm that confirmed strong anti-China sentiment among youth through recent public opinion polls, said, "After the COVID-19 crisis, anti-China sentiment spread rapidly via social networking services (SNS)," and judged that this contributed to the rightward shift among young people. He explained, "According to various polls, the proportion of far-right voters who strongly support martial law is only about 5% at most."

Kang added, "When we use artificial intelligence (AI) to extract racially discriminatory comments from portal sites and filter by target country, anti-China hate is the most prevalent. In Japan, so-called anti-Korean websites surged as the Korean economy began to grow, and similarly, in Korea, anti-China sentiment has expanded since China's economic development accelerated."

He argued that anti-China sentiment, combined with backlash against the now-established progressive forces, has intensified the rightward shift among young people. Kang analyzed, "Fifteen years ago, many young people participated in the mad cow disease protests due to resentment toward the then-conservative government, but now, with the progressive government as the establishment, the backlash has shifted in the opposite direction. Among young people who grew up in Gangnam, there is a strong tendency to support the conservative bloc out of opposition to the current administration."

However, he pointed out that it is difficult to label all those exhibiting a rightward shift based on anti-China sentiment as far-right. Kang said, "To discuss youth far-rightism in Korea, there would need to be a situation where a party with actual far-right agendas becomes the leading party. In that sense, one could argue that Europe is experiencing a far-right shift, but such a phenomenon has not yet occurred in Korea. It is accurate to say that young people are shifting to the right, but we should be cautious about describing it as a far-right movement."