[War & Business] The 'Alliance Modernization' Challenge Posed by Trump

Alliance Modernization Demanded of NATO and Japan
Unreasonable Demands Must Be Rejected

On the 25th of last month (local time), at the US-ROK summit held in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington DC, President Lee Jae Myung (left) and US President Donald Trump (right) shook hands. Photo by Yonhap News

One of the main topics at the US-ROK summit was "alliance modernization" between South Korea and the United States. While the term itself suggests updating the alliance system to fit current circumstances, in reality, it encompasses far more complex issues. For the United States' allies, the word "modernization" often functions as pressure to update everything from treaty systems to overall defense postures in line with American standards.

The Donald Trump administration has consistently demanded this modernization not only from South Korea, but also from other US allies such as Japan and European countries. The tasks involved can largely be divided into military buildup and changes in defense strategy. Accordingly, all NATO member states, as well as South Korea, have been tasked with raising their defense budgets to about 5% of their respective GDPs.

The modernization of national defense strategies varies by region. In Europe, for example, the US military presence in Germany, which had already been reduced by 11,900 troops in 2020 to around 35,000, is under consideration for further reduction, with a significant portion of those troops potentially being redeployed forward to Poland. In Japan, there are ongoing organizational reforms to consolidate the US Forces Japan Command with the US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, with the aim of strengthening deterrence against war in the Taiwan Strait.

For South Korea, the United States' key ally in Northeast Asia, even more complex and challenging tasks are expected. The immediate issue at hand is the "strategic flexibility" of US Forces Korea, which is already a formidable challenge. This refers to measures that would allow US Forces Korea, which has so far been dedicated to the defense of the Korean Peninsula under the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, to be more broadly deployed in Indo-Pacific regional conflicts. If the South Korean government accepts this, the current 28,500-strong US Forces Korea could be significantly reduced, depending on regional security conditions and US needs, much like the US forces in Germany.

However, it appears that the Trump administration's demands will not stop there. Along with the flexibility of US Forces Korea, South Korea is expected to be asked to participate more actively in efforts to strengthen deterrence against China. The "Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance" released by the United States in March states, "US allies in the Indo-Pacific region must have the capability to defend against or deter Chinese threats in their respective areas," and emphasizes that "allies must strengthen their own defensive measures under the assumption that China may attempt a military takeover of Taiwan in the future."

In line with this strategy, South Korea is already being asked to join the Quad, a military consultative body aimed at containing China, which includes the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. For South Korea, which must consider its economic and security relationship with China, joining the Quad is by no means an easy choice. Participation would immediately increase military tensions in South Korea depending on changes in US-China and China-Taiwan relations, and could also result in sustained economic damage.

South Korea’s security strategy, which has so far been focused on homeland defense, will inevitably require a major overhaul. The strategy of focusing on North Korea's military provocations near the Demilitarized Zone is fundamentally different from one aimed at countering China’s maritime provocations throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Substantially more budget will be needed to expand intelligence-gathering areas, build multiple military satellites, and establish human intelligence networks, as well as to procure advanced weapons and conduct training to expand fleet operational range and blue-water capabilities. This would require an enormous budget, far exceeding any increase in South Korea’s share of defense costs with the United States. Even if the defense budget, currently about 2.3% of GDP, were more than doubled, it would still be a daunting task.

No matter how strong the pressure from the United States, South Korea cannot take on tasks it simply cannot fulfill. All aspects of the national interest-including the economy, defense budget, and foreign relations-must be considered, and any excessive demands should be rejected. Since the United States has not yet presented any concrete alliance modernization plans before or after this summit, South Korea must proactively distinguish between what it can and cannot do, and firmly refuse to take on what is not feasible.