[Insight & Opinion] Absurd Theory of 'Far-Right Radicalization Among the 2030 Generation'

Cho Kuk, head of the Institute for Innovation Policy, who resumed his activities after receiving a special pardon, has once again sparked controversy-this time by proposing the theory of "far-right radicalization among people in their 20s and 30s." As rebuttals and criticism intensified, he doubled down, insisting that a segment of the 20s and 30s generation has indeed become radicalized to the far right. By that logic, any generation could have a segment that leans far right. The claim that only a portion of the 20s and 30s generation is radicalized is, in fact, a self-contradiction that undermines his own argument by attributing it specifically to the characteristics of that generation. Above all, the political identity of the 20s and 30s generation should be seen as a free generation not subsumed by Korea's factional political structure. The far-right radicalization theory does not correspond to the facts and is an unethical framing tactic that seeks to turn criticism into a counterattack.

In Europe and other regions, far-right groups are defined by strong tribal exclusivism and a willingness to resort to violent actions. In South Korea, there is no meaningful political force that fits this definition of the far right. Instead, political camps have become increasingly dogmatic, almost like pseudo-religious groups, defining themselves as 'good' and their opponents as 'evil.' This extreme, exclusionary factional politics has become more pronounced recently. Among these groups, hardliners could be classified as extremists on both the left and right.

Cho Kuk did not systematically explain the phenomenon of far-right radicalization. Instead, he remarked, "Who can say that the 2030 generation cheering for Yoon Suk Yeol in front of Acro Vista and chanting 'Yoon Again' is not far-right radicalized?" He appeared to be referring to supporters of Yoon Suk Yeol and those who endorse election fraud theories. People from various generations are likely included in this group, but the active participation of some in their 20s and 30s may have been more noticeable. However, Cho Kuk's theory of far-right radicalization among the 20s and 30s generation was essentially a counterattack against their anger directed at him.

The far-right radicalization theory arose in response to a question about how to interpret the phenomenon of young people's criticism being more vocal than that of other generations. He said, "I have continued to apologize, but apologizing again will not ease the minds of the 2030 generation," adding, "I believe my role is to offer a vision and policy proposals for the pain and anger the 2030 generation is experiencing." It is characteristic of Cho Kuk to extend this to the claim that structural inequality has led to the rightward shift of this generation. When called upon to apologize and take responsibility for his actions, he instead talks about policy alternatives.

He also stated, "Although the 'Cho Kuk incident' of 2019 was resolved legally and politically, it seems the 20s and 30s generation think differently." In reality, it was not legally resolved; rather, it was confirmed as a criminal act under the law. Therefore, he should be talking about responsibility. Politically, it was not a resolution but a special pardon, which the majority of the public views as a privilege. Even within the ruling bloc, there are many who point out that he should not act as if he were a released independence activist.

As various surveys have confirmed, within the current factional political structure, people in their 40s and 50s overwhelmingly support the progressive camp, while those in their late 60s and older strongly support the conservative camp. The 20s and 30s generation is relatively free from factional politics. According to integrated results from major polling agencies including Korea Research during the presidential election season last May, 38.7% of those in their 20s identified as unaffiliated, and 42.1% as centrists. Among those in their 30s, the proportions were slightly lower but still higher than other generations, with 26.4% unaffiliated and 35.8% centrists. These objective facts should have been taken into account. Of course, errors such as claiming that the 20-member negotiation group standard during the First Republic was a product of the Yushin regime, or introducing Rousseau's "The Social Contract," which criticized representative democracy itself, as a classic advocating "vote wisely," are also spread indiscriminately in the context of fandom politics.

The political consciousness of the 20s and 30s generation is not about far-right radicalization; rather, as democratic citizens not subsumed by factional politics, they represent a hopeful asset. To ignore this asset and disparage them with the far-right radicalization theory is a confession of exclusionary factional politics and nothing more than an immoral counterattack backed by fandom politics.

Kim Manheum, former Director of the National Assembly Research Service