"Enough to Buy Six Years of Food: North Korea's Annual Profit from Additional Troop Deployment to Russia Reaches 28 Trillion Won, Deepening Dependence on Russia [AK Radio]"

Dispatch and Arms Support Amounts to 70% of GDP
Decline in Trade with China, Significant Weakening of Chinese Control

There is an analysis suggesting that North Korea is expected to earn a massive profit of up to 28 trillion won through additional troop deployments to Russia. This amount is equivalent to about 70% of North Korea's annual gross domestic product (GDP) of 40 trillion won, signaling a fundamental transformation in the structure of the North Korean economy.

North Korea has doubled the scale of its troop deployment to Russia from the existing 15,000 to 30,000 personnel. It is estimated that this alone will generate an additional annual profit of 1.4 trillion won. When adding the earnings from dispatching workers for postwar reconstruction in the Kursk region of Russia, as well as profits from selling conventional artillery shells and cannons, the total is analyzed to reach 28 trillion won. This is enough for North Korea to purchase six years' worth of food. The funds, which have been lacking and have hindered nuclear and missile development and luxury imports for the elite, are now likely to expand significantly.

What is particularly noteworthy is the contrast with North Korea's previous major sources of foreign currency. Until now, North Korea had relied on international crimes such as hacking overseas cryptocurrency exchanges, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling to procure foreign currency. However, these profits involved significant risks due to the need for transactions with black markets or international criminal organizations during the cashing-out process. In contrast, the current troop deployment and arms exports to Russia are being conducted under an official mutual assistance treaty with the Russian government, making them a stable source of income. The Russian government, for its part, is able to secure military strength at a much lower cost than conscripting its own citizens, so there have been no delays or postponements in payments.

There are also significant changes in North Korea's external economic dependency structure. Until now, the North Korean economy has been absolutely dependent on China. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, annual North Korea-China trade volume was 33 trillion won, accounting for most of North Korea's GDP. However, after the onset of COVID-19, North Korea-China trade has continuously declined, dropping to just over 20 trillion won last year.

It is analyzed that even within North Korea, there is a growing perception that economic dependence on China is excessive, leading to the imposition of restrictions on trade with China. Furthermore, the recent deterioration in relations with China and the reduction in Chinese economic aid due to China's economic downturn have combined to rapidly increase North Korea's trade dependence on Russia. Previously, trade with Russia was less than one-thirtieth of trade with China, but troop deployments and arms exports have led to explosive growth in trade with Russia.

On June 29, North Korea's Korean Central TV broadcast scenes of North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia as the background screen during an artist's performance. Photo by Yonhap News

However, the current expansion of trade with Russia is due to the special circumstance of the Ukraine war. Excluding troop deployments and arms exports, there are not many items that North Korea and Russia can trade. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the current level of trade will continue after the war ends. This is because both North Korea and Russia sell raw materials to China and import manufactured goods from China, which limits the items available for trade between the two countries. As a result, after the end of the Ukraine war, it will be difficult for Russia to replace China as North Korea's number one trading partner.

Nevertheless, North Korea's recent increased economic dependence on Russia is becoming a significant burden for China. Until now, China has played a key role in Korean Peninsula issues based on its absolute influence over North Korea. However, as North Korea and Russia grow closer, China's ability to control and influence North Korea is gradually weakening, deepening China's concerns.

Despite this, China has not openly objected to the current close relationship between North Korea and Russia. In the delicate situation among the three countries, deteriorating relations with either North Korea or Russia could further isolate China internationally. In particular, as the current confrontation with the United States and the West intensifies, the solidarity among North Korea, China, and Russia is more important than ever, making it difficult for China to intervene excessively in North Korea-Russia relations. There are also concerns that if China interferes in North Korea-Russia relations, North Korea may lean even more toward Russia or further reduce trade with China.

Additionally, the new variable of the activation of the Arctic shipping route is complicating China's calculations. Due to global warming, it is expected that the Arctic route will be navigable year-round starting next year, increasing the likelihood of a new direct route connecting Russia, China, and Europe. In this case, the route connecting China, South Korea, and Russia's Primorsky Krai will become extremely important, and North Korea is located in between. There is analysis that China's silence is also influenced by concerns that excessive intervention in North Korea-Russia relations could prompt North Korea to disrupt plans for the Arctic route.

The deepening of North Korea's dependence on Russia is also bringing fundamental changes to the security landscape of Northeast Asia. Until now, issues on the Korean Peninsula have revolved around the two major powers, the United States and China. Although Russia shares a border with North Korea, it has mostly left North Korean affairs to China. However, since the Ukraine war, Russia has emerged as a new key player in Northeast Asian affairs, reshaping the existing power dynamics. Russia now has significant influence in Northeast Asian issues through its close ties with North Korea.

On the 23rd, the North Korean People's Army combined unit conducting a shooting training exercise. Photo by Yonhap News

This is increasing the strategic burden on the United States. Previously, the United States only had to manage the Russian threat in Eastern Europe, but now it must also prepare for the possibility of military provocations by the North Korea-Russia alliance in Northeast Asia. The burden of managing two fronts simultaneously has grown substantially. New variables have also emerged for the new North Korea policies and dialogue efforts being pursued by South Korea and the United States. While the Trump administration has expressed its intention to engage in dialogue with North Korea, and the South Korean government is actively preparing new North Korea policies, they now have to take Russia as a new variable into account.

In particular, as future US-China trade negotiations unfold, China may use negotiations with North Korea as leverage, making Russia's role a new key factor. The complexity of the situation has increased significantly, shifting from a US-China-centered structure to a triangular structure that includes Russia.

Improvements in North Korea's economic conditions and closer military ties with Russia pose a direct threat to South Korea's security. The 28 trillion won in revenue is expected to provide significant momentum for North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. In particular, the perception that North Korea has secured a reliable patron in Russia is likely to influence Chairman Kim Jong Un's strategic calculations. Previously, economic pressure from China's checks and international sanctions limited North Korea's provocations, but now, with Russian support, North Korea is in a position to pursue even more aggressive policies.

The accumulation of real combat experience by the North Korean military is also a factor that cannot be overlooked. Experience on the Ukrainian front could lead to improvements in the North Korean military's combat capabilities, and the possibility of advanced weapons technology transfer from Russia cannot be ruled out. There are also concerns that North Korea, having effectively shifted to a wartime economy, will become even more belligerent. With troop deployments and arms exports now becoming core national industries, a state of ongoing tension has become economically advantageous for North Korea.

These changes require a fundamental reassessment of South Korea's security strategy. It is now necessary to establish a new strategy that encompasses not only North Korea-China relations but also North Korea-Russia relations. As the complexity of the Northeast Asian situation increases significantly, South Korea's strategic response capabilities must be further strengthened.