[The Editors' Verdict] The First Chapter of the "K-Quarantine" Black Book of the Moon Administration

President Lee Jaemyung appears poised to be the first to peel back the packaging of "K-Quarantine," which was heavily commercialized by the Moon Jaein administration during the COVID-19 pandemic. This refers to the issue of handling the so-called "loan bomb" for small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employed individuals, which has been repeatedly postponed through extensions and repayment deferrals and is set to expire at the end of September. During his presidential campaign, President Lee stated in a televised debate that "substantial debt forgiveness, not just simple debt restructuring, is necessary." The discussion of establishing a bad bank to purchase and dispose of non-performing loans has begun to accelerate behind the scenes as this concept takes shape. President Lee also remarked that "while other countries took on national debt to shoulder the damage caused by COVID-19, Korea responded by providing loans, which only ended up increasing the people's debt." This comment drew as much attention as the proposed method of debt forgiveness itself, as it essentially implies that a specific policy of the previous government, which he helped bring about, was wrong.

When a large-scale infectious disease like COVID-19 breaks out, the state must consider how actively it will transfer the burden of the damage to the economy. The Moon Jaein administration chose to transfer this burden to the economy in a particularly forceful way. This is, in essence, the core of K-Quarantine, which operated through two main mechanisms. One was to strictly control people's movements using IT infrastructure and state power, sometimes in a rather forceful manner. The other, as President Lee mentioned, was to completely shut down businesses and say, "We will arrange loans for you, so just borrow and try to hold out as long as you can." Those who were already struggling and were then pushed to the front lines of crisis response pleaded for more imaginative solutions?such as minimizing lockdowns as much as possible, reducing rent burdens, or injecting more active fiscal support?but these appeals were largely ignored.

The liquidity feast triggered by a disaster situation is temporary, and the subsequent contraction that follows is predictable. Therefore, it was not difficult to foresee that the hastily implemented loans would eventually return as a ticking time bomb. Nevertheless, it seems the government at the time was able to push this policy forward because of the prevailing fear among the public. In the end, however, we all came to realize at some point that we would have to live with COVID-19, and a society that once panicked at the news of just a dozen confirmed cases in a region became desensitized even to reports of hundreds or thousands of cases. It is not hard to find people who survived on COVID-19 loans but have now given up on repaying their debts. Those who had already exhausted their security deposits and become exposed to bad credit have little left to lose. While some raise concerns about fairness for those who faithfully repaid their loans, hesitating because of this would mean the economic shock our country would have to endure would be too great. Realistically, it is difficult to imagine any other way to resolve the issue in an orderly manner.

It is not fair to claim that the quarantine policies at the time were entirely wrong. However, it is clear that the complex and precarious bills resulting from those policies have now begun to arrive. In retrospect, we never had a real opportunity to reflect on or review the COVID-19 quarantine policies. The issue of imminent loan maturities is just one example. The experience of the state shouting at people to turn themselves in for violating quarantine rules?or threatening to come and arrest them if they did not comply?was an experience of sanctioned violence that twisted daily life and completely changed the trajectories of individuals' lives, yet these issues have been too easily forgotten. Many countries that are as affluent or sophisticated as ours did not go to such extremes, and it was not due to a lack of IT capabilities. In some societies, there was a line that "should not be crossed," but we crossed it without hesitation, and the government focused on branding and promoting K-Quarantine, leaving behind those who suffered as a result. Therefore, the debt forgiveness measures the current administration is attempting can be seen as, in effect, the first "black book" of K-Quarantine.