Supreme Court Overturns Lee Jaemyung Election Law Acquittal, Orders Retrial with Guilty Instructions [Full Supreme Court Ruling]

On the 1st, the Supreme Court overturned the second-instance verdict in the case of Lee Jaemyung, the Democratic Party presidential candidate, who was charged with violating the Public Official Election Act, and remanded the case with instructions to find him guilty. This decision came nine days after the case was referred to the full bench with all justices participating, and 36 days after the not-guilty verdict in the second trial.

Chief Justice Choi Heedai and other Supreme Court justices entered the Supreme Court in Seocho-gu, Seoul, on the afternoon of the 1st to deliver the verdict on the appeal trial of Lee Jae-myung, the Democratic Party presidential candidate, regarding the violation of the Public Official Election Act. 2025.05.01 Photo by Joint Press Corps

The following is the full text of the verdict delivered by Chief Justice Choi Heedai on this day.

I will now pronounce the verdict. 2025Do4697, Violation of the Public Official Election Act, Defendant: Lee Jaemyung, Appellant: Prosecutor. Before the sentencing, I would like to address the composition of the court. Supreme Court Justice Noh Taeak, who concurrently serves as the Chairperson of the National Election Commission, recused himself from this case. Accordingly, Justice Noh Taeak did not participate in the deliberation or the rendering of the verdict in this case.

I will now summarize the reasons. This case concerns the violation of the Public Official Election Act by the defendant, who ran as the Democratic Party candidate in the 20th presidential election, through the dissemination of false information. The prosecutor indicted the defendant under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act for statements related to Kim Moonki and Baekhyeon-dong.

The court of first instance found the defendant guilty for the “golf statement” related to Kim Moonki and for the Baekhyeon-dong statement, but not guilty for the remaining statements regarding Kim Moonki. Both the defendant and the prosecutor appealed. During the second trial, the prosecutor partially amended the indictment, but the appellate court acquitted the defendant of all charges.

Since the prosecutor appealed the second-instance verdict, the Supreme Court must review the grounds for the prosecutor’s appeal. The main issue in this case is whether the defendant’s statements about Kim Moonki and Baekhyeon-dong constitute the crime of disseminating false information under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act.

Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act stipulates that anyone who, with the intent to be elected, disseminates false information about the candidate’s conduct or other matters through speeches, broadcasts, or other means to benefit the candidate shall be punished. Here, “false information” refers to matters that do not correspond to the truth and are sufficiently specific to mislead voters’ accurate judgment of the candidate.

Whether a statement constitutes the dissemination of false information should be judged based on the overall impression it gives voters, considering the objective content and overall context of the expression, the ordinary meaning of the words used, and the way the phrases are connected.

I will now examine each charge against the defendant in turn.

First, regarding the statements about Kim Moonki, excluding the “golf statement.” The appellate court found these statements to be merely about the defendant’s awareness, not about conduct, or not to have independent significance, or not to be false, and thus acquitted the defendant. This judgment of the appellate court is acceptable. Next, I will address the “golf statement” related to Kim Moonki.

Around the time the defendant was nominated as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, suspicions of preferential treatment in the Daejang-dong urban development project spread, and the relationship between the defendant and Kim Moonki, the official in charge, became an issue. During this period, allegations arose that the defendant had traveled overseas with Kim Moonki and others, taken photos, and played golf with Kim Moonki during the trip.

In response, the defendant appeared on a broadcast program and stated that, while he may have seen Kim Moonki during the overseas trip, he did not remember him because he was a lower-level staff member. The defendant also addressed the golf allegation, stating: “The People Power Party released a photo of four people, as if I played golf, but when I checked, they had cropped part of our group photo and showed it that way. It was fabricated.”

In the appellate court, the prosecutor amended the indictment to clarify that the charge regarding the golf statement was not about whether the defendant knew Kim Moonki, but rather about the dissemination of false information regarding the act of playing golf together. Considering that the golf outing with Kim Moonki, which included four people such as Yoo Dongkyu, was a lengthy social interaction, it constitutes an independent and significant fact that could influence voters’ judgment about the relationship between the defendant and Kim Moonki. It cannot be regarded as merely a subsidiary argument about awareness.

The appellate court misunderstood the calculation of the charges and misapplied the law. The golf statement, in its content and structure, the words used, and the overall context, gives the impression that only a cropped part of a group photo was shown to make it appear as if the defendant played golf. It is interpreted as meaning that the photo was manipulated to make it look like the defendant played golf. The golf outing with Kim Moonki occurred during an overseas trip, and the defendant admitted to traveling overseas with Kim Moonki.

Given the defendant’s statement that he did not know Kim Moonki because he was a lower-level staff member, ordinary voters would naturally interpret the golf statement as meaning that, while the defendant traveled overseas with Kim Moonki, he did not play golf with him during the trip. However, since it is a fact that the defendant played golf with Kim Moonki during the overseas trip, this golf statement constitutes the dissemination of false information regarding the act of playing golf together.

Lastly, I will address the Baekhyeon-dong statement. Around the time the defendant was nominated as the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, suspicions were raised in political circles and the media that the defendant, while serving as mayor of Seongnam, had given preferential treatment to private developers in the Baekhyeon-dong development project.

The day before the Baekhyeon-dong statement, during a National Assembly inspection of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, the Seoul mayor raised suspicions that, after a private developer purchased the Baekhyeon-dong land, which was classified as green space, the land use was upgraded in four stages to quasi-residential, resulting in huge profits for the developer. In response, the defendant, during a National Assembly inspection of Gyeonggi Province the following day, made a prepared statement to address the suspicions about preferential land use upgrades for the Baekhyeon-dong site.

The Baekhyeon-dong statement was made in response to a question that naturally followed from the previous day’s panel presented by the Seoul mayor, which referred to a four-stage land use upgrade for the Baekhyeon-dong site, and a similar panel presented during the Gyeonggi inspection, to which a sticker reading “fabrication” was attached. The defendant then explained the overall suspicions about the Baekhyeon-dong development project, and the question was whether the four-stage land use upgrade for the Baekhyeon-dong site was a preferential treatment granted by the defendant. The defendant’s statement was a single response naturally connected to this question.

Therefore, the meaning of the entire connected statement should be interpreted based on the overall impression it gives to ordinary voters. The suspicions raised against the defendant and the panels presented by the questioners all related to the land use upgrade of the Baekhyeon-dong site. The interest of ordinary voters encountering the Baekhyeon-dong statement was also focused on the Baekhyeon-dong site. Thus, the defendant’s response should be interpreted as a statement related to the land use upgrade of the Baekhyeon-dong site.

The defendant’s Baekhyeon-dong statement consists of two points. First, the statement that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) pressured for the land use change by invoking the mandatory provision of Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act. Second, the statement that MOLIT threatened to accuse the defendant of dereliction of duty if he did not comply with this provision.

These statements are not vague or abstract expressions about being pressured or threatened by MOLIT. Instead, the defendant specifically cited the mandatory provision of Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act, presented a panel showing this provision, and made a statement including a specific fact. This constitutes the dissemination of a fact, not merely an exaggerated expression or an opinion.

Regarding the statement about being pressured by the mandatory provision, the land use upgrade was initiated by the City of Seongnam based on its own judgment, and at no stage did MOLIT pressure Seongnam by invoking the mandatory provision.

Seongnam first sent an official inquiry to MOLIT, asking whether the previous cooperation request from MOLIT was based on Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act, and whether, despite conflicting with the higher-level plan, the land use could be changed to residential as requested by the Food Research Institute.

MOLIT clearly responded in an official letter that the previous cooperation request had nothing to do with Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act, and that the land use change was a matter for Seongnam to decide. MOLIT’s position did not change thereafter. Nevertheless, the defendant made a statement that clearly contradicts these facts.

Regarding the statement about being threatened with accusations of dereliction of duty, there was no fact that MOLIT threatened Seongnam with such accusations in relation to the land use upgrade. Nevertheless, the defendant made such a false statement.

The defendant’s Baekhyeon-dong statements were sufficient to give voters the false impression that MOLIT pressured Seongnam, where the defendant was mayor, by invoking Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act, and, when that failed, threatened accusations of dereliction of duty, leaving the defendant with no choice but to approve the land use upgrade. These statements about pressure from the mandatory provision and threats of dereliction of duty are specific and central enough to independently influence voters’ judgment in the election.

The essence of democracy lies in the free expression of opinions and active debate on matters of public concern. Therefore, in the process of realizing democracy through elections, political expression must be fully protected as long as it does not undermine the fairness of the election. However, the degree of protection for political expression may vary depending on the subject and target of the expression.

When a candidate for public office disseminates false information about themselves to the public, the same level and meaning of freedom of expression as that allowed for ordinary citizens expressing opinions or beliefs about public figures or matters of public concern cannot be permitted.

The punishment of the crime of disseminating false information under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act must be understood in this context.

The crime of disseminating false information under Article 250, Paragraph 2 of the Public Official Election Act serves not only to protect the candidate’s political expression, but also to ensure that the sovereign people can form their political will based on correct information and express their will as sovereigns through elections without blemish.

When determining whether a candidate’s statement constitutes the dissemination of false information, care must be taken not to unduly restrict political expression, especially expressions of opinion or belief, while also considering the constitutional rights of voters, such as the right to know and the right to vote, which must be faithfully protected through fair elections.

The meaning of an expression should be interpreted from the voter’s perspective, not that of the candidate or the court. The extent to which false information can be tolerated under the name of freedom of expression depends on the degree to which the false information affects the fair judgment of voters. This is the result of such considerations.

In this case, the “golf statement” about Kim Moonki and the statements about Baekhyeon-dong are deemed to be false statements about matters significant enough to mislead voters’ accurate judgment regarding the defendant’s qualification for public office. Therefore, they cannot be tolerated under the name of the candidate’s freedom of expression.

Based on this judgment, I will now address the conclusion of this case. The statements about Kim Moonki, excluding the “golf statement,” do not constitute the crime of disseminating false information under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act. The “golf statement” is interpreted as meaning that the defendant did not play golf with Kim Moonki during the overseas trip, and this constitutes the dissemination of false information about the candidate’s conduct. The appellate court’s acquittal of the “golf statement” was based on a misunderstanding of the law under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act, which affected the verdict.

The Baekhyeon-dong statement is interpreted as meaning that the defendant was pressured by MOLIT to change the land use designation based on Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act, and, in the process, was even threatened with accusations of dereliction of duty, leaving him no choice but to approve the land use upgrade. This constitutes the dissemination of false information about the candidate’s conduct.

The appellate court disregarded the specific statements about pressure from the mandatory provision of Article 43, Paragraph 6 of the Innovation City Act and threats of dereliction of duty, and instead distorted the meaning of the Baekhyeon-dong statement by interpreting it solely as a legal demand by MOLIT, leading to an acquittal based on this premise.

This judgment was based on a misunderstanding of the law under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act, which affected the verdict. Consequently, it is the majority opinion of the Supreme Court that the “golf statement” about Kim Moonki and the statements about Baekhyeon-dong constitute the crime of disseminating false information under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act. Regarding this majority opinion, there are dissenting opinions from Justices Lee Heunggu and Oh Kyungmi, as well as concurring and dissenting opinions from Justices Seo Kyunghwan, Shin Sookhee, Park Youngjae, Lee Sukyeon, and Ma Yongjoo, and a supplementary dissent from Justice Lee Heunggu.

The main points of the dissenting opinion are as follows. The dissenting justices cannot agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the majority that the “golf statement” about Kim Moonki and the Baekhyeon-dong statements constitute dissemination of false information under Article 250, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act. The reasons are as follows. The majority’s method of interpreting the meaning and falsity of the “golf statement” and the Baekhyeon-dong statement does not conform to the precedents or even to the new legal principles presented by the majority.

Rather, if the meaning of the “golf statement” and the Baekhyeon-dong statement is interpreted in accordance with the precedents and the new legal principles, they could be understood differently from the majority’s interpretation. If the meaning and falsity of the two statements are determined based on the laws cited by the majority, there is insufficient evidence to prove that either statement constitutes the dissemination of false information, and thus the defendant should be acquitted.

The Supreme Court has consistently declared laws that limit and narrow the scope of the crime of disseminating false information under the Public Official Election Act, in order to maximize the protection of political expression and promote the development of democratic constitutional order.

If the Supreme Court were to reverse this direction and adopt an interpretation that broadens the scope of the crime of disseminating false information, it would be a regressive idea that could undermine the development of democracy by restricting freedom of political expression and open debate, and by wielding the sword of regulation.

In particular, if this interpretive approach is combined with the prosecutor’s discretionary power to indict, it could pose a serious risk to democratic politics and the political neutrality of the courts. Widening the path for investigative agencies and the judiciary to intervene in the electoral process through the application of the crime of disseminating false information under the guise of ensuring fair elections would not only undermine freedom of expression and electoral freedom, but also introduce risks to the political neutrality of the courts.

By bringing mutual disputes between political groups, which should be resolved in the political arena, into the courtroom for judicial judgment, this approach invites criticism of the politicization of the judiciary. The attitude of the precedents, which have expanded freedom of political expression, serves as a safeguard for the political neutrality of the courts and must be respected.

First, regarding the “golf statement” about Kim Moonki. The “golf statement” ultimately concerns the speaker’s memory of conduct or interactions that occurred six or seven years ago, and, given the possibility that the photo released by the People Power Party was manipulated, there is ample room for alternative interpretations. Interpreting the statement solely in line with the prosecution’s case, while disregarding other reasonable interpretations, fails to sufficiently consider the constitutional significance and importance of freedom of political expression and freedom of electioneering, and also violates the principle of legality and the basic criminal law principle of favoring the defendant in cases of doubt.

Next, regarding the Baekhyeon-dong statement. The Baekhyeon-dong statement, taken as a whole, constitutes an expression of opinion, and even if there are minor inaccuracies or somewhat exaggerated expressions in the details, it cannot be regarded as a false statement. MOLIT did, in fact, make several requests to Seongnam for land use changes based on the mandatory provision and other legal grounds, and such actions by MOLIT were part of the policy coordination process between the central and local governments. It is clear that this process influenced Seongnam’s ultimate decision to change the land use designation. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the reference to the mandatory provision as the cause of the land use change was false.

The Baekhyeon-dong statement was made in the context of the defendant, as the head of a local government, being politically attacked for implementing policies to strengthen public interest. The statement was made in the process of emphasizing the rationality and legitimacy of the policies he pursued or defending himself. Taken as a whole, the defendant’s explanation in the National Assembly about the background and merits of past policies, and his emphasis that the ultimate cause of the land use change lay in MOLIT’s demands, constitute an expression of opinion. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a factual assertion constituting the crime of disseminating false information.

Accordingly, the dissenting opinion is that the “golf statement” about Kim Moonki and the Baekhyeon-dong statements cannot be punished as the crime of disseminating false information.

This concludes the explanation of the reasoning. I will now read the order. In accordance with the majority opinion, the judgment is as follows.

The appellate court’s judgment is overturned, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

This concludes today’s sentencing.