[Defense Brief] The Foundation of National Security Lies in Soldiers

The United States was caught off guard and suffered a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. It was a shameful defeat. The same goes for us. At 4 a.m. on June 25, 1950, we were unaware of North Korea’s surprise attack and lost Seoul within three days. Modern militaries emphasize vigilance in their military doctrines. Failure in vigilance can lead to a situation where resistance against the enemy is impossible and total annihilation may occur. How about our military? Recently, the military decided to apply artificial intelligence (AI) video analysis functions to the General Outpost (GOP) scientific surveillance system. The newly developed scientific surveillance system is said to be the first to introduce AI video analysis, thermal imaging, and short-wavelength infrared functions.

The military’s effort to improve the GOP scientific surveillance system stems from consecutive failures in surveillance operations. In 2012, the 22nd Division experienced the ‘Knock Defection’ incident. The Knock Defection refers to an event in October 2012 when a North Korean soldier crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and knocked on the window of our GOP barracks to express his intention to defect, which is considered a representative case of surveillance operation failure.

Following this incident, the military introduced the scientific surveillance system in 2016. The GOP scientific surveillance system is designed to reinforce day and night surveillance duties in the GOP area, which is the frontline observation post along the armistice line. It consists of radar, surveillance cameras, TOD (thermal observation devices), and fiber optic sensors. Fiber optic sensors are installed along the barbed wire fence, and mid-range and short-range cameras are placed at intervals of several hundred meters. The military promoted this system as enabling “impeccable vigilance.” During the 2018 military agreement, the Ministry of National Defense argued that the presence of GOPs equipped with triple barbed wire fences and scientific surveillance systems along the southern boundary line of the DMZ would minimize the impact of GP withdrawal on surveillance operations.

However, the system was breached again. In November 2020, a North Korean man who crossed the barbed wire fence on the eastern front line of Gangwon Province was captured 14 hours later. The military had detected the man wandering in the northern side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) a day earlier but failed to prevent him from crossing the GOP fence located 2 km south on our side. The detection sensor that should have sounded an alarm when the man crossed the barbed wire was completely ‘out of order.’ There was controversy over the fact that the man’s custody was secured only 14 hours after crossing the fence.

The military once again reinforced the GOP scientific surveillance system. This time, they installed a video analysis server equipped with intelligent detection software. They also added a system capable of surveillance during adverse weather conditions such as fog and sea mist, aiming to overcome surveillance vulnerabilities. However, it was insufficient. In January 2021, a North Korean man who had crossed north a year earlier re-entered North Korea through a drainage channel under the fence.

Ultimately, no matter how advanced the equipment is, there is no surveillance method as reliable as humans. In this regard, the recent early morning drinking incident involving soldiers of the Army Missile Strategy Command only caused public anxiety. It was a typical example of military discipline collapse. The Missile Strategy Command is considered a core unit possessing the Mass Punishment Retaliation (KMPR) means, one of the ‘Korean-style 3-axis’ systems. This unit was visited by Defense Minister Shin Won-sik on the 8th of last month to inspect readiness, less than a month before the incident.

Within the military, there are complaints that “every time the command changes, the leadership is more concerned with terminology and slogans than establishing discipline among soldiers.” The leadership must not forget that in the face of severe security situations, readiness based on basics and principles is more important than slogans. It is a time when more substantial measures are urgently needed.