Supreme Court: "First Instance Fact-Finding Should Not Be Overturned Without Reasonable Grounds"

[Asia Economy Reporter Choi Seok-jin, Legal Affairs Specialist] The Supreme Court has ruled that in a criminal appeal trial, even if no new testimony or evidence emerges, there must be reasonable circumstances that make it difficult to maintain the first trial's factual findings in order to overturn them.

According to the legal community on the 13th, the Supreme Court's Second Division (Presiding Justice Cheon Dae-yeop) overturned the original ruling that sentenced defendant A to four months in prison in the appeal trial for violating the Narcotics Control Act (psychotropic substances) and remanded the case to the Seoul Central District Court.

The court stated, "The original ruling contains errors that violated the principles of evidence-based judgment, trial-centeredness, and direct examination, which affected the judgment," as the reason for the reversal and remand.

Defendant A was prosecuted on charges of injecting approximately 0.05g of methamphetamine diluted with bottled water into the right arm of his girlfriend B using a disposable syringe at his home in Gangnam-gu, Seoul, on March 30, 2020.

A had previously been convicted for methamphetamine use at the same location on March 29, 2020, the day before the incident. It was confirmed that B was present at A's home on the day of the offense, and methamphetamine tested positive along with B's DNA was detected on pieces of disposable syringes seized from A's home.

Throughout the investigation and trial, A consistently denied the charges, stating, "I do not know if B injected methamphetamine herself, but I never injected methamphetamine into B's arm."

The issue centered on the testimony of girlfriend B.

B, who was arrested alongside A on methamphetamine use charges, initially denied using methamphetamine during police questioning. However, after her DNA was found on the seized syringe and methamphetamine was detected in her hair analysis, she reversed her statement, claiming that A had injected methamphetamine into her.

She also submitted a handwritten letter of remorse to the investigative agency, stating, "I regret not firmly and resolutely refusing," and received a conditional suspension of prosecution with education.

However, after making statements about A's criminal acts, submitting the letter of remorse, receiving the conditional suspension, and completing the related education, B reversed her testimony again in court.

At trial, B testified as a witness for A, stating, "A did not inject methamphetamine into me, and I do not clearly remember the day of the incident. The statements I made to the investigative agency are not true."

The first trial court found B's testimony, which changed twice, to be unreliable and acquitted A.

The court pointed out, "B's testimony lacks consistency and is difficult to believe on its own, and it cannot be completely ruled out that she made false statements to avoid criminal responsibility."

Although methamphetamine was detected throughout the 12cm length of B's hair from the root, considering that hair grows about 1cm per month on average, it is reasonably inferred that B used methamphetamine before or after the incident. Despite this, B denied any methamphetamine use, which influenced the court's judgment.

However, the second trial overturned the first trial's acquittal. The appellate court overturned the first trial's not guilty verdict and sentenced A to four months in prison, along with a fine of 100,000 won.

The appellate court accepted the prosecutor's appeal reason that "considering the evidence, it can be recognized that A injected methamphetamine into B, and the original ruling's acquittal constitutes a factual error."

The court stated, "Although B testified as a witness in the first trial that she did not remember the day of the incident and denied methamphetamine use, this testimony contradicts her admission of the crime, conditional suspension of prosecution with education, and completion of the education process. Considering the circumstances of her recantation, it is difficult to accept the recantation as reasonable. Therefore, it can be recognized that the defendant (A) used methamphetamine on B as stated in the indictment."

The fact that B visited A several times and provided money while A was detained, maintaining their romantic relationship, also supported this judgment.

However, the Supreme Court overturned this second trial ruling again.

The court, citing Supreme Court precedents, stated, "Under the current Criminal Procedure Act, the appeal trial is based on a de novo review but also contains significant elements of a post-review. Therefore, when the appeal court reviews the first trial's judgment, it must consider the characteristics of this hierarchical structure."

It continued, "Therefore, if no new objective reasons that could influence the formation of conviction emerge during the appeal trial, and the appeal court seeks to re-evaluate and overturn the first trial's judgment post-review, there must be reasonable circumstances that make it clearly unfair to maintain the first trial's evidence value assessment or that the reasoning leading to the factual findings violates logic or experience. Without such exceptional circumstances, the appeal court should not lightly overturn the first trial's factual findings."

The court added, "Especially for evidence supporting the indictment, if the first trial, having directly observed the witness's demeanor and attitude during testimony, judged the witness's credibility to be lacking, the appeal court can only overturn this judgment and recognize the credibility if there are sufficient and convincing exceptional circumstances that make the first trial's rejection of credibility unacceptable."

It further stated, "This aligns with the spirit of trial-centeredness, which requires that the conviction or acquittal in criminal cases be formed through court proceedings, and the substantial direct examination principle, which holds that only evidence directly examined before the judge should form the basis of the judgment."

The court found that ▲ the appellate court relied mainly on B's confession made during the investigation to support A's indictment, but the only supporting evidence was a copy of a statement ▲ the statement copy was a hearsay document recording B's testimony, not the defendant's, and lacked B's signature or seal as required by Article 313 of the Criminal Procedure Act, thus lacking evidentiary power ▲ the circumstances cited by the appellate court were all based on evidence already examined in the first trial and not newly revealed during the appellate trial, so they could not be considered special circumstances to overturn the first trial's judgment ▲ A's consistent statements and attitude, and the absence of A's DNA on the seized syringe pieces used as the crime tool, provided no objective or reasonable grounds to conclude that A used them, and therefore the appellate court's reversal of the first trial's factual findings was erroneous.

Ultimately, the court concluded, "The remaining evidence submitted by the prosecution does not overwhelmingly prove that the defendant injected methamphetamine into B to the extent that it can be recognized as true beyond reasonable doubt, and suspicious circumstances in the evidence relationship have not been definitively eliminated. Therefore, the indictment cannot be recognized as guilty."