[Defense Commentary] Where Did China's Rapidly Growing Military Power Come From?

[Professor Kim Hoseong, Department of Business Administration, Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon] On the 2nd, China strongly opposed the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to Taiwan. As a result, the flight route of the delegation from Malaysia to Taiwan had to detour through Indonesian and Philippine airspace instead of crossing the South China Sea. In preparation for any contingency, the U.S. had to prepare various military options, including deploying the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group to the eastern waters of Taiwan.

In response to U.S. military movements, China mobilized all of its aircraft carrier forces, the Liaoning and Shandong, around Taiwan. Additionally, it was reported that 21 fighter jets entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Pelosi’s visit to Asia triggered a military standoff between the U.S. and China on the brink of conflict. Hong Kong’s Ming Pao even assessed that “the U.S. and China are facing the greatest crisis since the Korean War.” This strong response from China raises a question: since when has China’s military shown such confidence against the U.S. military? In fact, the current state of China’s military power is the result of rapid development since the early 21st century, about 20 years ago. The confidence in China’s current defense capabilities is the fruit of a relatively short but intensive period of ‘defense innovation.’

At the beginning of the 21st century, China’s defense capabilities were poor compared to the U.S. In the 2000 annual report submitted by the U.S. Department of Defense to Congress, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was described as “large in size but remaining at the level of a conventional army.” The report evaluated that the PLA faced serious organizational obstacles that, if unresolved, could hinder its maturation into a world-class military. In conclusion, the military at that time was unsuitable for the long-term ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party. There seemed to be no part intact?whether troop structure, combat capability, conventional missiles, intelligence and cyber capabilities, or space capabilities. The defense industry also faced technical limitations in transitioning from outdated weapons to high-quality weapon systems. A bigger problem was the lack of organization and capability necessary to effectively operate modern weapons, even if they could be produced or acquired.

Entering the 21st century, China has invested in and reformed the modernization of the PLA to address various security goals beyond the continuous emphasis on Taiwan contingencies. It has sought to modernize across all domains of warfare?land, air, sea, space, counter-space, electronic warfare, and cyber operations. As a result, in several areas of military modernization, including naval vessels, ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems, China has already reached parity with or even surpassed the U.S. At the end of 2015, President Xi Jinping announced substantial military structural reforms. The reforms were designed to create a leaner and more lethal military capable of conducting joint operations against the U.S. as a competitor.

The focus of the reforms was to clarify command responsibilities and integrate the services for joint operations to facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime. Currently, China continues to prioritize modernizing its ability to command complex joint operations in both near and far battlefields, recognizing the importance of joint operations, intelligence integration, and rapid decision-making in modern warfare. In addition, it emphasizes interoperability and integration between the regular forces, paramilitary, militias, and the military, while also modernizing and diversifying its nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless, China’s most recent 2019 Defense White Paper states that China is engaged in a long-term military-technical competition with the U.S. and that the PLA still lags behind the world’s top militaries.

The White Paper notes that the PLA must invest more in military modernization to meet national demands. Given this trend, China’s investment in defense capabilities is expected to continue. As of 2020, China’s defense budget has maintained its position as the world’s second-largest military spender after the U.S., with over 20 years of continuous increases. Compared to the past decade, it has nearly doubled. Based on economic data and growth forecasts, China appears capable of supporting sustained growth in defense spending for the next five to ten years.

China’s defense industry has also undergone significant changes over the past 20 years, transforming its foundation. The core of defense industry reform was to establish an innovative defense industrial base capable of providing cutting-edge technology to meet future military requirements. Since the mid-2010s, China’s defense industry has enjoyed record sales and profits in history. The land, space, electronic, and aviation sectors were the most profitable, while the shipbuilding industry faced difficulties due to a severe global shipbuilding downturn. Today, the defense industry has shifted from an industry that chronic losses characterized during the central planning era to one that is highly profitable, aligned with internal military modernization and the global arms buildup atmosphere. It is now embarking on the next phase to join the ranks of the world’s top defense industrial powers. The expansion of the defense industrial base is positive even amid China’s economic growth slowdown. The high level of defense budget increases supports this assertion.

What should be considered the source of China’s rapid defense innovation? I would emphasize the importance of ‘strategic goals’ and ‘leadership.’ China has key milestones in building its defense capabilities. President Xi has symbolically highlighted the ‘100th anniversary of the Communist Party’ in 2021 and the ‘100th anniversary of the founding of the nation’ in 2049. He presented a broad military modernization plan linked to these two important centennial milestones to achieve national rejuvenation. To bridge the long interval between these two anniversaries, President Xi added a provisional goal for 2035. The current military strength is the result of efforts driven by the 2021 milestone. According to the goals, by the end of 2020, the PLA’s mechanization and informatization military objectives were nearly completed. Going forward, the goal is to ‘basically complete’ military modernization by 2035 and to ‘transform into a world-class military’ by 2049.

Chinese leaders emphasize that strengthening the PLA into a world-class military by the end of 2049 is an essential element of the strategy to rejuvenate China as a ‘modern socialist great power.’ Additionally, in 2020, they added the 2027 milestone of ‘intelligentization.’ This goal supplements the objective of broadly completing mechanization and making significant progress toward informatization by the end of 2020. Intelligentization is defined as the expanded use of artificial intelligence and advanced technologies at all levels of warfare and likely involves technological developments such as AI and machine learning. The 2019 Defense White Paper also suggested that the era of intelligent warfare has arrived alongside preparations for informatized warfare. If these developments are realized, China will have more reliable military options in various military activities, including contingencies with Taiwan. Along with the PLA’s ‘strategic goals,’ President Xi’s active ‘leadership support’ has been key in breaking down bureaucratic barriers long present in defense and the defense industry and promoting reforms.

Interest in China’s military power has been hotter than ever recently. This was also felt at the NATO summit held in Madrid, Spain, at the end of June this year. Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor, said, “The new strategic concept to be adopted at the NATO summit will mention the threat posed by China in an unprecedented way.” The ‘strategic goals’ and ‘leadership’ that are the sources of China’s rapid rise to global military prominence provide significant insights and implications for our country’s defense capability development.

In closing, I reflected on what was the core source that enabled the late Chairman Lee Kun-hee to make Samsung a world-class company. The same principle?an appropriate combination of ‘strategic goals’ and Chairman Lee’s ‘leadership’?was likely the key. In fact, Chairman Lee’s leadership emphasized the strategic goal of ‘quality assurance’ for Samsung to become a global leader. The 1995 burning ceremony of 150,000 mobile phones (worth 50 billion won) at the Gumi plant, held by Chairman Lee, is a representative example showing Samsung’s ‘strategic goals’ and his ‘leadership.’