[The Editors' Verdict] Police Reform: More Haste, Less Speed

[Asia Economy Choi Seok-jin, Legal Affairs Specialist Reporter] Until recently, the country was embroiled in the issue of ‘Geomsu Wanbak’ (Complete Removal of Prosecutorial Investigation Authority), but now it is in turmoil over the police control measures, so-called ‘Gyeongsu Wanbak’.

The Police System Improvement Advisory Committee recently recommended establishing a Police Bureau within the Ministry of the Interior and Safety and enacting Police Chief command regulations through Ministry ordinances. The recommendation also included a plan to create a system allowing the Minister of the Interior and Safety to intervene in police personnel, disciplinary actions, and inspections.

Watching Minister Lee Sang-min of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety directly briefing on police system improvement measures brought to mind the scene three years ago when then Minister of Justice Cho Kuk briefed on prosecutorial reform plans. It looked very plausible, and it felt as if corrupt power institutions would be reorganized to lead the realization of justice, but the outcome was not so.

The reason the prosecutorial reform pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration and the Democratic Party of Korea failed is clear. Although the stated purpose was ‘prosecutorial reform,’ the actual goal was ‘neutralizing the prosecution’ or even ‘abolishing the prosecution,’ so various illegal and unreasonable means were used during the process of changing the system. During the launch of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials, the initial agreement was ignored and the law was hastily amended to nullify the opposition party’s veto power. In the final stages, when passing the amended Prosecutors’ Office Act and Criminal Procedure Act containing the ‘Geomsu Wanbak’ provisions, procedural rules set by the National Assembly Act were ignored, and a loophole was exploited by forcing affiliated lawmakers to leave their parties.

Above all, the decisive factor was that neither the president nor the ministers maintained neutrality in personnel matters. Prosecutors who investigated the living power were invariably demoted to sidelined positions, while prosecutors who covered up investigations into personnel from the Moon administration’s Blue House or the case involving former Minister Choo Mi-ae’s son, who became a suspect, were promoted to chief prosecutors or high prosecutors and advanced rapidly. Prosecutors who led disciplinary actions or investigations related to President Yoon Seok-youl, who was then Prosecutor General, were also top candidates for promotion. The promotion of Prosecutor Jeong Jin-ung, who assaulted Minister of Justice Han Dong-hoon during a search and seizure, to deputy chief prosecutor instead of disciplining him, is the epitome of biased personnel decisions. Instead of ability or qualifications as a prosecutor, which should be the primary criteria for personnel decisions, blind loyalty to power or regional and academic ties with power holders became the standards for advancement. The ultimate goal of prosecutorial reform was to secure political neutrality and independence of the prosecution, but the starting point was flawed.

The result of hastily pushing through institutional reforms with impure motives was disastrous. The police, who received the investigation authority taken from the prosecution, struggled to handle the overflowing cases in a timely manner, and both the prosecution and police showed extremely passive attitudes toward politically sensitive investigations. The Corruption Investigation Office, which was launched with public expectations for fearless investigations into power, hid the summons of our side’s chief prosecutor, who was a suspect, by using the director’s official car on a holiday, and disappointed the public by focusing investigations on the opposition party’s presidential candidate ahead of the presidential election.

It is true that, ahead of the implementation of the Geomsu Wanbak law in September, measures to control the bloated police power are necessary. However, there are considerable concerns about the police reform measures currently being pursued by the Yoon Seok-youl administration. Historically, police systems have developed to keep maximum distance from political power based on historical reflection, but there are even talks that this is a return to a past police state. There are also criticisms that administrative legislation such as Ministry ordinances could start a politics of enforcement decrees that nullify the Police Act enacted by the National Assembly.

They say “more haste, less speed.” It is hoped that the mistakes of the previous administration will not be repeated through rushed, push-through reforms.