[Opinion] What Is the Purpose of Economic Support for North Korea?

Lee Yong-jun, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador for North Korean Nuclear Issues

As North Korea's economic difficulties worsen day by day, the government’s final desperate efforts to provide economic aid to North Korea continue. However, with all aid to North Korea rendered illegal under the UN Security Council resolutions aimed at denuclearization, no legal exit strategy is in sight.

Since the Kim Young-sam administration began food aid to North Korea in 1995 until the UN sanctions banned aid in 2017, the South Korean government carried out various support projects for over 20 years. The amount paid to North Korea in remittances and in-kind aid until 2017 exceeded 10 billion dollars (approximately 11.46 trillion won).

South Korea’s remittances and in-kind support to North Korea peaked at 6.82 billion dollars during the 10 years of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. Had North Korea been willing, that money could have been used to start economic development along the lines of China or Vietnam, potentially becoming a turning point for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

However, paradoxically, the situation on the peninsula deteriorated most intensively during that period. With pockets full, North Korea manufactured and deployed 600 Scud missiles and 200 Nodong missiles aimed at South Korea. The development of long-range missiles, which cost at least hundreds of millions of dollars, and the first nuclear test also took place during that time. Two naval clashes at Yeonpyeong, triggered by North Korea’s preemptive attacks, also occurred then. That was North Korea’s response to our economic support.

During the period of division, the West German government also provided substantial economic aid to East Germany. In 1971, amid the height of the Cold War between East and West blocs, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt began economic aid to East Germany despite criticism of “giving away to East Germany.”

However, unlike South Korea, the West German government applied strict reciprocity to its aid to East Germany. Following the principle that “there is no unconditional aid,” specific conditions were set for each East-West economic cooperation project, such as allowing East Germans to listen to West German broadcasts, expanding East Germans’ visits to West Germany, improving human rights and judicial systems, and permitting political prisoners to emigrate abroad. The implementation of these conditions was strictly linked to the provision of aid.

West Germany supported East Germany with about 5 billion marks (2 billion dollars) over 19 years, mainly investing in social overhead capital (SOC), until German reunification in 1990. In return, East Germany implemented significant reforms and openings. Until reunification, over one million East Germans and over one million West Germans visited each other’s regions annually, and about 250,000 East Germans were permitted by the government to migrate to West Germany.

Due to West Germany’s persistent demands, all East Germans could freely listen to West German broadcasts, and the number of East German political prisoners and their families bought out by the West German government reached 33,755. This reciprocal exchange and cooperation by West Germany transformed the East German system and became an indispensable foundation for the 1990 reunification of East and West Germany.

Since the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration, various initiatives have been pursued with the aim of bold economic aid to North Korea, including calls for easing UN sanctions, construction of railroads and roads, power support, food aid, fertilizer aid, and resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourism. Although these are the strongest non-military negotiation tools available to us, none of these proposals have ever been conditioned on positive changes from North Korea such as denuclearization, reform and opening, repatriation of POWs and abductees, human rights improvements, or cessation of hostile acts against the South.

Concerns that unconditional support would accelerate North Korea’s nuclear and military buildup and worsen peace on the Korean Peninsula were completely ignored. Although all these attempts were thwarted by the firm barriers of UN sanctions and the US secondary boycott, the government must clearly explain to the public what exactly it is so obsessed with in providing aid to North Korea.