[Professor Hwang Jaeho's Diplomatic Odyssey] Former Minister Jongseok Lee: "North Korea Policy Should Achieve Results Step by Step"

[Asia Economy, Reporter Yoo Inho]

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

5. Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, Known for "Seeking Truth from Facts"

Interview/Professor Hwang Jaeho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

- Professor Hwang Jaeho of the Division of International Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies serves as a member of the Presidential Policy Planning Committee and as Director of the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, is one of the leading authorities in North Korean studies, both academically and from a policy perspective, with direct experience handling North Korea-related issues. He has consistently been at the forefront of dramatic historical events involving inter-Korean relations and the international dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

He was a strong supporter of the Sunshine Policy under the Kim Dae-jung administration and served as a special aide to President Kim Dae-jung during the 2000 inter-Korean summit. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, he served as Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council in 2003 and as Minister of Unification in 2006.

We met with him to discuss solutions for the Korean Peninsula policy, including North Korea, as well as the United States, China, and Japan.

Jongseok Lee (left), Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at the Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-Depending on one's perspective, inter-Korean relations over the past four years could still be seen as a system competition or as a soft landing toward peaceful unification. Personally, I see it as a process of finding both domestic and international points of convergence for the advancement of peace and prosperity in inter-Korean relations. I think it would be good to start by discussing the achievements of the current administration's North Korea policy over the past four years.

▲It is not easy to evaluate the merits and faults of a government. In particular, it is relatively easier to assess when the government is making successful progress, but it becomes more difficult when problems arise and challenges are faced.

Nevertheless, if I were to evaluate the achievements of the current administration's North Korea policy, I would say that the initial approach to North Korea and the policy framework were excellent. In the process, although implementation was a prerequisite, the administration achieved several remarkable inter-Korean agreements, which deserves high praise.

However, it is very regrettable that these agreements did not lead to tangible results through implementation, and thus have not produced outcomes significant enough to advance history.

As you know, there were three inter-Korean summits, and during two of them, agreements of historical significance were reached.

In addition, our government played a crucial mediating role in the North Korea-U.S. summits. Through these achievements, we could have made significant contributions to consolidating peace on the Korean Peninsula, but ultimately, shortcomings led to what can be considered a failure, which is deeply disappointing.

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-If there is one thing the current administration absolutely should have accomplished, what would it be?

▲If I had to choose just one, it would be related to Article 5 of the Pyongyang Joint Declaration on September 19, 2018. Article 5 of the Joint Declaration addresses North Korea's nuclear issue and contains agreements between the two Koreas on resolving this matter.

Specifically, North Korea agreed to dismantle the Dongchang-ri engine test site first, and if the United States took corresponding measures, to permanently dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facilities through a phased process involving expert inspections.

This was a very important agreement in terms of inter-Korean relations and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Our government’s achievement in obtaining this agreement from Secretary General Kim Jong Un of the Workers’ Party was significant, but for it to have real meaning, it was essential to persuade the United States and make progress on the North Korean nuclear issue.

I believe our government was confident that, based on Article 5, it could persuade President Trump and the United States.

However, the result was a failure. All of North Korea's nuclear facilities and related technologies originate from Yongbyon.

Despite agreeing to dismantle these facilities, the United States maintained a passive stance. Perhaps, from President Trump's perspective, the Article 5 agreement was seen as an achievement between Secretary General Kim and President Moon, rather than something attributable to himself.

Given President Trump's tendency to claim all achievements as his own, he perceived the September 19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration on North Korea’s nuclear program as a gift from Secretary General Kim to President Moon. As a result, he downplayed this crucial agreement, and ultimately, the Korean government failed to persuade the U.S. administration.

In retrospect, if Secretary General Kim had presented the contents of Article 5 of the September 19 Joint Declaration directly to President Trump, there might have been a greater chance of success. I believe Article 5 of this Joint Declaration was a turning point that shaped the current state of inter-Korean relations and the Korean Peninsula.

Jongseok Lee (left), Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at the Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-Is the current administration still in the "driver's seat" regarding the Korean Peninsula? Should our goal be not to become a glamorous Formula One driver like Michael Schumacher in the spotlight, but rather to ensure safe driving like a local bus driver? Perhaps navigation or another supporting role would also be appropriate.

▲The term "driver of the Korean Peninsula" is a symbolic expression. Rather than focusing on such labels, I believe we must always approach Korean Peninsula issues with a sense of ownership and make proactive and creative efforts, regardless of the situation.

The Korean Peninsula issue is a matter of destiny directly tied to our survival. In this sense, "driver" is too simplistic a term.

Depending on the situation, even someone in the passenger seat can actively intervene and make decisions, and sometimes play a more important role than the driver. Ultimately, we need to approach Korean Peninsula issues with a leading and proactive attitude.

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-In a previous interview, you said that even among the North Korea policies of previous administrations, there are aspects that must be maintained. What are some of those aspects?

▲The most important thing is to maintain consistency, as much as possible, on matters that have been agreed upon between the two Koreas or passed by the National Assembly. Inter-Korean agreements, in a sense, are equivalent to international agreements between states.

I always feel that we must distinguish between the government and the administration. Administrations are finite, but the government of the Republic of Korea is infinite. Administrations have partisan characteristics, but they also possess continuity as successors to the Korean government.

Therefore, it is necessary to maintain continuity in policies promised externally by previous administrations. Of course, situations may arise where this is not possible, but in such cases, it is important to explain why and seek understanding from the other party to avoid losing trust.

I say this based on my experience. When I was in government, there was a nuclear material incident. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) conducted uranium enrichment experiments, which were discovered during the mandatory International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections under the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

Of course, the Roh administration had not been informed of this in advance. The IAEA, led by the United States, also demanded disclosure of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) site from the Chun Doo-hwan regime in the 1980s.

The Chun Doo-hwan administration was suspected of plutonium experiments. At that time, the Roh administration was already struggling with North Korea's nuclear issue, and the emergence of these incidents raised concerns that South Korea might be perceived as a "rogue state" conducting nuclear tests.

During this time, the government faced criticism from the media and suspicion from the international community. I realized that claiming, "This happened under a previous administration, so it’s not the current administration’s fault," was pointless. What matters is that the government must take responsibility and resolve the issue.

Through this experience, I learned firsthand that administrations are finite, but the government is infinite. I came to believe that policy makers must work with this mindset.

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-What makes it difficult for previous administrations to maintain consistency in North Korea policy?

▲There have always been periods of upheaval in the process of South Korea's North Korea policy, making it very difficult to maintain consistency.

South Korea's North Korea policy depends not only on the orientation of our own government but also on the affinity or dissonance with the then-ruling U.S. administration.

Looking back, problems and conflicts in South Korea’s North Korea policy often occurred when a progressive or conservative administration in South Korea and a Republican or Democratic administration in the U.S. did not align in their orientations.

Relatively speaking, the U.S. Democratic Party tends to listen to its allies. While the Democratic Party also takes a hardline stance on North Korea, when the South Korean government is progressive, there are often cases where persuasion leads to coordinated North Korea policies between South Korea and the U.S.

During these periods, the possibility of peace increased. Historically, the period when both a progressive administration in South Korea and a Democratic administration in the U.S. were in power was from 1998 to 2000.

During this time, there were achievements such as the Perry Process, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, and Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok’s visit to the White House. With the Democratic Biden administration now in power in the U.S., there is ideological alignment with the Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea.

Structurally, I believe that while there may be some ups and downs in inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations this year, there is a possibility that the situation will move toward easing tensions.

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-With about one year remaining in their terms, can President Moon Jae-in and President Biden achieve results similar to those from 1998-2000?

▲There is one key difference between then and now. In 1998, it was the first year of the Kim Dae-jung administration, and there was ample time for policy exchange with the Clinton administration.

However, the Moon Jae-in administration is now in its final phase, so it is difficult to predict how much policy exchange and what results can be achieved with the Biden administration.

Nevertheless, considering the orientations of the Moon and Biden administrations, I think the likelihood of a certain degree of stability on the Korean Peninsula will increase for the time being.

-Should we understand the Moon-Biden relationship as requiring a realistic approach focused on peacekeeping, rather than the dramatic changes seen during the Moon-Trump era?

▲It is unlikely that a "big deal" approach will emerge in North Korea-U.S. relations as it did under the Trump administration.

Currently, to stabilize the conflict situation and potential sources of dispute on the Korean Peninsula, various steps are needed. The Moon and Biden administrations are expected to make efforts to address these issues one by one.

In a way, while the Trump administration's North Korea policy aimed for a single, hard-to-achieve "big deal," the Biden administration’s approach is likely to be a gradual, step-by-step diplomatic process that can yield incremental results.

-North Korea claims to be a "strong and prosperous nation," but personally, I interpret it as a "strong-willed regime," a state that prioritizes regime survival above all else. What is North Korea’s Achilles’ heel? Despite the worst internal and external survival conditions, the regime’s durability remains considerable. Why is that?

▲Until now, we have focused on North Korea's belligerent and provocative aspects, especially its nuclear tests and security issues.

As a result, we have overlooked other changes in North Korea’s economic and production sectors. Many people wonder how North Korea manages to survive under such extreme economic sanctions.

Secretary General Kim has a much stronger tendency than Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong Il to establish his legitimacy by realizing the motto of a "prosperous North Korea."

Against this backdrop, North Korea's system has shifted from a military-first policy to an all-out focus on economic development. This means the national priority for resource allocation has been completely reversed.

Secretary General Kim set the goal of building a so-called prosperous North Korea and recognized that competition is the key element for economic development, utilizing competition as a main driver for North Korea’s economic growth.

To achieve this, North Korea abolished the alternative business system, which was essentially a Leninist command economy, and adopted the socialist enterprise responsibility management system, reflecting this in both the constitution and the party rules.

Thanks to this strategic shift and reform policies, internal productivity has increased, providing the foundation for North Korea’s economy to be maintained even under intense sanctions.

On the other hand, North Korea’s Achilles’ heel would be intensifying regime change or internal political conflict. As long as such internal conflicts do not escalate, North Korea will be able to maintain at least the minimum momentum to survive, even if not achieve rapid economic development, despite strong sanctions.

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-South Korea's national power is nearly 50 times that of North Korea. Yet, we still seem unable to escape the defensive competitive mindset of the 1970s. There is a peculiar dual psychology in our stance toward North Korea.

▲From my perspective, current inter-Korean relations are facing a significant paradox. Since division, South Korea has miraculously developed democracy amid inter-Korean confrontation, reaching a globally impressive level.

The development of democracy means the advancement of pluralism, which increases inclusiveness toward those who are different. The economic gap between South and North Korea is now enormous.

Logically, given this background, it would be reasonable for our hostility toward North Korea to have eased. However, despite South Korea’s high level of democratization and the growing gap between the two Koreas, our tolerance toward North Korea has actually decreased.

This paradox is a challenge we must address going forward. Unlike in the past, South and North Korea now have significant disparities in politics, economy, society, culture, and daily life. There is a growing generation in our society that does not see North Korea as part of the same nation, but rather as "the South" (from the North’s perspective).

The notion of North and South as hostile brothers in one family has faded significantly. In this context, the perception of two separate states has expanded, and trust in North Korea continues to decline due to the regime’s long-standing dictatorship.

As a result, interest in national identity is decreasing in our society, and political conflict over North Korea policy is intensifying, making it even more difficult to establish a system for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

-The foundation of the current administration’s North Korea policy is, as the name "Korean Peninsula Peace Process" suggests, focused on peace. The focus has shifted from distant unification to achieving peace in the near term. Should the next administration emphasize peace or unification?

▲During the Park Geun-hye administration, the so-called "unification jackpot" theory was promoted, prioritizing unification.

In contrast, the Roh Moo-hyun administration pursued a policy of peace and prosperity rather than unification. President Roh believed that overcoming the current hostile conflict and achieving peaceful coexistence between North and South should come first, and thus placed greater emphasis on peace on the Korean Peninsula.

President Moon Jae-in, like President Roh, also values peace and has pursued policies accordingly. Regardless of which administration comes next, if it is similar in orientation to the Moon administration, the emphasis on peace will likely become even stronger.

-If the next administration emphasizes unification, will inter-Korean relations change significantly?

▲While unification can be emphasized as a discourse, I believe it is realistically difficult to pursue direct unification policies.

When discussing forms of unification, the traditional approach of a single system, ideology, or political structure is virtually impossible in the mid- to short-term. As I mentioned, with the concept of national identity becoming ambiguous and the gap between North and South growing, unification as a nation-state has already become a distant prospect.

Of course, if North and South could resolve their hostile relationship and convert the armistice into a peace treaty, enabling free exchanges, then pursuing unification in the form of a confederation would make sense.

However, unification as a single state or federation will be impossible for a considerable period. This was made clear at the June 15, 2000 inter-Korean summit.

Jongseok Lee (left), Senior Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at the Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

At that time, President Kim Dae-jung spoke about the practical difficulties of federal unification, and Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed, stating that while moving toward a low-level federation might be possible, actual federal unification was not feasible.

In other words, North Korea has long since set unification as a long-term, rather than an immediate, task. Realistically, it will be difficult for North and South to pursue unification as an immediate agenda item going forward.

-International relations scholars often argue that North Korea experts lack objectivity, while North Korea experts believe the same of international relations scholars. You have served as both Minister of Unification and Standing Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC). Did you experience any academic or policy gaps between the two fields?

▲Compared to my life as an academic, my time as a public servant responsible for policy in the Korean government was more dynamic and filled with daily tension.

There is a clear difference between the lives of academics and government officials, and gaps may arise between the two. However, I was fortunate that my knowledge was positively utilized in my policy work.

While working in government, the knowledge and insights I had accumulated as a scholar were very helpful, and my experience at the Ministry of Unification and the National Security Council also had a positive impact when I returned to academia.

In particular, while writing "Peace on the Edge," I realized something important. Although my time for research and study diminished while working in government, making it difficult to achieve major academic accomplishments, my perspective on phenomena and objects, as well as my judgment and analytical skills, improved compared to before.

I believe these aspects help me offer new perspectives and insights to the next generation.

Jongseok Lee, Senior Research Fellow at Sejong Institute, is being interviewed on the 6th at Sejong Institute in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province. Photo by Jinhyung Kang

-How would you define yourself in one word?

▲The word I value most and consider most important in my life is "seeking truth from facts."

The attitude of seeking truth based on facts was the most important principle for me, both during my years of study and research and during my time in government.

Therefore, I would be most pleased if people recognized me as someone who pursues a life grounded in this principle.

◆Jongseok Lee

Former Minister Lee served as Deputy Secretary-General of the Blue House National Security Council (NSC) for three years, and as Minister of Unification from February to December 2006, during the final year of the Roh Moo-hyun administration. He first worked with President Moon Jae-in in 2003, when Moon was Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs and Lee was NSC Deputy Secretary-General. His publications include "The North Korea-China Border: History and Reality" (2017) and "Peace on the Edge: A Memoir of Unification, Diplomacy, and Security during the Roh Moo-hyun Era" (2014).

Compiled by Yoo Inho

Transcription by Shin Eui-chan, Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation