[The Editors' Verdict] Proportional Response Strategy: North Korea's True Intentions

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification

North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong-un mentioned the determination for a "March of Hardship." This was addressed in front of about 10,000 cell secretaries, who are the core of the party's grassroots organizations. He called for an extraordinary resolve comparable to the anti-Japanese armed struggle and food shortages. Starting with the 8th Party Congress early this year, followed by training sessions for city and county party secretaries and the Party Cell Secretaries Conference, Chairman Kim has been focusing on tightening control over the party's mid-to-lower level cadres. This is essentially about building endurance for a long-term confrontation with the United States. This strategic code is also reflected in the lineup of those accompanying General Secretary Kim during his visit to the Day of the Sun. They included Jo Yong-won, the party secretary in charge of organization who oversees party-centered governance, organizational maintenance, and discipline enforcement; Pak Jong-chon, the Chief of the General Staff responsible for major construction projects in the military; and Kim Yo-jong, the deputy director who acts as the "mouthpiece" for inter-Korean and US relations. This can be read as a symbolic move anticipating a prolonged current situation.

Building internal endurance also aligns with the strategy toward the US. It is a "proportional response strategy." This involves "tit for tat," responding in kind to what the opponent does, following the principle of "strong against strong, good against good." To ensure proportional responses to the opponent's actions, endurance and the display of rapid response cards are necessary. An example is the cruise and short-range missile launches at the end of March. These were responses to the joint South Korea-US military exercises that had been requested to be suspended and to the US's remarks on North Korean human rights.

So why declare such a strategy? From a game theory perspective, this "proportional response strategy" is useful for managing the situation. It allows one to easily make the opponent recognize their strategy. By presenting a simple logic that cooperation will be met with cooperation and hostility with hostility, the opponent inevitably becomes conscious of this rule. While North Korea refrains from taking preemptive threatening moves, the US also has to be careful with its words and actions to avoid giving North Korea a pretext to provoke it.

For this strategy to be effective, it is necessary to make the opponent recognize both the generosity of cooperation and the thoroughness of retaliation early on. Publicly revealing the strategic weapons under development and deliberately showcasing new weapons during the military parade was intended to demonstrate the means of retaliation. Depending on how the Biden administration's North Korea policy outline and its initial words and actions toward North Korea are taken, North Korea is highly likely to strongly prove its principles through actions early on, using that as a pretext.

Of course, the Biden administration's North Korea reconciliation policy also requires boldness from North Korea to respond accordingly. The important point is that by not unilaterally taking preemptive strong moves, North Korea tries to find justification in the US attitude without narrowing the scope of the US's North Korea policy maneuvering. This strategy differs somewhat from the times when North Korea first conducted threatening weapons tests to attract US attention and pressure. While the existence of weapons that can directly threaten is displayed, instead of preemptively making direct threats, the response level is adjusted in small increments according to the opponent's actions. This is a typical attitude to keep the possibility of cooperative behavior with the opponent open.

If both sides adopt similar proportional response strategies, the situation can be managed stably for the time being. This is because they will hesitate to take preemptive strong moves or will consider the repercussions if they do. However, if one side only waits to see the other's reaction rather than acting first, unintended strategic patience or prolonged waiting without communication may occur. To prevent this waiting from turning into "misunderstanding" or threatening attention-seeking, a bold signal of reconciliation or a messenger to convey friendly signals is necessary. Historically, most conflict resolutions have begun not through demands for overwhelming surrender but through bold and preemptive messages of reconciliation.

Hong Min (Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification)