Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification
The Biden administration's North Korea policy is still 'under review.' However, hints can be found in some of its statements. First, there is a recognition of urgency. Recently, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department stated that the North Korean nuclear issue is urgent and a high policy priority. The widely anticipated possibility of 'Strategic Patience 2.0' or a policy relegated to a lower priority seems unlikely. Second, there is an emphasis on 'coordination.' Both South Korea and the U.S. highlighted close coordination when explaining the first phone call between their leaders. This may indicate an intention to generate momentum based on setting joint goals and building consensus rather than unilateral action by the U.S.
Third, inclusiveness is stressed. Additional sanctions, diplomatic incentives, and cooperation with allies were mentioned. While there is instrumental inclusiveness, one can also consider inclusiveness in the approach that encompasses denuclearization and a peace regime. Lastly, there is caution. The White House referred to North Korea by its official name, the 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea,' and in the U.S.-Japan leaders' call, the phrase 'complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' was used.
All these expressions are found in the North Korea-U.S. Singapore Joint Statement. Their use is intentional to show diplomatic agreement or respect toward the counterpart. So far, there is an atmosphere of refraining from rash words or actions toward North Korea. This reflects an intention to handle the matter cautiously and manage the situation. It can be seen as 'initial management' reflecting the diplomatic and security community's extensive experience with North Korea.
The Biden administration launched amid an increasingly unstable international nuclear order. There are cracks in the international nonproliferation and arms control regimes, as well as nuclear arms races with Russia and China. During the Trump administration, the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and reimposition of sanctions resulted in Iran restarting uranium enrichment facilities. With Russia, the U.S. abandoned the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), letting go of the reins of arms control that had been maintained. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) were openly challenged. Meanwhile, the U.S., Russia, and China are engaged in a fierce competition to develop advanced strategic weapons such as hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles and torpedoes, submarine-launched cruise missiles, and missile defense systems.
The Biden administration urgently needs to prevent the collapse of the U.S.-Russia arms control regime and establish additional arms control frameworks for strategic weapons, including submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), which are increasing instability in the arms race. It also needs to seek arms control regimes that can curb China's nuclear weapons modernization. Nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament must be activated at the levels of international organizations and treaties, regional frameworks, and multilateral and bilateral dimensions. Nuclear issues must be linked and coordinated across multiple scales. Rather than unilateral denuclearization demands or applying separate principles to specific countries, it is a crucial time to systematize and model nuclear arms control and disarmament within the framework of reconstructing the international nuclear order.
Sanctions are an important tool of nonproliferation policy, but the history of North Korea's nuclear issue over the past 30 years, including the Trump administration period, shows that it is unrealistic to expect sanctions alone to swiftly eliminate all of North Korea's missiles and nuclear facilities. There has been no case where denuclearization was achieved solely through sanctions. Under the principle of reestablishing the international nuclear order, a smart and pragmatic phased diplomatic strategy is needed. This includes reaffirming the North Korea-U.S. Singapore Joint Statement, a comprehensive approach that pursues peace and denuclearization simultaneously, a reciprocal and phased approach based on mutual security guarantees rather than unilateral denuclearization, and proactive relationship improvement and preemptive reconciliation policies. To this end, it is necessary to actively send messages of 'goodwill.'
Hong Min (Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification)
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