[Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club] Disagreement on ROK-US Wartime Operational Control Transfer... Further Discussions Planned

It has been reported that South Korea and the United States will begin joint military exercises starting on the 5th. The photo shows a US 2nd Infantry Division M1A2 SEP tank crossing a pontoon bridge during the South Korea-US joint river crossing operation training held at the Hantan River in Yeoncheon-gun, Gyeonggi Province, in December 2015.

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] There are observations that South Korea and the United States had disagreements over the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) at this year's Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).

On the 26th, during a comprehensive audit of the Ministry of National Defense, Park Sung-joon, a member of the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly from the Democratic Party of Korea, asked, "The joint statement this time did not include a timeline for the OPCON transfer; did you simply accept the U.S. side's position?" Minister of National Defense Suh Wook replied, "There were disagreements, so we decided to have additional discussions after the SCM."

South Korea and the U.S. agreed to conduct the second phase of the three-stage verification this year, the Full Operational Capability (FOC) verification, but due to the reduction in training scale caused by the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), proper training could not be conducted. The joint statement implies that the evaluation procedures necessary for the OPCON transfer, including the FOC verification, will continue, but specific details such as the implementation timeline were not included in the statement.

It is known that the South Korean government expressed the opinion that the evaluation and verification methods for these conditions are comprehensive and ambiguous and should be clearly redefined. The prevailing view is that if the existing agreed conditions are followed, the transfer would be impossible by 2022, which is within the Moon Jae-in administration's term. However, the U.S. side strongly insisted on adhering to the "Basic Plan for Transfer Based on 2015 Conditions" and the "First Revision of the OPCON Transfer Plan Based on 2018 Conditions," showing disagreement.

Additionally, Secretary Esper demanded that the "2016 Crisis Management Memorandum of Understanding" be updated by the end of the year. This memorandum, which is the highest-level document defining the joint crisis management response guidelines, reportedly includes wording that limits the scope of joint crisis management to "contingencies on the Korean Peninsula." However, during last year's consultations, the U.S. side proposed adding the phrase "contingencies involving the United States" in addition to "contingencies on the Korean Peninsula," aiming to expand the scope of crisis management to areas the U.S. evaluates as security threats. Military experts point out that if the scope of joint crisis management is expanded to include "contingencies involving the United States," it would provide grounds for the South Korean military to be dispatched and cooperate in U.S. military operational areas such as the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, Minister Suh responded to criticism that the phrase "the U.S. needs to understand South Korean military weapon acquisition plans," which was included for the first time in the joint statement, implied the introduction of U.S.-made weapons, by saying, "Some U.S.-made weapon systems may be included," and added, "We are preparing the transfer conditions covering domestic research and development and other fields, so it cannot be definitively stated that it is only U.S. weapon systems."