[Square] Shin Hanul Units 3 and 4 Construction Halted, Will It Follow Wolseong Unit 1's Path?

Jeong Dong-wook, Professor, Department of Energy Systems Engineering, Chung-Ang University.

The results of the Board of Audit and Inspection's audit on Wolsong Unit 1 have been announced. It has been 2 years and 4 months since Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power abruptly decided to permanently shut down Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 through a board meeting on June 21, 2018, and now the truth behind the 'economic feasibility evaluation' that served as the basis for this decision has been revealed. According to the audit opinion, it was found that related parties forcibly distorted the economic analysis to create grounds for the early closure of Wolsong Unit 1.

Among the 94 nuclear reactors, 82 have received 20-year operation extension permits in the United States, but there are reactors that have either given up on obtaining extension permits or are in the process of review. The Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant received a 20-year extension permit but returned the extension permit and chose permanent shutdown because it was difficult to secure economic feasibility in competition with gas power generation.

The Point Lepreau nuclear power plant in Canada, which has the same reactor type as Wolsong Unit 1 and was built around the same time, received a 5-year operation extension in 2012 and an additional 5 years in 2017, planning to operate until June 2022. Another Canadian nuclear power plant built around the same time as Wolsong Unit 1, Gentilly Unit 2, decided to decommission due to economic reasons and entered permanent shutdown following the expiration of its operation permit in 2012. Coincidentally, the decommissioning decision of this plant became controversial as it coincided with the ruling period of a political party in Quebec that pledged to close nuclear power plants.

When summarizing the cases of Wolsong Unit 1 and overseas examples, the main basis for deciding whether to continue nuclear power operation lies in economic feasibility rather than the safety of nuclear power, which the current government has used as a justification for its nuclear phase-out policy. Safety is ensured through facility and personnel reinforcement and verification by nuclear safety specialized institutions. However, if the cost is too high and economic feasibility is lacking, permanent shutdown is chosen. The original justification for the nuclear phase-out policy was 'safety.' Despite citing safety concerns of aging nuclear plants, it appears that economic feasibility was distorted because it is difficult to use safety as a basis for decommissioning reactors that have been granted continued operation permits.

The Board of Audit and Inspection refrained from commenting on the unfairness of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power's board decision, stating that the appropriateness of the early closure of Wolsong Unit 1 was outside the scope of the audit. However, since the basis for the early closure of Wolsong Unit 1 was economic feasibility analysis, it cannot be said that a decision based on distorted economic analysis is valid. Moreover, the destruction of documents related to the early closure by public officials indicates that the government was not only involved in the board's decision but also aware of its unfairness. Since the process was not fair, the result cannot be just. This audit of Wolsong Unit 1 is not merely about the validity of the early closure decision of a single nuclear plant but concerns fairness and transparency in the policy-making and implementation process.

Energy is not only an important national infrastructure but also requires the establishment of a stable supply system. Furthermore, in a country like ours, which lacks indigenous energy resources, a long-term national energy strategy is essential. The late President Roh Moo-hyun recognized these characteristics of energy and enacted the Framework Act on Energy. He even took the role of chairman of the National Energy Committee, composed of ministers and experts in the energy sector. The case of Wolsong Unit 1 occurred because the government's nuclear phase-out policy did not follow the spirit of the Framework Act on Energy, which emphasizes the collection of diverse expert opinions and fair procedures.

It is difficult to restore Wolsong Unit 1 to its original state. However, as a lesson from Wolsong Unit 1, the government should transparently disclose the social and economic costs and benefits of the nuclear phase-out and energy transition policy even now. If Wolsong Unit 1 was shut down early, Shin Hanul Units 3 and 4 are currently under construction suspension. The cost is said to amount to several hundred billion won. To prevent the decision to suspend construction of Shin Hanul Units 3 and 4 from following in the footsteps of Wolsong Unit 1, the first target to demonstrate the transparency of the energy transition policy should be to show whether the suspension of Shin Hanul Units 3 and 4 construction is justified.

Jung Dong-wook, Professor, Department of Energy Systems Engineering, Chung-Ang University