[The Editors' Verdict] What Are Our Core Interests?

[Asia Economy Reporter Choi Il-kwon] Unlike the United States, which seems to mobilize all means except the use of force to target China, China's response adjusts its intensity depending on the situation. Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the United States, with President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even calling China "fools" and an "evil dictatorship," has launched verbal attacks. However, Xi Jinping, President of China, and Yang Jiechi, a member of the Communist Party's Political Bureau responsible for foreign affairs, have remained relatively quiet. In March, Yang Jiechi issued a warning, and President Xi briefly made a statement targeting the U.S. during this year's Two Sessions, saying, "We oppose acts that hinder international cooperation to combat the epidemic." Regarding COVID-19, spokespersons from relevant government departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respond when questioned, or state-run media act on behalf of the government.

However, China does not maintain this attitude consistently across all issues. When Tsai Ing-wen, President of Taiwan, recently rejected the One Country, Two Systems policy at her second-term inauguration, China immediately expressed concern through the Taiwan Affairs Office, stating that it "destroys the political foundation for peaceful development." Additionally, in response to international criticism over the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law, China strongly opposed it, saying "Do not interfere in internal affairs." Even Wang Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, unusually used the term "new Cold War," stating that "some political forces in the United States are trying to push China-U.S. relations into a so-called 'new Cold War'." Judging by the speed and intensity of the response, it can be inferred that China reacts more sensitively to interference in internal affairs than to COVID-19, which has struck the world.

China's reactions stem from the fact that issues related to territory, internal affairs, and sovereignty correspond to so-called "core interests." This is why China does not hesitate to strongly criticize matters related not only to Hong Kong but also Taiwan, Xinjiang Uyghur, and the South China Sea.

The term "core interests" was introduced by Tang Jiaxuan, then Chinese Foreign Minister, in 2003 when the U.S. exported weapons to Taiwan. China's core interests are defined as political stability under the socialist system, protection of sovereignty, unification, and continuous social development. In short, these are interests linked to the foundation of the nation. The Chinese leadership's consistent stance is that even the superpower United States cannot make concessions on core interests.

The U.S.'s strong criticism is ultimately to protect its own interests. In a recently released China strategy report, the U.S. criticized China, stating that it is "infringing on vital interests." According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, the U.S.'s vital interests are based on four pillars: protecting its citizens and territory, promoting prosperity, maintaining peace through strength, and expanding American influence. From this perspective, the Chinese Communist Party's dictatorship and state-led economy conflict with U.S. interests. Ultimately, the hegemonic struggle between these countries is a process to protect national interests.

What about us? In a situation where security and economy depend respectively on the U.S. and China, a precarious balancing diplomacy has been the best for national interests. The current G2 conflict is sometimes compared to the second THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) incident. However, this time it is on a different level. Global supply chains are changing, and the U.S. is urging alliance unity. While the 2016 THAAD incident was about persuading one side, now we are being forced to choose between two. There is growing speculation that the conflict will not be resolved even after the U.S. presidential election in November. A former senior official who said four years ago, "Korea is invisible in Washington," remarked, "I don't know what the government is thinking." What we must consider is clear: What are our core interests?