[W Forum] n번방·Telegram, and the Government's Indifferent Measures

The Nth Room case is a digital sex crime incident in which dozens of women, including minors, were coerced into filming sexually exploitative videos, which were then traded via Telegram. This is not the first time. Recent cases like Burning Sun and earlier incidents involving the Dark Web and Soranet, though differing in methods and scale, are all shocking digital sex crimes. In particular, 'Welcome to Video,' operated on the Dark Web by Son Jung-woo, was the world's largest child sexual exploitation site, and it was revealed that even a 6-month-old infant was targeted, causing widespread horror. Why do such unspeakable incidents keep recurring?

First, South Korea’s punishment level for digital sex crimes is far too lenient. From 2011 over five years, among about 1,800 cases prosecuted in five Seoul courts for illegal filming, distribution, and sales, only 5% resulted in imprisonment. In 2018, sex offenders charged with producing obscene materials targeting children and adolescents received an average prison sentence of two years. Soranet shared various illegal videos in real-time for 17 years since 1999, but when the site was shut down in 2016, the only punishment was a four-year prison sentence for the operator.

Son Jung-woo, the Dark Web operator, received a suspended sentence in the first trial and one year and six months imprisonment in the second trial, and is about to be released on the 27th. The Burning Sun case is still under trial, but the investigation process did not convey the gravity of the incident. Despite mobilizing about 150 investigators, no sexual violence issues inside the club were found, and Yoo, a business partner of Seungri, had his arrest warrant dismissed. Yoon, a police superintendent nicknamed the 'Police Chief,' suspected of collusion with Seungri’s group, was sent to the prosecution without detention.

In the United States, producing child pornography can result in 15 to 30 years imprisonment, and commercial distribution 5 to 20 years, with no exceptions for first-time offenders, unlike in South Korea. In fact, an American member of Son Jung-woo’s site received 97 months imprisonment and 20 years probation, and a man in his 40s who downloaded child sexual exploitation videos from the site was sentenced to 15 years. In the UK, a person who uploaded videos to a pornography site was sentenced to 22 years. Compared to this, our penalties for digital sex crimes seem to have no deterrent effect.

Next is international cooperation on digital sex crimes. To fully punish digital sex crimes committed on overseas platforms, international judicial cooperation is essential. Although Soranet and Dark Web cases were cracked down through international cooperation, most were cases where foreign judicial authorities recognized the crimes and requested cooperation from domestic authorities; cases where we proactively detected and cracked down are rare. At an emergency meeting of the National Assembly’s Science, Technology, Information and Broadcasting Committee, the Minister of Science and ICT said, "We don’t even know if Telegram has servers," and "investigators are trying to locate the servers."

Of course, Telegram does not disclose the exact location of its servers or headquarters. Due to Telegram’s technical characteristics, information is not properly stored on servers and is highly volatile, making it difficult to find meaningful data through server seizures. Nevertheless, we must not allow a precedent where sex crimes can evade punishment through such overseas platforms. More systematic and stronger judicial cooperation is needed, such as joining the Budapest Convention, which over 60 countries have already signed, to prevent international cybercrime. A national campaign to reject and boycott overseas platforms that are uncooperative in digital sex crime investigations could also be a means to pressure judicial cooperation.

Finally, there are inadequate measures against digital sex crimes. The political sphere is focusing on using the Nth Room case for political attacks against opposing parties rather than promptly preparing countermeasures. The measures announced by the National Assembly and related ministries do not seem to grasp the essence of the problem. The government said it would strengthen monitoring of digital sex crime materials and increase platform operators’ responsibility. But is it possible to monitor, delete, and impose strict responsibility on Telegram, which we don’t even know the server or contact person for? Can we hold Telegram, whose headquarters location is unclear, strictly accountable and enforce penalties for non-compliance? Ultimately, the problem occurs overseas but its impact is severe domestically, yet the countermeasures are just floating in the air. It is doubtful whether such measures can prevent another Nth Room in the future.

Kim Hyun-kyung, Professor, Graduate School of IT Policy, Seoul National University of Science and Technology