[The Editors' Verdict] Distorted Inter-Korean Relations: The Essence Is Resolving Hostility

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification

The scathing remarks by North Korea's second-in-command, First Deputy Director Kim Yo-jong, and the consoling letter from Chairman Kim Jong-un swung inter-Korean relations to extremes within a day. Since Chairman Kim's order to dismantle South Korean facilities in Mount Kumgang at the end of last year, numerous items such as individual tourism, exchange cooperation, and quarantine cooperation have emerged. To get straight to the point, there is a need to move beyond our one-sided fantasies, materialism, and trivial items. A 'direct breakthrough' into the essence is necessary, and perhaps North Korea also wants to hear that.

From now on, future North Korea policies should focus on the practical resolution of hostility. The 'April 27 Panmunjom Declaration' and the 'September Pyongyang Joint Declaration' established principles of action to resolve military confrontation and hostility for a 'Korean Peninsula without war.' Unlike past administrations that mainly instrumentalized North Korea policies for political purposes or reacted inconsistently to situations without maintaining policy consistency, a distinctly different approach is needed. Policies with sincerity and consistency focused on the practical resolution of hostility, breaking away from the old-fashioned approach of political proposals without accompanying actions, are required.

There is a need to break away from the framework of 'denuclearization,' 'end-of-war declaration,' and 'peace agreement,' which converge on and depend on North Korea-US relations. Prior to that, the 'resolution of hostility' that South and North Korea can achieve is important. It is a consistent policy pursuit to realize a 'de facto end-of-war declaration or de facto peace agreement.' The 2018 'September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement' contained practical agreements on arms control at the highest level since the division. It was very groundbreaking as a 'practical declaration' containing specific action guidelines and manuals. If implemented smoothly, it has the effect of a de facto 'end-of-war declaration.' It is a transition to 'cooperative security' that creates security through mutual cooperation.

The 'September 19 Military Agreement' agreed on the formation and operation of the Inter-Korean Military Joint Commission, enabling continuous discussions on overall arms control in the future. This military agreement can be said to express the will of South and North Korea to quietly walk toward a practical end of war through the implementation of arms control, even if various conditions are not fully met or North Korea-US relations improve slowly. Through such agreements and implementation, it is necessary to realize a de facto end-of-war declaration situation and demonstrate to the United States and the international community the will for non-aggression, denuclearization, and peace. The resolution of war threats between South and North Korea can never be a subsidiary issue dependent on North Korea-US relations. Not only in terms of compliance with the armistice agreement but also in alleviating war threats and military confrontation, a more assertive policy pursuit is necessary.

Steps toward the practical resolution of hostility between South and North Korea should play a role in driving North Korea-US relations. If dependent on the speed of North Korea-US relations, there is a high possibility that inter-Korean relations will lose momentum when North Korea-US relations stagnate. Rather, by moving ahead by about one step and forming a certain tension with the pace of North Korea-US relations progress, it can act as a driving force for North Korea-US relations. Of course, speed and timing are important. South and North Korea's arms control cannot go too far ahead. The resolution of military tension on the Korean Peninsula is possible when 'North Korea's denuclearization,' 'the United States' removal of military threats to North Korea,' and 'gradual arms control between South and North Korea' form a virtuous cycle.

Therefore, South and North Korea need to advance concrete and practical agreements on the resolution of hostility as much as possible. A peace regime is not achieved only through denuclearization. It is possible through institutionalizing peace practice, removing the actual military confrontation structure, and changing the perception structure of mutual distrust. Efforts to resolve practical hostility can play an important role in securing the irreversibility of the Moon Jae-in administration's peace process. Now, it is necessary to break away from wasting time on 'distorted' North Korea policies that avoid the essence and get bogged down in trivial items. What North Korea wants is the practical resolution of hostility and the establishment of a new relationship.

Hong Min, Director of North Korea Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification