[The Editors' Verdict] The Dilemma of Border Closure

Young-gi Cho, Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University · Chairman of the Advanced Unification Research Association, Hanseon Foundation

A Plan B for policy is needed. The novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19), which started in Wuhan, China, is now showing signs of a pandemic. Despite expert groups such as the Medical Association urging proactive measures to block the inflow of contamination sources, expert opinions were thoroughly ignored. Of course, the government and ruling party have insisted that their comprehensive judgment considered external economic factors. Rather, when the spread of COVID-19 temporarily slowed, the government and ruling party engaged in "politics without knowledge," encouraging a return to daily life.

Politics without knowledge ended its life as a prelude to a pandemic centered around a religious group called Shincheonji. The basics of blocking a pandemic are actively preventing the inflow of external contamination sources and thoroughly disinfecting contaminated areas. However, on the 20th, when the first domestic COVID-19 death occurred, President Moon Jae-in’s remark during the Korea-China summit that "China’s difficulties are our difficulties" was far from an active response to blocking inflow.

Regarding the prelude to the pandemic, it is necessary to reconsider whether the president’s consistent passive response was appropriate and whether the language hoping for an early return to daily life was justified. This is due to concerns that the president’s words may have acted as a prelude to the pandemic and that the dialogue between the two heads of state may have self-restricted and blocked maneuvering room, resulting in a blunder that lost the opportunity for Plan B.

Meanwhile, North Korea fully closed its borders on the 22nd of last month to block the inflow of COVID-19 contamination sources and extended the quarantine period for entrants from 14 days to 30 days starting the 12th. The border closure and quarantine extension are measures to block the inflow of COVID-19 without considering political and economic factors with China. Prioritizing strengthening the quarantine system over political considerations is a very effective response. This effective and proactive response by North Korea appears to be a factor in maintaining a zero confirmed case situation. Of course, North Korea’s announcements cannot be taken at face value, but based on the Ministry of Unification’s announcements, considering North Korea’s poor medical quarantine system, it is rather evaluated as "scientific." North Korea’s border closure is the result of accurately recognizing the threat of the aftershocks that COVID-19 inflow would bring. In other words, the COVID-19 situation is recognized as a "serious political issue concerning the survival of the state," and Plan B was chosen as a crisis overcoming tactic.

However, North Korea’s border closure accelerates the economic crisis. Smuggling, which is essential to solving livelihood problems, requires border opening(?). Thus, quarantine through border closure and border opening for smuggling are contradictory. North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un chose border closure because he saw the aftershocks caused by quarantine failure as a more threatening factor to the stability of the three-generation hereditary system.

Since the COVID-19 situation in China is unlikely to calm down in the short term, border closure seems likely to continue for a considerable period. North Korea has also issued a strict military law to govern smuggling, so lifting the closure is unlikely.

The impact of border closure is already hitting the livelihood economy hard. According to sources on North Korea, the price of rice in the Jangmadang market rose from 4,500 won per kilogram (January 27) to 5,500 won (February 11), and gasoline prices increased from 13,000 won to 16,500 won per kilogram. Also, as prices of daily necessities rose up to 60%, North Korean authorities are making desperate efforts to stabilize prices by supplying quantities.

Foreign currency procurement through Chinese tourists has also been blocked due to border closure. If the COVID-19 situation prolongs, a second "Arduous March" is anticipated. The higher the possibility, the greater the opportunity for us to increase negotiating power. Recently, North Korea’s external propaganda media "Chosun Today" showed interest in individual tourism proposed by President Moon, emphasizing ethnic cooperation. Between the lines of this interest, North Korea’s urgent situation can be read. This urgency is an opportunity and means to use as a turning point for North Korean change. Therefore, now is not the time to cling to Plan A of hoping for North Korea but the time to seek wisdom to realize Plan B.