[Jeon Youngsoo's Population Prism] 2020: The Starting Year of the Midlife Crisis, 10 Million Middle-Aged People Pouring Out

The year 2020 marks a critical turning point in population changes. This is not about the well-known low birthrate or population cliff. Rather, it is a new crisis warning that is more unfamiliar and shocking precisely because no one has paid attention to it. Until now, the focus has been solely on the decrease in the denominator of the population structure. The decline in the working-age population (since 2017) due to low birthrates has emerged as a serious social issue. However, starting in 2020, a different statistical warning is added. This is because even the numerator (the existing population) begins to undergo broad and deep structural changes. When the denominator decreases, the fraction value soars even if the numerator remains the same. To make matters worse, from 2020 onward, the numerator also rapidly increases.

The main actors in this crisis statistic are the middle-aged population. From 2020, the middle-aged population noticeably expands. The middle-aged crisis is a strange problem that is difficult to grasp even if left alone, but if this population itself rapidly increases, it is certain to be elevated to a new urgent issue. The year 2020 is the starting point of the middle-aged crisis, and the perceived impact and shock are bound to be tremendous. It is close to a megaton-level impact right from the first blow. Those who have experienced it prepare themselves mentally, but since the middle-aged population has never been the mainstream of the population composition, the ripple effects and aftershocks are unimaginable.

So why 2020? The equation '2020 = middle-aged crisis' gains traction because the leading generation of 7.4 million first baby boomers (born 1955?1963), starting with those born in 1955, enter the age of 65. Over nine years from 2020, 7.4 million people will steadily reach 65 years old. The concentrated and massive entry of the baby boomer population into the 65-year-old bracket is more than a simple demographic phenomenon. It heralds significant social and economic ripple effects unlike anything seen before. The choice of 65 years is also important. Age 65 is the dividing line between active employment and retirement, where employment insecurity becomes a reality. Although the retirement age is still generally 60, even with extensions, the effective end is likely to be 65, the age for national pension benefits (currently being phased in). Age 65 is the point that distinguishes active workers from retirees. For baby boomers, that age 65 begins in 2020. It is the dawn of an era where, even if they want to work, they must exit.

Mentioning the middle-aged crisis in 2020 solely because 7.4 million baby boomers reach 65 lacks sufficient logic. Even if it is a crisis, it is only the beginning. In fact, it is just a preview of the long-term entry into age 65 by heavier subsequent cohorts. The broad baby boomer group (born 1955?1975), a huge population bonus group, will take over the baton of the middle-aged crisis. Just as those born in 1955 turn 65 in 2020, those born in 1960 turn 60, and those born in 1965 turn 55. The age of 40, commonly recognized as middle age, is lowered to those born up to 1980. This means that over 20 years from 2020, 17 million baby boomers will be exposed to the middle-aged crisis. Even conservatively, about 10 million people will be affected over the next decade. They will face the middle-aged crisis of mass unemployment, poverty pressure, isolation, and family risks.

The low sensitivity to the middle-aged crisis is partly because there is no general age standard. Since it is unclear who is middle-aged, there is frequent confusion not only in personal identification but also in policy application. Even for those in their 60s, opinions differ on whether they are middle-aged or elderly. In advanced countries, people in their 60s are generally considered middle-aged. Using Korean traditional views, the age of 60 (hwangap) is the entry point into the elderly population. However, this is an old notion. Considering the changing times and the emergence of retirement age extension as a topic, the perception of people in their 60s as elderly should ultimately be revised. Some argue that since many work into their 70s, many retire early in good health, and elderly morbidity begins at 70, it is more accurate to say '60s = middle age.' At least, 'hwangap = elderly' is uncomfortable.

Therefore, a new definition of middle age is urgently needed. For example, one method is to define youth as ages 10?39, middle age as 40?69, and elderly as 70?100 (including those over 100). Ages 0?9 are excluded as they are unilaterally protected, and part of the child-rearing and schooling group, unrelated to economic activity. Reflecting trends in aging, health levels, social activity, and social perception, this three-age classification is quite consistent. The delay in employment and marriage age, and the fact that children become independent around ±70 years, also support applying middle age to the 60s. Viewing 70 and above as full elderly and retired individuals can alleviate existing conflicts over skill utilization and financial savings to some extent. Allocating 30 years to each group also provides a sense of balance. Looking at middle age according to this new age standard, the situation becomes quite urgent. The size itself rapidly expands, coinciding with the retirement entry of the first baby boomers in 2020. When youth (10?39), middle age (40?69), and elderly (70 and above) are each considered a group, middle age boasts overwhelming presence. Among the three major population groups, it is the most prominent in terms of growth. If this overflowing middle-aged population cannot settle and flounders into an unhappy trap, it will inevitably cause tremendous shocks not only to individual households but to society as a whole. The year 2020 is highly likely to be the inaugural year of this.

In fact, in 1990, the size of the middle-aged population was only second place (24.1%). The youth population dominated with 73.0%, enjoying the last fruits of the demographic bonus. At that time, the elderly population was only 2.9%, showing that despite low birthrates, the felt crisis of population change was small. From the 2000s, the situation changed markedly, and by 2015, the proportions reversed. The youth population rapidly shrank to 48.6%, while the relative proportion of the middle-aged population rose to 42.7%. This was the result of including the youngest group of the broad baby boomers, those born in the mid-1970s, into the middle-aged population in their 40s.

Until now, middle age has been neglected and marginalized in Korean society. This is why there are concerns about 2020, when they will pour out in huge numbers and create discord. Nevertheless, clear legal definitions and categories surrounding middle age remain ambiguous. Being neither youth nor twilight, they are not considered beneficiaries of policies. They have only been the support base for the socially and economically vulnerable generations before and after them, not a welfare or administrative beneficiary group. Of course, it is fortunate that this is changing somewhat recently. Naming the 50s and 60s as the new middle age and offering tailored employment support is an example. Still, much remains to be done.

The problem lies ahead. By 2035, the size of the middle-aged population will rank first among the three major population groups. Although the growth rate slows, the absolute size expands. It will number 23 million, accounting for 43.8%. Conversely, even with median projections, the youth population (35.4%) will fall below 20 million. The formidable elderly population will surpass 10 million but still account for only 20.8%. Looking at the population pyramid according to the new standard, it becomes clear why we must pay attention to the expansion of the middle-aged population. The unprecedented changes faced by the largest population group must inevitably be the link to a societal shift in awareness and institutional reform.

Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University