[Reading Science] Diplomacy Has Thawed, but Science and Technology Cooperation Is Different

Recently, the issues of technology talent outflow and management related to China have once again become sensitive topics among domestic companies. Key research personnel are moving to Chinese firms, and disputes are arising over the scope of technology information sharing during joint research projects. Legal conflicts over patent infringement and trade secret leakage are also ongoing. Despite the word "cooperation" often heard in diplomatic circles, the sense of caution remains strong on the ground for businesses.

Amid this atmosphere, a Korea-China summit was held. With the resumption of dialogue between the leaders and a renewed commitment to cooperation, the relationship between the two countries has entered a new phase of conversation. However, it remains uncertain whether this change will immediately lead to an expansion of scientific and technological cooperation.

The joint statement from the summit included phrases such as scientific and technological innovation, digital cooperation, and expanded human exchanges, but today, scientific and technological cooperation cannot be achieved by declarations alone. The scope of research, access to data, ownership of intellectual property rights, and restrictions on personnel movement all need to be specified in detail through contracts and regulations. Technology cooperation is not the result of political agreement, but rather the outcome of practical and specific negotiations.

Global news agency Reuters reported that, in relation to the Korea-China summit, Korea "finds itself in a position where it must seek improved relations with China while also considering its technology alliance with the United States." This statement accurately captures the reality facing Korean diplomacy. Whether scientific and technological cooperation happens depends less on dialogue between leaders and more on the legal and economic risks that companies and research institutions must bear.

Let us look at specific examples. In the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors, the United States and Europe maintain basic scientific research and cooperation with China in areas such as environment and health, but strictly control advanced semiconductor equipment, AI computation technologies, and access to critical data. The doors to research labs remain open, but the doors to factories and data centers are kept closed. Even under the banner of "cooperation," the conditions vary greatly depending on the stage of technology involved.

The New York Times, a leading U.S. daily, recently described technology cooperation as "an area managed as part of national strategy." This means that technology cooperation has moved beyond the stage of trust-based exchange and is now managed according to national strategy and security considerations. Cooperation is possible, but without specific conditions and management, it is difficult to sustain. The responsibility for this is also likely to fall more on companies and research institutions on the ground than on the government.

Korea's situation is even more nuanced. China remains an important partner and one of Korea's largest trading partners, and its scientific and technological research capabilities are among the best in the world. At the same time, Korea is deeply integrated into a U.S.-centered technology ecosystem in semiconductors, AI, and advanced manufacturing. Cutting off cooperation with either side is not realistic. Yet, it is also not possible to cooperate on all technologies under the same standards.

In actual research and industrial settings, these phenomena are already being reflected. Joint research is possible, but research topics are becoming more segmented, and while personnel exchanges may be allowed, sensitive technology fields are often excluded. Even data sharing, under the name of cooperation, is handled with the utmost caution until the very end. Under the single term "scientific and technological cooperation," the areas that are permitted and those that are tightly managed are different.

It is difficult to say that the Korea-China summit has fully opened the door to scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries. Expecting a comprehensive expansion of technology cooperation is also far from reality. Diplomacy can change the atmosphere of relationships, but the scope of scientific and technological cooperation is determined by the international order, technological competition, and security perceptions.

After the Korea-China summit, what we should pay attention to is not the achievements of cooperation itself, but rather the differences in how diplomacy and science and technology operate. Diplomacy manages the atmosphere, but technology cooperation is driven by contracts. Ultimately, the decision on what to share and what to protect rests with the companies and research institutions on the ground.