[Reading Science] Expectations for the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment

On September 7, the government announced a plan to reorganize government ministries, transferring the energy policy division of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy to the Ministry of Environment and expanding the latter into the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment. The proposal to establish a separate Ministry of Climate and Energy was not realized. Climate and environmental groups have mostly expressed negative views regarding this reorganization plan.

Looking more closely, electricity and renewable energy policies will be transferred to the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment, while the fossil fuel industries-such as oil, coal, and natural gas-will remain under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. For nuclear energy, safety and radioactive waste management will fall under the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment, while nuclear energy export policy will remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

The initial rationale for creating the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment was to enable an integrated and consistent response to climate change, but the current reorganization plan leaves room for differences in positions and policy conflicts between ministries. Although it is progress that the word "climate" appears in a ministry's name for the first time, there will be many challenges to resolve through coordination between the two ministries.

Even European countries, which are more proactive than Korea in responding to the climate crisis, did not have a perfect government structure from the start. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Gordon Brown established the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in 2008 to oversee energy policy and climate change response. However, eight years later, in July 2016, right after Prime Minister Theresa May took office, DECC was merged into the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). After the abolition of DECC, the consistency of energy and climate policies weakened, and policy objectives were criticized for being subordinated to short-term industrial support. Ultimately, in 2023, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak had to separate energy policy functions and establish the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) to strengthen climate policy. During this process, the UK spent tens of millions of pounds in direct costs for the organizational restructuring and experienced setbacks such as decreased efficiency in ministerial work and a decline in policy credibility.

In December 2021, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz integrated climate protection functions into the existing Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (BMWi) to establish the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK), reflecting the intention to structurally link climate crisis response with industrial and economic policy. However, following the surge in energy prices due to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) decreased by about 0.9% in 2023, and in 2024, the country had to endure the label of "the sick man of Europe" as it entered negative growth. As the economy declined, carbon reduction plans under the Climate Protection Act were delayed, and climate policy inevitably underwent restructuring. Ultimately, in May 2025, BMWK was reorganized into the Federal Ministry for Nature, Climate, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection (BMUKN), with the environment ministry once again taking a central role in climate policy.

The cases of the United Kingdom and Germany clearly demonstrate how difficult it is for short-term, direct economic policies and long-term, macro-level climate crisis response policies to coexist.

It is not new that government regulations and policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions and protecting the environment are regarded as obstacles to the competitiveness of the industrial sector, leading to demands for their relaxation. Even if the need for carbon reduction and eco-friendliness, behavioral changes to address climate change, and responsibility for future generations are understood intellectually, there are calls for delays and rollbacks on the grounds that neither the preparation nor the capacity for transition exists.

Furthermore, in a country like Korea, where energy-intensive manufacturing industries such as semiconductors, steel, and petrochemicals are crucial, changes in energy policy affect various factors including product costs, export competitiveness, and employment. With numerous contentious issues such as the expansion of renewable energy, the use of fossil fuels and thermal power generation, and the construction and export of nuclear power, a power struggle between the government and the business sector, as well as between the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy within the government itself, seems inevitable.

Given that the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment has been reorganized to reflect the seriousness of the climate crisis and the expectations of the public, it is hoped that it will establish an independent and balanced operating system to pursue consistent policies.