[War & Business] Lessons from the Rafale Fighter Jet Crash That Shook the Southeast Asian Defense Market

Shot Down by Chinese-Made J-10C
India Points to "Tactical Failures Over Airframe Performance"
A Closer Look at the Causes Behind Indian Military’s Operational Failures

A French-made Rafale fighter jet delivered to the Indian military is flying at the "2021 India Airshow" held in Bengaluru, India, in March 2021. Photo by Reuters Yonhap News

The most widely reported news from the border conflict between India and Pakistan that broke out on May 7 was the downing of a French-made Rafale fighter jet. The report stated that the latest Rafale jet operated by the Indian military was shot down by a Chinese-made J-10C fighter jet belonging to the Pakistani military. Many Southeast Asian countries that were considering the acquisition of Rafale jets were reportedly shocked by this news.

After the aerial skirmish between the two countries, at "LIMA 2025," the largest defense exhibition in Southeast Asia held in Malaysia, military officials from Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and other Southeast Asian nations flocked to the booth of China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAC), the manufacturer of the J-10C. The Indonesian military, which had previously decided to purchase an additional 42 Rafale jets, announced that it would also include the Chinese-made J-10C in its list of potential bidders. Chinese state media launched a publicity campaign, claiming that the combat capabilities of the J-10C had been proven in real-world operations.

There were even reports that French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Indonesia on May 29 was aimed at preventing the Indonesian government, which had finalized its Rafale jet purchase, from changing its mind.

In 2016, the price of a Rafale jet purchased by the Indian military was about $220 million (approximately 302.4 billion KRW) per unit. In contrast, when the Pakistani military acquired the J-10C in 2021, it paid $76 million per unit?one-third the price of the Rafale. Southeast Asian countries had wanted to buy the Rafale, which, despite its high cost, was considered the most advanced among 4.5-generation fighter jets. However, the Rafale’s disappointing performance in actual combat came as a shock.

However, within India, there has been more criticism of the Indian military’s tactical failures than of the Rafale’s airframe performance. Many argue that the Indian military made a mistake by relying solely on the Rafale’s capabilities when deploying it in combat. They claim that it was not an issue of the fighter jet’s performance, but rather poor operational tactics that led to the defeat by the Pakistani military. In terms of the number of fighter jets mobilized, the Indian military had 72 jets, while the Pakistani military had 42, indicating a significant disparity in strength. Nevertheless, the Indian military failed to respond effectively to the Pakistani forces.

Until just before the engagement with the Pakistani military, the Indian Air Force’s Rafale jets were stationed more than 200 kilometers away from the border area. The pilots had little experience flying in the border region and had not undergone proper terrain training. Anil Chauhan, Chief of Staff of the Indian military, acknowledged in a recent interview with Bloomberg TV that “the important thing is not that the fighter jet crashed, but why it crashed,” admitting to tactical mistakes by his own forces.

In contrast, although the Pakistani military’s air power was inferior to that of India, it strengthened local defense training in preparation for attacks and focused on enhancing surveillance capabilities by importing not only J-10C fighter jets from China, but also ZDK-03 early warning aircraft and advanced radar systems. Because local training was thorough and more on-site information could be collected, the Pakistani military was able to conduct efficient operations regardless of the fighter jet’s performance.

The downing of the Rafale demonstrates that in modern warfare, the price and performance of weapons are not everything. Without fundamental elements such as local training, surveillance systems, and intelligence gathering, even expensive and high-performing weapons can prove useless. The recent string of accidental bombings and patrol aircraft crashes during training in the South Korean military highlights the need to closely examine the Indian military’s operational failures.