There Were Three Opportunities to Catch the Latitude Input Error,
But All Were Missed
The Air Force has decided to supplement and strengthen the procedure of double-checking target coordinates to prevent friendly fire accidents involving fighter jets.
On the morning of the 10th, the Air Force announced the interim investigation results and recurrence prevention measures related to the KF-16 fighter jet friendly fire accident in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province.
According to the Air Force, this friendly fire accident was a 'man-made disaster' caused by the failure to properly carry out the three-step process of re-verifying target coordinates.
The incident originated from an erroneous input of target coordinates on the day before the accident (the 6th). The pilot of the first aircraft read out the route coordinates including the target, and the pilot of the second aircraft entered them into the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS), but mistakenly input the latitude coordinate ×× 05.××× as ×× 00.×××. However, they did not re-verify this input.
The same situation repeated on the day of the accident (the 7th). During the process of saving the incorrectly input data from JMPS to the Data Transfer Cartridge (DTC), the DTC on the second aircraft failed to save the data due to equipment error, so the second pilot manually entered the correct target coordinates. As a result, the first aircraft had incorrect coordinates, while the second aircraft had the correct ones. Even during the second verification after takeoff, the first pilot did not notice the erroneous input.
The bomb dropping phase was similar. The first pilot sensed that the terrain of the target area was different from prior training, but trusted the incorrectly input flight information and proceeded with the mission. Although there should have been a visual confirmation procedure at this stage, it was not properly performed to meet the designated Time on Target (TOT). The second aircraft had the correct target coordinates input, but the pilot was focused solely on maintaining formation and simultaneous bomb release, failing to recognize the error.
Command and supervision by unit commanders other than the pilots were also inadequate. The Air Force analysis pointed out insufficient detailed management and supervision of flight preparation status, such as checking flight recorders of the mission formation and verifying target briefings. In particular, they did not conduct pilot reporting and review of the operational plan in advance.
Accordingly, the Air Force decided to supplement the double-check procedure by adding the following to the existing procedures: ▲ a mutual confirmation of target coordinates between formation members before entering the final attack phase ▲ designation of a dedicated controller for the operations officer at the Missile and Radar Control Center (MCRC) to verify the mission formation and target coordinates.
The responsibility of commanders will also be strengthened. During major operational missions, unit commanders will receive face-to-face reports on flight plans and mission results, and battalion commanders (flight commanders) will directly participate in briefings to check mission readiness and performance capability.
During the briefing, several issues related to the delay in situation assessment and reporting of the friendly fire accident were also pointed out. The Air Force Operations Command recognized the abnormal situation at 10:07, when the pilot confirmed the coordinate input error after firing, but despite recognizing the friendly fire accident, they focused only on verifying whether the bomb that caused civilian damage was dropped from the fighter jet. As a result, the friendly fire was reported to the Air Force Operations Commander 14 minutes after the situation was recognized, at 10:21.
Regarding the reason for notifying the media nearly 90 minutes after the friendly fire accident occurred, the Air Force stated, "We thought it was a priority to confirm the exact facts, so we announced after the final confirmation of MK-82 bomb fragments," but added, "Considering the seriousness of the situation, we now judge that it would have been more appropriate to notify immediately upon the occurrence of the abnormal drop."
The Air Force said, "Those identified as negligent in situation assessment and reporting will be held accountable according to laws and regulations," and added, "We will also implement follow-up measures such as strengthening real-time reporting systems."
Meanwhile, the Air Force decided to gradually resume flight training linked to the 2025 Freedom Shield (FS) exercise starting from this day. However, live-fire exercises will only resume after recurrence prevention measures are established and completed.
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