[Trump Again] Will Kim Jong-un Meet Again... Concerns Over 'Korea Passing'

Possibility of a 'Small Deal' if Denuclearization Is Deemed Difficult
Trump Likely to Restore Communication Channels with North Korea for Achievements
Negative Impact on Korean Peninsula Security... US Forces Korea Also at Risk

As Donald Trump, the President-elect of the United States, prepares for a second term, the possibility of resuming North Korea-US talks is being discussed. This analysis reflects an attitude that views security even from the perspective of bargaining.

According to diplomatic circles on the 15th, it is highly likely that the Trump administration will attempt talks with North Korea, with timing being the only issue. During the election period, President-elect Trump repeatedly showcased his familiarity with Chairman Kim Jong-un, and he has already appointed officials with experience in North Korea-US dialogue to his second-term cabinet.

Possibility of Arms Reduction Talks if 'Denuclearization is Difficult'

In June 2018, Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, and Donald Trump, then President of the United States, met and shook hands at the Capella Hotel in Singapore. Photo by Yonhap News

North Korea remains internationally isolated. However, a major variable different from Trump’s first term has emerged. North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced significantly, boasting achievements such as 'miniaturization of nuclear warheads.' Additionally, by dispatching troops to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has gained a strong backer in Russia.

Because of this, some speculate that a new phase in North Korea-US talks might manifest as a 'bad bromance' between President-elect Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. There is a view that Trump, seeking short-term achievements, might engage in risky negotiations that effectively acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Jo Han-beom, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, "Trump promoted Alex Wong, who prepared for the North Korea-US summit during the 'Hanoi no deal,' to Deputy Assistant to the National Security Council, bringing him back. This suggests that the resumption of North Korea-US talks could happen sooner than expected, and in that case, Trump is likely to play the 'small deal' card."

The 'small deal' literally means a small-scale negotiation or transaction. If the longstanding issue of North Korean denuclearization is judged 'unachievable,' the talks could shift to freezing nuclear weapons or arms reduction negotiations. The goal would be to at least eliminate the threat to the US mainland, if not the Korean Peninsula.

Considering President-elect Trump’s preference for top-down decision-making, South Korea is likely to be excluded. This raises concerns about 'Korea passing' in North Korea-related matters becoming a reality. North Korea is expected to use issues such as the withdrawal of troops from Russia as leverage in negotiations with the Trump administration, which desires an 'end to the war.'

Security Also Viewed as a Transaction...Disputes Over Defense Cost-Sharing

Concerns from South Korea’s perspective do not end there. President-elect Trump has repeatedly shown an attitude of treating diplomatic and security issues as bargaining chips. During the election period, he pressured allied countries to increase defense costs, and it is analyzed that such offensives could intensify after his inauguration. For example, he argued that NATO member countries should spend about 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense, a figure significantly higher than the existing guideline of 2%. This means even alliances are viewed from a cost perspective.

South Korea is no exception. During the election process, President-elect Trump likened South Korea to a 'Money Machine,' claiming that South Korea should pay $10 billion (approximately 14 trillion won) in defense cost-sharing. This is nearly nine times the amount South Korea is scheduled to pay under the 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA) concluded last year, which will apply in 2026. Consequently, some fear that the Trump administration might even use the withdrawal or reduction of US Forces Korea as a card to enforce an increase in defense costs.

When he first took office in 2017, it took time to establish a policy on the Korean Peninsula, but with accumulated experience, it is analyzed that this time he could conduct a 'speed battle' on various issues. During Trump’s first term, after the Moon Jae-in administration took office, demands for increased defense costs were made in earnest around the June 2017 US-Korea summit. This time, it is expected that the defense cost issue could ignite even earlier.

Above all, President-elect Trump does not link the presence of US Forces Korea to America’s security interests. He has repeatedly expressed the perception that American young soldiers are taking risks solely to protect 'another country.' In an interview with a weekly current affairs magazine in April last year, when asked about the withdrawal of US Forces Korea, he said, "(US Forces Korea) is in a precarious position," and asked, "Why are we defending others?"

Direct Blow to Korean Peninsula Security...Experts Call for 'Diversification of Options'

(From left) Park Won-gon, Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, Jo Han-beom, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification. Photo by Yonhap News

After President-elect Trump’s inauguration on the 20th, South Korea is expected to continue experiencing a 'diplomatic vacuum' due to the impeachment political situation for some time. While a more detailed strategy is needed to deal with President-elect Trump, who values personal relationships, South Korea is inevitably placed in a relatively disadvantageous position as summit diplomacy is impossible.

Professor Park Won-gon of Ewha Womans University’s Department of North Korean Studies presented a specific concern called 'double suspension.' He explained that President-elect Trump, who is negative about joint US-ROK military exercises and the deployment of US strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula, might trade these for North Korea’s suspension of ICBM launches and nuclear tests. Professor Park analyzed, "Rather than pushing for a sudden summit like in 2018-2019, they will try to restore dialogue channels first, and from the beginning of talks, a double suspension deal could be made."

The suspension of joint US-ROK military exercises and the deployment of US strategic assets means a weakening of North Korea nuclear response capabilities. This again links to the issue of defense cost-sharing. Professor Park said, "Trump can only declare political victory if the US mainland is safe, but the possibility of North Korea accepting nuclear-related agreements is low. Ultimately, it is a matter of cost. Instead of us covering the costs, we should try to turn this into an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear alliance."

Jo Han-beom, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, believes that alternatives such as independent nuclear armament should be considered from a long-term perspective. He expressed concern, saying, "If a 'small deal' involving partial denuclearization and sanctions relief is pursued, South Korea will naturally be excluded in this process due to Trump’s tendencies and North Korea’s 'two-state theory.'” He advised, "We need to prepare various options such as independent nuclear armament, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and securing nuclear fuel reprocessing technology."