[Inside Chodong] Timep's Final Destination: "K-Commerce" Must Not Happen

Kim Cheol-hyun, Deputy Director of the Bio Startup and Venture Department

It was August 2010, 14 years ago. Rumors spread in the industry that Heo Min, the former CEO of Neople who had achieved great success in gaming, was returning to business. The rumors were true, and the business in question was the then-emerging “social commerce.” In October, Namu Internet was established, launching an online shopping mall service called “WeMakePrice.” This was the beginning of Wemakeprice. Social commerce was a concept first introduced to Korea earlier that year in May by young entrepreneur Shin Hyun-sung, who brought the business model from the US, such as Groupon, and started a business under the name “Ticket Monster.” Thus, Wemakeprice and Ticket Monster (Timon) both started as “social commerce” platforms in 2010.

Although social commerce has now disappeared from the domestic e-commerce market, it was very popular at the time. It was a kind of group buying that utilized the concept of social networking services (SNS) in online shopping. Each day, one or two products were posted with a target number of buyers to be secured, and if that target was met, a dramatic discount was applied. Using this business model, Timon and Wemakeprice (Timon+Wemakeprice = Timep) were able to attract consumers quickly and lay the foundation for growth shortly after launching their services.

Although the start was social commerce, the way Timon and Wemakeprice have been described has changed continuously over the past 14 years. As market competition intensified, they quickly shed the social commerce label. To survive, they had to offer a wider variety of products, naturally evolving into an open market business structure. Timep was sometimes called “time commerce” because discounts were applied at set times, and at other times, it was promoted as “content commerce” by linking with entertainment to attract consumers. They diversified product presentation methods, branding themselves as “live commerce,” and depending on display strategies, they were also called “brand commerce” or “vertical commerce.” Neither company has ever posted an operating profit since their founding, but they have managed to barely function as commerce platforms in various forms.

Currently, Timep faces a crisis where it cannot function as any kind of commerce platform due to a large-scale settlement delay incident. Sellers who were not paid have withdrawn, and consumers who lost trust have stopped visiting. Considering Timep’s settlement structure, if consumption does not resume on the platform, resolving the problem is difficult. Unless it goes bankrupt leaving only damages behind, whether sold separately or merged and rebuilt, it must ultimately function again as a commerce platform where consumers visit and open their wallets. Only then can settlements be made and the problem be resolved. This ironic reality?where a problem that no one wants to face has occurred, yet someone must return to resolve it?fully reveals the fragile truth of Timep, which has precariously survived for the past 14 years by settling past sales with current sales proceeds.

Assuming it does not close its doors, what kind of commerce path will Timep take now? Koo Young-bae, CEO of Qoo10, proposed merging Timep and creating a unified shopping mall tentatively called “K-Commerce,” which would involve affected sellers as shareholders. A new corporation, KCCW, was also established. Upon closer inspection, this structure requires sellers to plan products, sell them, and even promote them in order to recover unpaid balances. This idea, which holds victims hostage, emerged because there is no solution unless Timep starts operating again. Wherever Timep’s final destination may be, Koo Young-bae’s “K-Commerce” must not be allowed.