[If You Know] Jang Taewan Has Had a Difficult Relationship with Jeon Du-hwan for a Long Time (Part 1)

Director Kim Seongsu's 'Seoul Spring' Highlighting the 12·12 Military Coup
Jang Taewan, the First Among 6·25 Commissioned Officers to be Promoted to Army Major General
Jeon Duwhan Delivered Kim Jangbi to Jang Taewan's Office Ahead of 12·12
"If Jeong Seunghwa Had Complied, He Would Have Been Served Above Minister Level"

The film Seoul's Spring, directed by Kim Seong-su, deals with the December 12 military rebellion that occurred in 1979. It depicts the tense nine hours between Jeon Du-gwang (played by Hwang Jung-min), the Security Commander of the new military faction attempting to seize power, and Lee Tae-shin (played by Jung Woo-sung), the Capital Defense Commander striving to protect Seoul. The sharp confrontation was set against the backdrop of the October 26 incident. The key issue that emerged was who would manage and lead the transitional period of power vacuum.

In reality, the attitude of the military was the most crucial. The direction of democratization could be determined by the stance of those wielding strong physical force. In this regard, the success of democratization absolutely required the military's political non-intervention and neutral stance. Jeong Seung-hwa, the Martial Law Commander, showed support for the civilian government but could not sustain it. On December 12, Jeon Du-hwan, the Security Commander, along with hardliners within the military, staged a military rebellion of insubordination, arrested Jeong, and seized control of the military.

One of the main reasons the military rebellion succeeded less than two months after the October 26 incident was the tight-knit network forged by the Hanahoe. Although they comprised only 0.05% of all officers, they had effectively occupied key institutions. Even core figures on the opposing side were indecisive and confused, resulting in a virtually bloodless takeover. During this failure to prevent the disruption of national order, the military's legitimacy, command system, and discipline were completely trampled. Jang Tae-wan, the Capital Defense Commander who had mobilized troops and prepared for deployment, later revealed the truth about the December 12 military rebellion and expressed the following hope. This may be the reason why Seoul's Spring was produced.

"For the sake of achieving genuine reform in this land, the judicial punishment of the ringleaders of the December 12 military rebellion is a historical mission and a national task. Under the premise that a proper historical judgment is impossible without an accurate investigation of the facts, I believe that the only way to begin a correct historical judgment is to reveal the substantial truth through strict judicial punishment of these ringleaders, excise their crimes completely, and strike a decisive blow so that a tragic event like the December 12 military rebellion, which has become a major blot in our nation's history, never occurs again."

'Did you know?' provides useful information in a casual manner. It is a tip for enjoying the film more interestingly.

* Jang Tae-wan was the first army general to be promoted among about 30,000 officers commissioned during the Korean War. He later recalled, "If I had not been the frontrunner, I would not have been assigned as the Capital Defense Commander, nor would the miracle of not becoming a lifelong traitor have occurred."

* On October 27, 1979, around 3 a.m., while serving as Deputy Chief of the Army Headquarters Education Staff, Jang Tae-wan received a Level 2 emergency alert from the duty officer. Level 2 emergency is an emergency measure that requires immediate combat readiness upon order.

* Upon arriving at the Army Headquarters, Jang Tae-wan was curious about how Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa knew about the incident at the Blue House earlier than others and ordered the Level 2 emergency alert. The day before, Kim Jae-gyu, the head of the intelligence department, called Jeong and suggested having a quiet discussion over a meal about the current situation. Unaware of Kim's intentions, Jeong agreed without hesitation. Jeong was guided to the intelligence chief's office reception room, but the expected guest did not appear. He learned that Kim was drinking with the president, chief secretary, and security chief about 50 meters away, which upset him, but he continued waiting during the meal. Kim appeared during the meal and said, "Please wait a little longer. The president suddenly asked me to attend a dinner, so I will be a bit late," and left again. Just as the meal was nearly over, sudden gunshots rang out. Shortly after, Jeong received news of President Park Chung-hee's death from Kim while in the back seat of a car ascending the 3.1 Overpass. When Jeong asked where they were going, Kim said to Namsan (Central Intelligence Agency). Jeong suggested going to the Army Headquarters, thinking that if the president was assassinated, the culprit must be a security officer. If the culprit was Cha Ji-chul, the security chief, or his associate, since Cha had connections with military commanders, it would be better to go to the Army Headquarters, which had a perfect communication network to command the entire military in case of emergency. The car then rushed to the Army Headquarters.

* At the time of ordering the Level 2 emergency alert, Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa did not know who assassinated the president. He was unanimously appointed Martial Law Commander at the Cabinet meeting.

* As Martial Law Commander, Jeong Seung-hwa tried to prevent military involvement in politics and realize the military's political neutrality. Jang Tae-wan said, "As Deputy Chief of the Education Staff, I was close enough to confirm this," and added, "The 'military's political non-intervention pledge' also proves this." Jeong was a soldier with no political ambition. He maintained domestic security and order within the framework of martial law and aimed to establish a true democratic government as soon as possible according to public opinion.

* On October 28, 1979, Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa summoned Deputy Chief Jang Tae-wan. He said, "You excelled in the education course, and most of your career has been as a commander of frontline field army units and operations staff. Your rear service is relatively light, but you also served as Chief of Staff of the Capital Defense Command between 1973 and 1975. General Jang is very suitable as Capital Defense Commander." Jang was pleased but fearful and replied, "There must be many generals more suitable than me, so I suggest reconsidering the selection. I apologize." Jeong immediately responded firmly, "You! Personnel decisions are made by the Chief of Staff. You just do as you're told. You are the most qualified. I decided this after much consideration, so know that!" Jang pleaded for a few days' grace and then left the Chief of Staff's office.

* Jang Tae-wan and Jeong Seung-hwa were not close. Their hometowns were Indong and Gimcheon, respectively, and they worked together in the First Army for only three months. They had only brief contact of about 10 minutes exchanging approvals once or twice. Jang met Jeong again in early 1979 when Jeong became Army Chief of Staff while Jang was Deputy Chief of the Education Staff. However, apart from attending a few general staff meetings as acting chief when the chief was absent, they had no direct encounters. Moreover, Jang was dispatched to the Ministry of National Defense as chairman of the Army, Navy, and Air Force officer education system research committee less than a month after Jeong's appointment. He returned to the Army Headquarters about 10 months later and reported the 'Army Education Reform Plan' he researched to Jeong. Jeong praised it, saying, "This is truly excellent research. I will definitely try to implement it during my tenure as Chief of Staff."

* On November 16, 1979, at the Capital Defense Command parade ground, Jang Tae-wan held a change of command ceremony with former Capital Defense Commander Jeon Seong-gak, presided over by Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander Jeong Seung-hwa. Jang felt as if returning home, having served as Chief of Staff of the Capital Defense Command for two years and three months since April 1973. Most non-commissioned officers were comrades he had worked with before, so it was not unfamiliar. After the ceremony, he interviewed key colonels: Jang Se-dong, commander of the 30th Security Group; Kim Jin-young, commander of the 33rd Security Group; Jo Hong, military police commander; Hwang Dong-hwan, anti-aircraft artillery commander; and Gu Myeong-hee, artillery commander. The 30th and 33rd Security Groups were the Blue House guard units, a specific area exempt from higher unit command inspections. Although officially subordinate to the Capital Defense Command, they were operationally controlled by the Blue House Security Office, which even exercised personnel authority over commander selection. Jang had worked with Colonels Jang Se-dong and Kim Jin-young when he was deputy battalion commander of the 1st Regiment, Maengho Division. They treated Jang respectfully as a senior.

* Colonels Jang Se-dong, Kim Jin-young, Jo Hong, Lieutenant Colonel Shin Yun-hee (deputy military police commander), and Lieutenant Colonel Kim Jin-sung (operations staff assistant) were members of the Hanahoe.

* On December 5, 1979, Colonel Heo Hwa-pyeong, Chief of Staff to Security Commander Jeon Du-hwan, visited Jang Tae-wan's office and handed him an envelope containing a check and a note written by Jeon with a fountain pen: "Brother, it's not much, but please use it to help with your family's kimchi-making expenses." Jang was puzzled because when he was Chief of Staff of the Capital Defense Command, he had imprisoned Kim Sang-gu, commander of the anti-aircraft artillery battalion and Jeon's brother-in-law. He wondered about Jeon's intention in sending money for kimchi expenses despite the deep regret. Jang sent Heo away and called Brigadier General Kim Ki-taek, the Chief of Staff and a classmate of Jeon from the 11th class of the Military Academy, into his office. Jang instructed, "Since returning the money immediately might be awkward, please find a way to return it soon without causing misunderstanding." Kim suggested using it for year-end party expenses, which Jang approved and handed the check to him.

* Jang had never met Jeon Du-hwan before the incident involving Kim Sang-gu. After assuming command of the Capital Defense Command, he met Jeon, the Security Commander, for the first time at a martial law meeting. Jeon congratulated Jang on his appointment. Jang subtly probed whether Jeon still held resentment over Kim Sang-gu's case. Jeon replied, "That's all in the past. That friend did wrong, so why dwell on it?"

* On December 8, 1979, Colonel Jo Hong visited Jang Tae-wan and said, "Commander! Today I went to greet Security Commander Jeon Du-hwan, and he said he would like to hold a unity dinner on December 12 at 6:30 p.m. with you, Special Forces Commander Jeong Byeong-ju, and Military Police Chief Kim Jin-gi (then head of martial law security). He asked me to suggest this." Jang scolded, "Why are you making such contact? Are you joking about getting promoted this time? If you act recklessly to get promoted alone, you are not qualified to be a general. And now am I supposed to buy you drinks? What's your position?" Jo denied this strongly. Since the Security Commander's chief of staff had also visited with such a message, Jang thought it was an event that should happen someday and agreed, "Then fine!"

* Looking back on a series of events, Jang speculated, "The December 12 military coup plan was being devised well before December 5. The plan was finalized and the date set for December 12. Since Colonel Jo Hong conveyed the party date set by General Jeon on December 8, it shows they had completed all preparations before December 5. It is known that the trigger for the December 12 incident was Martial Law Commander Jeong Seung-hwa's attempt to oust Security Commander Jeon Du-hwan. However, in my judgment, although some say it was an unplanned military insubordination, it was definitely a planned coup. I can assert this because General Jeong said he discussed replacing the Security Commander with Defense Minister Noh Jae-hyun while playing golf, but that day was Sunday, December 9. On that day, Jeong proposed to Minister Noh to replace Security Commander Jeon after Kim Jae-gyu's trial, but Noh suggested trying to appease him more and replace him only if it failed. According to rumors, Noh told Deputy Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyu about this and asked for his opinion, and Kim agreed. However, about two hours later, Kim went to the Security Command and tipped off Jeon Du-hwan, directly triggering the December 12 incident. But this happened the day after I was informed of the Yeonhui-dong party date. This shows that the attempt to oust the Security Commander was not the direct cause of the December 12 incident, nor was it an accidental coup."

* General Jeong Seung-hwa said the December 12 incident was planned: "After the October 26 incident, the people most anxious were those dispatched to special agencies like the Blue House or Central Intelligence Agency (most of whom were Hanahoe members). They probably thought it would be difficult to grow in the military after the October 26 incident. Moreover, there was much public opinion within the military to expel them. I, as Martial Law Commander, had to tour military commands and give admonitions to calm the situation." The admonitions likely reached Jeon Du-hwan through security channels.

* There is a theory that after the October 26 incident, Jeon Du-hwan and his Hanahoe supporters planned a military reorganization to place their members in key positions, and when this was ignored, they conceived the December 12 coup. Jang Tae-wan was convinced this was true. "Before I became Capital Defense Commander, I heard from the U.S. 8th Army that regular Military Academy officers, including classes 11 and 12, were frequently meeting and seemed to be planning something, so they advised close observation. This was later confirmed. Jeon Du-hwan and his supporters were planning not only military reorganization but also appointments of some cabinet members like the Prime Minister and Defense Minister to seize military hegemony and strengthen their position after October 26. For example, they planned to appoint Defense Minister Noh Jae-hyun as Prime Minister, Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or Defense Minister, 1st Corps Commander Hwang Young-si as Chief of Staff, Security Commander Jeon Du-hwan as Deputy Chief of Staff, 9th Division Commander Roh Tae-woo as Security Commander, 50th Division Commander Jeong Ho-yong as Special Forces Commander, and Lieutenant Generals Yoo Hak-seong, Cha Kyu-heon, and Yoon Seong-min as military commanders. This shows they were already planning to take power."

* After December 12, Jang was taken to Seobinggo for investigation and met Jeon Du-hwan, who said, "If Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa had cooperated willingly, we would have appointed him as minister or higher, and you, senior officer, would have been assigned as corps commander."

* December 12, 1979, was not only the day of the incident but also the day of the announcement of general promotions. In the morning, Jang Tae-wan was informed by Chief of Staff Jeong Seung-hwa that Operations Staff Colonel Park Dong-won was excluded from promotion. Park was not even on the list of candidates twice the number of promotion slots submitted by the review committee. Jang recalled Jeon's words a month earlier: "Brother! Promoting Operations Staff Park Dong-won would be a big problem. He was appointed operations staff by former commander Jeon Seong-gak, who served with him in Vietnam, but he has supported Kim Dae-jung since he was a captain. So he should not be promoted." Jang also heard similar remarks from Capital Corps Commander Cha Kyu-heon a few days later. At that time, Kim Dae-jung supporters were considered 'ideologically subversive' within the military. Park had never spoken about Kim Dae-jung but had openly criticized the Hanahoe during his regular Army College course as a captain.

* Around 6 p.m. on December 12, Jang Tae-wan moved to Yeonhui-dong, where Jeon Du-hwan's dinner invitation was scheduled, guided by his aide Cheon Yeon-woo. The venue was a high-end residence: a two-story stone building with a wide lawn garden decorated with various flowers. Special Forces Commander Jeong Byeong-ju and Military Police Chief Kim Jin-gi, who had arrived earlier, were sitting in the garden chatting with Security Command Chief of Staff Woo Guk-il. Inside the room was Military Police Commander Jo Hong. Jang was displeased by the attempt to join the gathering with fellow generals without prior permission and sharply rebuked them. Their presence was a ploy to keep Jang and Special Forces Commander Jeong at the dinner until the planned coup time of 8:30 p.m.

* During the dinner, Military Police Chief Kim Jin-gi stepped outside to take a call, returned with a serious expression, and called Jang. He reported hearing gunshots at the Chief of Staff's residence. Jang immediately called the residence but received a confused response shouting "ambulance" before the call was cut off. Shortly after, his aide waiting in the car relayed the same news. It was about 7:20 p.m., roughly 10 minutes after the main event had started. Jang drove the car at full speed as Capital Defense Commander.

* Jang asked Military Police Commander Jo Hong, sitting beside him, "What do you think about the situation at the Chief of Staff's residence?" Jo hesitated and replied, "Well, isn't it possible that armed infiltrators took advantage of the chaos after the president's assassination?" Jang thought this was an absurd suggestion. Anxious, he gave operational orders while driving: "Send an APC (armored personnel carrier) and a military police special forces platoon to the Chief of Staff's residence to assess the situation and respond to emergencies. Also, declare an emergency to all subordinate units and assemble all commanders and staff in the situation room!" This was around 7:40 p.m.

* The main actors of the December 12 coup gathered around 6:30 p.m. in the office of the commander of the 30th Security Group. They included Lieutenant General Yoo Hak-seong, Deputy Assistant Minister of Defense for Military Logistics; Major Generals Cha Kyu-heon, Capital Corps Commander; Hwang Young-si, 1st Corps Commander; Roh Tae-woo, 9th Division Commander; Brigadier Generals Park Jun-byeong, 20th Division Commander; Park Hee-do, 1st Airborne Brigade Commander; Choi Se-chang, 3rd Airborne Brigade Commander; Jang Ki-o, 5th Airborne Brigade Commander; and Baek Woon-taek, 71st Defense Division Commander. Colonels Jang Se-dong and Kim Jin-young, commanders of the 30th and 33rd Security Groups, were also present. This was while Jang Tae-wan, Jeong Byeong-ju, and Kim Jin-gi were at the Yeonhui-dong venue.

* Jeon Du-hwan sent Colonels Heo Sam-su and Woo Kyung-yoon to the Chief of Staff's residence to detain Jeong Seung-hwa. Jeon also went to the Prime Minister's residence with Lieutenant Colonel Lee Hak-bong, head of the Joint Investigation Headquarters, to seek President Choi Kyu-ha's approval. This was reportedly at 6:30 p.m.

References: Jang Tae-wan, 12·12 Coup and Me (1993, Myeongseong Publishing); Political Department of Hankook Ilbo, Seized Seoul's Spring (1994, Hankook Ilbo); Ko Namu, Still Alive Jeon Du-hwan (2013, Bookcomma); Roh Tae-woo, Memoirs (Vol. 1): National Democratization, My Destiny (2011, Chosun News Press); Jeong Il-young & Hwang Dong-ha, Jeon Du-hwan's Biography (2017, Grimssi); Jeong Hae-gu, Jeon Du-hwan and the 1980s Democratization Movement (2011, Institute for Historical Issues).