[Changing the World M]② 24-born Gapsu, 61-born Youngsoo, 90-born Jihoon

The Pioneer of Industrialization Crossing the Line Between the Pacific War and the Korean War, Gapsu
Yeongsu Who Overturned the Military Dictatorship and Led Democratization
Jihun Living as an 'Advanced Country' with Achievements in Industrialization and Democratization

The ‘Millennial generation (Millennials, born 1980?1996)’ is gaining attention as the leading force that will drive South Korea’s politics, economy, society, and culture over the next 30 years. The eldest group is entering their early 40s, and the youngest group is approaching their late 20s, gradually replacing the X generation and the ’86 generation’?who have now reached middle and old age?in various sectors of South Korean society. While the ’86 generation,’ which led Korean society for the past 30 years, experienced rapid economic growth during their childhood and youth and lived through the democratization transition period socially, the succeeding Millennial generation lives in an era of low growth and ‘post-democratization,’ marking significant differences in the experiences of the two generations. Accordingly, this article analyzes the present and future lives of three fictional representative figures?Kim Ji-hoon (born 1990), Lee Young-soo (born 1961), and Park Gap-soo (born 1924)?who respectively represent the advanced country generation, the democratization generation, and the industrialization generation, through their youth life histories.

‘Don’t Ask, Gapja-born’... Surviving War Devastation to Become Pillars of Industrialization

Park Gap-soo was born in 1924, the year of ‘Gapja’ in the sexagenary cycle. Those born and raised in their youth during this period are often referred to as ‘Don’t Ask, Gapja-born.’ Originally, this expression stemmed from a folk belief that those born in the first year of the 60-year cycle, ‘Gapja (甲子),’ possessed exceptional talents. However, for those born in 1924, who experienced the Pacific War and the Korean War, it came to mean that if their physical condition was suitable, they were forcibly conscripted ‘without question.’

Accordingly, the overarching theme of the Gapja-born’s youth was ‘survival.’ When Gap-soo was 15 in 1939, World War II broke out, and at 17 in 1941, the Pacific War began. Korea, then a Japanese colony, was effectively operated under a wartime mobilization system.

Gap-soo graduated from a vocational school (secondary education) and advanced to a professional school (higher education), making him part of the elite group of that era. According to the 2009 report ‘60 Years of Korean Education?Achievements and Challenges’ published by the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation, in 1942, there were only 22 higher education institutions in Joseon (including Keijo Imperial University and other professional schools) with a total of 4,505 students. This represented just 0.6% of the number of elementary education institutions (common schools) and 0.2% of the student population.

However, even Gap-soo, an elite of his time, was not free from the struggle for survival. From 1944, when he was 20, the Student Special Support Corps system was introduced and implemented. Although nominally a volunteer soldier system, it was semi-compulsory. Gap-soo served in Japan during the late war period rather than in Southeast Asia or the Pacific battlefields, but some of his friends did not return.

After liberation in 1945, when Gap-soo was 21, he returned to his homeland, but the unprepared independence led to chaos. Hyperinflation exceeding 2000% occurred, and left-right conflicts over future government formation persisted. Gap-soo started a family and had children around 1946?1947, when he was 22?23, but the turmoil continued.

The Korean War, which broke out in 1950 when Gap-soo was 26, was the pinnacle of the survival struggle. As an ‘intellectual,’ Gap-soo fled with his family. Although he survived, he was drafted and served until the armistice in 1953, at age 29, crossing the line of death again.

This survival story of Gap-soo can also be found in the lives of prominent Gapja-born politicians who shaped an era. Former President Kim Dae-jung, born in the Gapja year (officially recorded as 1926), graduated from Mokpo Commercial School and was employed by a shipping company in 1944. He initially planned to continue his studies but chose employment to avoid forced conscription. After liberation, he stood in the midst of left-right conflicts and was nearly executed by the People’s Army during the Korean War for being a ‘capitalist,’ but survived by a miracle.

The youth of Kim Jeong-ryeom, former Chief Presidential Secretary and a Gapja-born economic bureaucrat during the high-growth period, was similar. Kim, an elite who graduated from Nonsan Gang-gyeong Commercial School and Oita Economic Professional School in Japan, was conscripted in 1944 under the Student Special Support Corps and witnessed the end of the war in Hiroshima. After liberation, he returned to Korea, enlisted in the military in 1949, and participated in the Korean War. It is said that Kim suffered lifelong aftereffects from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

The Korean War and the post-war destruction also created a ‘new order.’ The traditional class society collapsed. Gapja-born individuals who entered the military grew into ‘military elites’ with continued military support from the United States and the United Nations (UN). The 8th class of the Korea Military Academy, mainly composed of those born in the 1920s such as former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil, later became the main actors of the May 16 coup, reflecting this background.

After the armistice, full-scale economic reconstruction began. The average economic growth rate from 1954 to 1959 reached 5.3%, largely due to aid from the United States and others. When Gap-soo was 36 in 1960, South Korea’s per capita GDP was only $79, making it one of the poorest countries. Real economic development began after the implementation of the ‘Five-Year Economic Development Plan,’ initiated by the Chang Myon administration following the April 19 Revolution and concretized by the Park Chung-hee administration.

Vivid Memories of Industrialization and Democratization... Young-soo Born in ’61

‘Young-soo’ was a popular male name in the 1940s to 1960s. According to an analysis by the Supreme Court’s business division in 2014 of names registered over 60 years since the 1940s, ‘Young-soo’ was the most common name in the 1940s to 1960s, ‘Jung-hoon’ in the 1970s, ‘Ji-hoon’ in the 1980s to 1990s, and ‘Min-jun’ in the 2000s to 2010s.

The 1970s, when Lee Young-soo spent his adolescence, was the period when the so-called ‘Miracle on the Han River’ began in earnest, building on the achievements of the previous industrialization generation. Massive capital investment in heavy and chemical industries led to an average annual economic growth rate of 10.5% (1970?1979), and despite the first oil shock in 1973, the economy grew by 14.9% that year, the highest since the founding of the nation.

In particular, in 1977, the year Young-soo entered high school at age 16, exports surpassed $10 billion, and per capita GDP exceeded $1,000, shedding the label of a least developed country. Young-soo, who grew up wearing rubber shoes, was able to attend high school wearing sneakers.

In 1980, at age 19, Young-soo took the last ‘preliminary college entrance exam’ and succeeded in entering university. At that time, not many peers had such a smooth life. According to the Ministry of Education, the enrollment rate in higher education institutions in 1980 was only 11.4%. Young-soo was among the ‘elite’ representing one in ten of his peers who entered university.

The world was ‘spring came but not like spring.’ The political thaw following the death of President Park Chung-hee in 1979 (when Young-soo was 18) froze again with the Gwangju Democratization Movement and martial law expansion in 1980 (age 19). The economy contracted due to overinvestment in heavy and chemical industries and the second oil shock. After entering university, classes were often disrupted by continuous protests, strikes, and martial law expansion.

Reflecting this, the ’86 generation’ was dominated by vivid memories of democratization movements. In a panel survey conducted by Asia Economy from May 31 to June 5 through the polling agency Embrain, targeting 1,000 men and women aged 20?69 nationwide, 32.6% of the ’86 generation’ (born 1960?1969) cited the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement and the June Struggle as the political-social events that most influenced them. Following were the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye (27.5%) and the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun (22.3%).

In 1981, at age 20, Young-soo chose to enlist in the military. Although the service period was shortened, he spent 30 months enduring military injustices. After his discharge in late 1983 (age 22) and return to university, the campus atmosphere remained tense. Some seniors and juniors engaged in democratization movements through disguised employment or underground activities, but Young-soo could not participate directly. Instead, he supported them covertly, alleviating his guilt.

Young-soo succeeded in finding employment in 1987 (age 26). With a clear economic growth trend, employment was not difficult. South Korea’s average economic growth rate from 1980 to 1989 was 8.9%. Around 1989, when he was about 30, South Korea’s GDP reached $246.927 billion, and per capita GDP was $5,817, entering the ranks of the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ thanks to the ‘three lows’ boom.

Spring that seemed unlikely finally arrived. With the start of the June Struggle in 1987, Young-soo, then a new employee, joined the ‘tie-wearing army.’ The introduction of direct presidential elections allowed him to savor the experience of ‘victory.’ The ’86 generation,’ including Young-soo, identified this period as the most dynamic in Korean society, marking democratization and the ‘three lows’ boom (1986?1989) (27.0%), the second highest after the previous generation (31.4%).

Young-soo married around 1988, at age 27?28, and had his first child. He had a second child around 1990. According to Statistics Korea, the average age of first marriage for men in 1988 was 27.5 years. During this period, South Korea’s development level improved significantly. When asked about the political, economic, social, and cultural level of South Korea during their 20s, 58.4% of the ’86 generation’ answered ‘developing country.’ When asked about the current level, 42.5% answered ‘just before advanced country,’ and 16.7% said ‘advanced country.’ The 1988 Seoul Olympics symbolized this ‘victory.’

After democratization, they rose as mainstream forces in various sectors of society. In the 1990s, the conservative and liberal parties continued recruiting talents. Examples include Kim Min-seok of the Democratic Party, elected to the National Assembly in 1996 at the young age of 31 and former president of Seoul National University’s student council, and Won Hee-ryong, Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, who entered politics in 1999 after careers as an activist and prosecutor.

Ji-hoon Born in ’90 Living in an Advanced Country

Like Young-soo, Ji-hoon is a representative name that dominated the 1980s and 1990s. Around the 2010s, when Ji-hoon entered young adulthood, South Korea had firmly joined the ranks of ‘advanced countries.’ When Ji-hoon was in high school in 2006 (age 16), per capita GDP surpassed $20,000.

However, this period also marked the beginning of a ‘low growth’ trend. The average economic growth rate during Ji-hoon’s young adulthood in the 2010s (2010?2019) was 3.3%, only 0.1 percentage points above the global average (3.2%).

The Lee Myung-bak administration, which came to power in 2008 when Ji-hoon was 18, launched with the so-called ‘747’ pledge to achieve 7% domestic economic growth, $40,000 per capita GDP within 10 years, and rank South Korea’s national power among the world’s top seven. However, this was an anachronistic plan. As low growth began, Ji-hoon’s middle and high school years were marked by repeated asset market fluctuations such as the credit card crisis (2003), real estate bubble (2005?2006), and the global financial crisis (2008?2009).

Ji-hoon’s high school years were a continuous competition. Since he could not afford to miss either early or regular admissions, he had to exhaust himself with night self-study and online lectures on weekdays and cram schools and private tutoring on weekends. Occasionally, he felt hollow when hearing about others’ early admissions. Although he entered university in 2009 (age 19), the path to success was no longer guaranteed. The higher education enrollment rate in 2010 was 69.3%, similar to the 69.8% high school enrollment rate in 1989.

Competition intensified after Ji-hoon turned 20 in the 2010s. Having experienced university entrance, military service, job preparation, and starting social life, Ji-hoon enlisted in 2010 (age 20) and served 18 months in the army. While there was no longer physical abuse or harsh treatment, he felt conflicted about his career path after returning to university.

After returning to school in 2012 (age 22), his concerns became reality. Peers exempted from military service had gotten ahead by steadily managing their credentials. Ji-hoon was busy managing grades, volunteering, and preparing certifications during the remaining semesters. Part-time jobs to cover living expenses were an additional burden.

Ji-hoon succeeded in employment at age 27 in 2017, the first year per capita GDP surpassed $30,000. His friends envied his ‘early’ employment. According to an analysis of data by the job portal Incruit in 2020, the average age of new employees at large companies in 2018 was 30.9 years, 5.8 years later than 25.1 years in 1998, just after the Asian financial crisis.

Starting a family was not easy either. In 2020, when Ji-hoon turned 30, the COVID-19 pandemic and liquidity expansion to counter the economic downturn caused rapid asset market bubbles. Even securing housing before marriage and childbirth became difficult. Ji-hoon, now 33, plans to marry his girlfriend next year. According to Statistics Korea, the average age of first marriage for men in 2022 was 33.7 years, an 8.2-year increase from about 30 years ago (27.5 years).

Ji-hoon’s youth was also marked by ongoing political ‘anomie.’ Although formal democracy advanced after achieving direct elections and horizontal regime changes, polarization between industrialization and democratization forces deepened. The deaths of former President Roh Moo-hyun in 2009 and the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye in 2016 attest to this.

The political and social event that left the strongest impression on the Millennial generation was the 2016 impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye (46.4%). Considering that the Z generation overwhelmingly cited the Sewol ferry disaster (47.1%), this shows that the impeachment had a greater impact on Millennials, who had voting rights, than on their younger counterparts who did not.

The Millennial generation’s perception of Korean society is complex, having experienced both the tail end and fruits of the high economic growth period comparable to Europe’s ‘Belle ?poque’ and the pressures of declining growth momentum and asset inequality. When asked about the level of Korean society in their 20s, the largest proportion (36.5%) answered ‘just before advanced country,’ followed by ‘middle-income country’ (32.1%). In contrast, when asked about the current level, the most common answer was ‘middle-income country’ (32.6%), followed by ‘just before advanced country’ (31.7%).

Only 35.6% (3.6% ‘strongly agree,’ 32.0% ‘agree’) of Millennials responded that South Korea’s entry into advanced country status had a concrete impact on their lives, the lowest among all generations. Although various indicators show Korea has reached ‘advanced country’ status, the individual perception of change among Millennials is likely limited.

When asked whether they believe social mobility is possible through individual effort, the highest proportion answered negatively (41.9%: 31.4% ‘no,’ 10.5% ‘not at all’). Notably, the 10.5% who answered ‘not at all’ was unusually high compared to other generations (3.8?7.5%).

Different Growth Environments... Changed Worldviews

Thus, the worldviews of Young-soo and Ji-hoon, who experienced different growth paths, also show significant differences. Regarding the attitude taken when encountering unfairness at work, 50.6% of the ’86 generation,’ including Young-soo, answered ‘even if it cannot be changed immediately, one should try to resolve it,’ whereas only 43.1% of the Millennial generation gave this response, the lowest among all generations. Regarding solutions, 16.4% of Millennials said they would ‘quit the job,’ the highest proportion among all generations.

Expanding the scope to political and social unfairness, only 21.6% of Millennials believed ‘it can be changed and one should try to resolve it,’ the lowest among all generations, while 30.5% of the ’86 generation’ answered this, the second highest after the previous generation (35.2%).

Regarding the future direction of Korean society, Millennials expressed more negative views. When asked whether Korean politics is likely to change in a desirable direction, 50.0% answered negatively (33.5% ‘no,’ 16.5% ‘not at all’), the highest proportion among all generations. In contrast, only 43.3% of the ’86 generation’ responded negatively.

Professor Gu Jeong-woo of the Department of Sociology at Sungkyunkwan University said, “The ’86 generation’ and those in their 50s and 60s, who are leaders in the workplace, tend to show positive and confident attitudes toward problem-solving, whereas the Millennial generation, sandwiched between the leadership group and the socially inexperienced Z generation, naturally exhibits a more cynical worldview, especially as they have entered a low-growth era compared to previous generations who experienced high growth.”