On the 27th, a press conference related to the West Sea public official shooting incident and the expulsion of heinous criminals was held, hosted by the Democratic Party of Korea's Yoon Seok-yeol Regime Political Oppression Countermeasures Committee. Photo by Yoon Dong-ju doso7@
[Asia Economy Reporter Kang Joohee] Park Ji-won, former Director of the National Intelligence Service, and Suh Hoon, former Director of the National Security Office at the Blue House, along with other key figures in the Moon Jae-in administration's security team, held a press conference on the 27th regarding the West Sea government official shooting incident and the repatriation of North Korean fishermen. They emphasized that there were no improper measures or interventions in the process of determining that the deceased Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries official Lee Dae-jun had defected to the North. They refuted point by point the audit results on the 'West Sea government official shooting' announced by the Board of Audit and Inspection on the 13th, criticizing, "The current government, immediately after taking office, has politicized security issues as a 'North Wind' incident and is obsessed with political retaliation against the previous administration."
Earlier, the Board of Audit and Inspection announced audit results stating that the previous Moon Jae-in administration concluded Lee had defected to the North despite insufficient evidence, that the initial response was inadequate, and that there was an attempt to cover up the incident through data deletion. In connection with this, former Minister of National Defense Seo Wook and former Commissioner of the Korea Coast Guard Kim Hong-hee were detained by prosecutors on the 22nd. With the two sides' claims sharply conflicting, the truth dispute surrounding the incident continues endlessly.
① Why was it judged as defection to the North?
The biggest issue in this incident is why the Moon administration judged it as defection to the North. At the press conference, Moon administration figures including former Blue House Chief of Staff Noh Young-min cited as grounds for the defection judgment: △ the Special Intelligence (SI) report contained the word 'defection to the North,' △ slippers presumed to belong to Lee were neatly placed on the ship, △ the weather conditions at the time of the incident were favorable and considering Lee's boarding experience, the possibility of accidental fall was low, and △ Lee was found wearing a life jacket and floating on debris in North Korean waters. They pointed out, "If the fact that the missing official found in North Korean waters expressed 'intention to defect to the North' in the SI intelligence is hidden or excluded, that would be manipulation. How can including the intelligence content as it is in the judgment be considered manipulation?"
However, the Board of Audit and Inspection views that the Moon administration hastily concluded defection to the North based on insufficient evidence. The expression of intention to defect was made after repeated questioning by North Korean soldiers, and it could not be confirmed whether the slippers belonged to Lee. The Board also revealed new facts that when Lee was first found, he was wearing a life jacket inscribed with Chinese characters, which cannot be obtained in Korea, and had bandages on him. There is a possibility that Lee was rescued by a Chinese fishing boat in the nearby waters. The Board's judgment is that the Moon administration deliberately concealed such information and pushed the 'defection narrative.'
However, former Director Suh and former Director Park said they "heard about the Chinese character life jacket, bandages, and Chinese fishing boat for the first time," and stated that the current government should investigate the newly revealed facts.
② Was there an order to delete data?
Regarding the audit result that 'intelligence reports were deleted' at the time of the incident, Moon administration figures denied it. They said it was not deletion but "an adjustment of distribution lines to prevent sensitive information from spreading to unnecessary units," and countered that "defining this as deletion is distorting the truth."
The Board of Audit and Inspection stated that on September 23, 2020, at 1 a.m., the day after Lee's disappearance, following a meeting of related ministers, the Ministry of National Defense deleted 60 military intelligence reports under the direction of former Minister Seo Wook. It also found that the National Intelligence Service had unlawfully deleted 46 intelligence reports. Until then, the National Security Office had presumed Lee's disappearance was due to accidental fall, but after the meeting, it concluded voluntary defection, according to the Board.
In response, Moon administration figures said, "If there had been an attempt to conceal, there would be no reason for 7 to 8 people including related ministers and aides to gather at the Blue House late at night for a meeting," emphasizing that "given the numerous personnel involved in the intelligence process from production, analysis, verification to judgment, concealment was impossible from the start." Former Director Park stressed regarding the National Intelligence Service, "I never ordered deletion, but even if I had, the staff are not foolish enough to follow such orders blindly." However, the National Intelligence Service filed a complaint with prosecutors in July accusing former Director Park of abuse of authority for ordering unauthorized deletion of intelligence reports under the National Intelligence Service Act.
③ Was the initial response inadequate?
The Board of Audit and Inspection believes that on September 22, the government recognized that Lee was found in North Korean waters but did not actively rescue him for repatriation, and that Lee died from gunfire during that time. In particular, the National Security Office received a report from the Ministry of National Defense about Lee's discovery but did not hold the 'initial situation assessment meeting' and only submitted a written report to President Moon Jae-in before leaving work.
Regarding this, Moon administration figures explained, "At the time the missing person was found in North Korean waters, it was not a life-threatening crisis. North Korea has historically detained or repatriated missing persons." They responded to criticism that no rescue measures were taken for Lee by saying, "Our military would have to physically cross the NLL (Northern Limit Line in the West Sea) and enter North Korean waters, which was impossible. Since the exact location of the missing person was unknown, taking immediate military action based solely on SI intelligence was practically impossible."
They added, "Every crime has a motive. What reason was there to push the so-called 'defection narrative' at that time?" emphasizing, "There was no reason or benefit to force the defection narrative."
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