[Desk Column] The Declaration of the End of the War as a Catalyst for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

[Asia Economy Senior Reporter Jinsoo Lee] It has been reported that the Moon Jae-in administration has entered into in-depth consultations with the United States regarding a Korean War end-of-war declaration. South Korea and the U.S. share a sentiment that the end-of-war declaration could serve as a catalyst to bring North Korea, which is exploring the situation through successive missile launches, back to the dialogue table.

In fact, the end-of-war declaration itself is merely a piece of paper. However, it cannot be denied that it is a necessary means for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Then, the claims that North Korea’s denuclearization must be completed before easing sanctions and declaring an end of war, and the opposing claims that easing sanctions and declaring an end of war must precede North Korea’s denuclearization, conflict with each other.

Here, it is necessary to rewind time a bit. The ‘Panmunjom Declaration,’ a product of the April 27, 2018 inter-Korean summit, included a plan to pursue an end-of-war declaration that year. Then U.S. President Donald Trump also expressed a positive stance on discussions about the end-of-war declaration.

The historic June 12, 2018 Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit joint statement also stated that “North Korea and the U.S. will participate in efforts to build a continuous and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” However, in the subsequent multiple North Korea-U.S. negotiations, the end-of-war declaration was not realized, and expectations surrounding it disappeared following the failure of the 2019 Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit.

At the Singapore summit, North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un proposed to President Trump to start establishing a new North Korea-U.S. relationship through an end-of-war declaration. However, the Hanoi summit failed as both sides could not narrow their differences.

While North Korea began showing small but positive moves such as closing the Dongchang-ri missile test site and returning some remains of U.S. war casualties, the U.S. showed no willingness to compromise on its principled stance regarding North Korea’s denuclearization. The U.S. had insisted that North Korea must submit a complete list of nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, and ballistic missiles, demanding North Korea’s denuclearization first.

Eventually, North Korea judged that adopting an end-of-war declaration, which is merely a political declaration, at the point when efforts to implement the Singapore joint declaration had stopped, would not help stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula at all and that the end-of-war declaration could be exploited as a smokescreen to conceal the U.S.’s hostile policy.

It has now become difficult even to bring North Korea to the dialogue table. The U.S. must learn from the mistakes of the Trump administration and be prepared to respond correspondingly to North Korea’s step-by-step moves. Only then can the denuclearization of North Korea, which the U.S. desires, gain momentum.

North Korea must also respond to dialogue. If all issues are negotiated at the negotiation table and an end of war is declared together with the U.S., it will be difficult for the U.S. to maintain a hardline stance toward North Korea.

China, a signatory to the armistice agreement, must also be involved. The formal name of the Korean War armistice agreement signed on July 27, 1953, is “Agreement on the Military Armistice in Korea, with the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command as one party and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army as the other party.” The commanders of the UN forces, North Korean forces, and Chinese forces signed it. The agreement was also drafted in English, Chinese, and Korean. If North Korea participates in the end-of-war declaration and North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations proceed, the situation around the Korean Peninsula can develop stably, which is also beneficial for China.

Thus, the end-of-war declaration is a very useful means to serve as an opportunity to resume dialogue with North Korea. The declaration itself shows that there is no hostile policy toward North Korea.

What is needed now is mutual trust. Mutual trust is not formed overnight. Something must be steadily exchanged between the parties. The end-of-war declaration will be the catalyst for that.