[Opinion] Korean Diplomacy Beyond the Normalization Threshold, Must Strive to Restore the Korea-US Alliance

Lee Yong-jun, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador for North Korean Nuclear Issues

Among diplomats, inter-state summits are regarded as “guaranteed successful meetings” or “meetings that cannot fail.” This is because summits are largely ceremonial processes where the leaders do not negotiate directly on-site but rather formalize and announce agreements that have been discussed and settled in advance by working-level officials. This is why protocol details such as the rank of welcoming officials, meeting duration, and dinner menus often attract more attention than the substantive issues discussed at the summit.

While disagreements inevitably exist in inter-state summits, such differences are kept confidential and the fact that discussions took place is often denied. If the disagreements are too significant to produce a “successful summit,” the summit simply does not take place. Although summits without prior working-level coordination are extremely rare, their chances of success are very uncertain. The 2019 North Korea?U.S. Hanoi summit, which ended in failure, is a representative example.

Few expected the recent summit held in Washington between President Moon Jae-in and President Joe Biden to succeed. Despite any successful prior consultations between the two countries, there were stark differences in their positions on North Korea and China issues.

The possibility of the U.S. agreeing to a North Korea?U.S. summit and easing sanctions on North Korea, which are South Korea’s core concerns, was nonexistent. Likewise, it was hard to imagine South Korea agreeing to U.S. interests such as combined South Korea?U.S. military exercises, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, South Korea?U.S.?Japan security cooperation, South China Sea issues, Taiwan issues, North Korean human rights, Chinese human rights, Quad participation, and advanced technology controls targeting China.

Nonetheless, a joint statement reflecting the nuanced positions of both sides was adopted, and both governments declared the summit a “success.” The joint statement included all issues that the U.S. emphasizes in the context of U.S.?China rivalry, such as the South China Sea, Chinese human rights, Quad participation, advanced technology controls targeting China, as well as highly sensitive issues like the Taiwan Strait and the COVID-19 origin investigation.

While the U.S. rejected South Korea’s top priorities of a North Korea?U.S. summit and easing sanctions on North Korea, it accepted the concept of using the Panmunjom Declaration and the North Korea?U.S. Singapore joint statement as the basis for North Korea negotiations and agreed in principle to pursue humanitarian aid to North Korea.

Additionally, the U.S. accepted the North Korean phrasing “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” instead of “denuclearization of North Korea.” It also agreed to exclude key security issues such as the actualization of joint military exercises, THAAD base approval, and South Korea?U.S.?Japan joint exercises. However, the U.S. stance prevailed on the timing of wartime operational control transfer and North Korean human rights issues.

Overall, South Korea sacrificed its relationship with China to advance inter-Korean relations, its top priority in the final phase of its term, while the U.S. appeared to concede security issues on the Korean Peninsula to achieve its grand strategy of detaching South Korea from the Chinese camp.

However, while the U.S.-reflected China-related phrases describe specific policies and positions, the North Korea-related phrases obtained by South Korea are largely general and conceptual. Therefore, the summit is generally evaluated as one where the U.S. gained international political benefits, and South Korea focused more on securing domestic political legitimacy.

Based on the results of this summit, the Moon Jae-in administration seems poised to make a final all-out effort to advance inter-Korean relations during its remaining term. However, a mirage remains a mirage. Now that our diplomacy has barely crossed the threshold of normalization, a far more important and urgent task left for this administration is to normalize the previously distorted foreign relations and restore the South Korea?U.S. alliance to its original state, thereby returning it to the people.