[Professor Hwang Jaeho's Diplomatic Odyssey] Professor Emeritus Ha Youngsun: "China Finds It Difficult to Replace US Leadership in World Order"

Hayoungseon, Chairman of the East Asia Research Institute. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

6. 'The Geopolitician of Love' Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute

Interviewer / Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Hwang Jae-ho, Professor at the School of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, serves as a member of the Presidential Policy Planning Committee and Director of the Global Strategy Cooperation Institute. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).

Professor Ha Young-sun is one of Korea's leading international relations scholars who has studied international political theory and history for half a century. He is currently the chairman of the East Asia Institute and an emeritus professor at Seoul National University. Rather than providing immediate, piecemeal responses to current issues, he approaches them with a long-term perspective that reads through the larger historical flow. Instead of viewing fierce international politics pessimistically or critically, his recent book titled 'The World Politics of Love' reflects a bright, warm, and constructive scholarly approach to finding solutions. We met him on the afternoon of April 14th in the conference room of the East Asia Institute.

- Professor, you have long spoken about the reconstruction of the world order. I would like to ask whether the reconstruction is currently underway in the world order, and if so, whether it is a complete rebuild, a partial renovation, or still merely at the design stage.

▲ Domestic discussions on the new construction, reconstruction, and dismantling of the world order remain at a rudimentary level, mainly addressing the risks and possibilities of conflict avoidance between hegemonic and challenger states from the perspective of power transition theory. However, the reconstruction of the 21st-century world order is a civilizational issue that concerns not only the Korean Peninsula but also the fate of humanity, so it requires deeper examination. Looking back at the history of modern world order construction since the 16th century, world powers such as Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States, victorious in world-scale wars roughly every 100 years, have rebuilt the world order five times. Over time, emerging states have criticized the legitimacy of the established order, leading the world order through phases of reconstruction, followed by decentralization of power, and eventually entering a dismantling phase through war.

Through two world wars in the 20th century, the British-led world order was dismantled, and the United States led the fifth reconstruction of the world order. Entering the 21st century, the U.S.-led world order is undergoing a reconstruction phase in response to the challenge posed by China, which has emerged as a new power following the Soviet Union.

The first characteristic of the ongoing reconstruction is that in the first half of the 21st century, the U.S. is expected to maintain military superiority over China, so the risk of direct military conflict between the two countries is low. However, indirect military tensions may rise as the U.S. and China seek to protect their core national interests in the surrounding regions of China. Second, beyond the military arena, the U.S. and China are engaged in intense competition and conflict over the legitimacy of the existing order in economic, technological, and normative arenas, striving to secure more member states in their reconstruction efforts. Third, historically, challenger states dissatisfied with the reconstruction led by the dominant order have continued to strengthen their military power, eventually triggering wars that dismantled the existing order and allowed the newly emerged dominant power to build a new order.

However, in the 21st century, when the U.S. and China enter a phase of military decentralization and potentially full-scale war, unlike the past, there is a risk that the global order could be irreparably destroyed. Therefore, all actors on the stage, not only the U.S. and China, must solve the civilizational challenge of finding a path of cooperation and coexistence instead of war ending the 21st-century world order.

Hayoungseon, Chairman of the East Asia Research Institute. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- You mentioned the U.S. and China, but are there other countries worth noting?

▲ It depends on the timeframe you consider. Based on global economic statistics, India is a country to watch in the long term. Although India has faced many difficulties in its modern state-building process, by the mid-21st century, India will become the most populous country in the world and one of the top three countries in terms of gross national product alongside the U.S. and China.

- During President Trump's four years, the U.S. deepened isolationism. President Biden is focusing on restoring U.S. leadership in the world order. How do you think the Trump and Biden eras will be evaluated in world history or U.S. diplomatic history?

▲ Since 1945, the U.S. has led the world order but has experienced relative decline in national power since the 1970s. To maintain its leadership role, the U.S. has continuously made various efforts. Entering the 21st century, with China's rapid rise, especially under President Trump, the U.S. pursued a foreign policy based on two principles: America First and peace through strength. While these efforts may have gained short-term domestic support, from the perspective of long-term changes in U.S. leadership, they inevitably have two very negative effects.

First, to prevent the relative decline of U.S. power, independent efforts are important, but joint leadership with other countries is inevitable. America First has had a negative effect in this regard. Second, 21st-century national power requires complex capabilities including military, economic, technological, ecological balance, cultural influence, and co-governance. Peace through strength faces limitations by utilizing the stage too narrowly. President Biden is pursuing a new foreign policy to restore U.S. leadership with allies and relatively emphasize the normative power of American-style democracy to overcome the limitations of Trump's diplomacy. However, for the U.S. to properly exert leadership in the world order, it must innovate in a future-oriented way rather than simply restoring the past. To do so, it needs to boldly consider policies toward China not only from a containment perspective at the Indo-Pacific level but also from a path of co-evolution. Moreover, the normative power of democracy should expand beyond American-style democracy to secure legitimacy as global democracy and broaden global normative power.

Hayoungseon, Chairman of the East Asia Research Institute. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- When the term Indo-Pacific emerged, I thought it was a defensive expression by the U.S. because the Asia-Pacific concept the U.S. had was no longer sufficient to contain China. In your view, does China's proposed new type of international relations strongly conflict with the U.S.-led world order system, or does it complement it?

▲ The Xi Jinping government's theory of new-type international relations can be summarized as new-type major power relations and new-type neighbor relations. First, the three principles of new-type major power relations?non-conflict and non-confrontation, mutual respect, and cooperative common prosperity?clearly show that China does not want full-scale military confrontation with the U.S. China's officially announced 2021 defense budget of $210 billion is estimated to be around $250-300 billion, about one-third of the U.S. defense budget of $750 billion this year. Therefore, China knows better than anyone that it is not desirable to confront the U.S. directly on the military stage at this stage. However, in new-type neighbor relations, China insists on protecting three core interests: sovereignty, security, and development. Among these, issues related to Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet are especially emphasized as domestic sovereignty matters.

It is necessary to cautiously review the recent U.S.-China Alaska talks, which succinctly reflected the current U.S.-China relationship. Compared to the confrontational public session on the first day, the second day's closed-door working session showed that China emphasized both the principles of new-type major power relations and new-type neighbor relations to the U.S. In effect, China wanted to strongly signal to the Biden administration that it is prepared for certain military tensions to protect core interests like 'One China,' as long as it avoids direct military confrontation with the U.S.

Next, attention should be paid to the conflict and cooperation between the U.S. and China in the economic and technological arenas. The U.S. and China are closely linked in the global economic order, so if the U.S., like under President Trump, imposes 25% tariffs, the U.S. would also suffer corresponding economic losses. Additionally, following recent trade wars, the U.S. is pushing to decouple supply chains in advanced digital technologies where it holds a relative advantage, causing significant difficulties for China. However, given the rapid globalization of advanced technologies and interconnected supply chains, complete decoupling is realistically limited. Third, the U.S. and China have agreed in principle to cooperate on global issues such as COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, and post-pandemic global economic recovery.

Therefore, the current U.S.-China relationship is more complex than it appears superficially, showing a composite nature of competition, conflict, cooperation, and coexistence. How the U.S. and China will mitigate competitive and conflictual elements and enhance cooperative and symbiotic elements going forward is crucial.

Professor Jaeho Hwang, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- Then, is it better for Korea to participate jointly from the early stages of reconstruction, or to observe the situation and join at the last moment?

▲ The most important thing in participating in reconstruction is to conduct a proper preliminary feasibility study and secure space by participating in the design stage as quickly as possible. We are lagging behind in both respects. First, to conduct a preliminary feasibility study suitable for the 21st century, we must quickly move beyond the Cold War and post-Cold War binary view of the U.S. and China. In the process of long-term and complex cost-benefit analysis of how designs led by the U.S., China, or a complex power affect our lives, there are two points to be especially cautious about.

First, from a long-term perspective, although the U.S. is experiencing relative decline, it is still expected to maintain leadership in the 21st-century world order. Despite China's rapid rise, it is difficult to expect China to replace U.S. order leadership. Therefore, for the survival and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century, it is essential to deepen the Korea-U.S.-Japan network while simultaneously embracing the Korea-China network. It is not wise to fail to properly utilize the U.S. because of China or to waver between the U.S. and China. While utilizing the U.S. and Japan, efforts to minimize China's negative influence and further enhance its positive influence are difficult but not impossible.

Second, 21st-century national power is no longer simply military and economic power but requires emerging powers such as technological capability, ecological balance, normative power, and co-governance. Therefore, preliminary feasibility studies must be much more complex. Based on such 21st-century preliminary feasibility, Korea must actively participate in the design stage of reconstruction as soon as possible and become a co-leader in building the 21st-century Asia-Pacific order.

Hayoungseon, Chairman of the East Asia Research Institute. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- Among international political systems?unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar?which system is most advantageous for Korea?

▲ Considering the ideals and realities of the world order, for all actors including the Korean Peninsula to live meaningful lives, the system must transcend unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity to become a complex system. In my recently published book 'The World Politics of Love,' I emphasized that the world politics we dream of must be complex world politics, the international political expression of the world politics of love. In the politics of hatred, to survive, others must die; in the future world politics of love, both I and others must live. For this world politics of love to become a dream world politics, the protagonists, stage, and actors of the order must move from simplification to complexity. Without such complexity, the coming world order will ultimately face tragedy.

- How will this administration's foreign and North Korea policies be evaluated in world or Korean history?

▲ It is difficult to give passing marks to the current government or past governments regarding their insight into the transformation of the 21st-century world order. This government has not properly anticipated the 21st-century transformation of U.S.-China relations and has tried to solve international political issues overly centered on resolving inter-Korean problems. It lacks efforts to actively read the complex changes in the world order and to take the lead.

The fundamental responsibility for this low evaluation lies in modern Korean history itself. The generation that fought authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s to establish democracy now stands at the center of Korean politics. However, with their 20th-century perspective on the 21st-century world order, attempts to solve inter-Korean issues with a simplistic post-Cold War view, and efforts to resolve domestic political polarization dichotomously, it is impossible to realistically prepare a survival and prosperity strategy for the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century. Thus, this generation, which experienced the condensed changes of modern Korean history in the 1980s, faces inevitable difficulties trying to solve 21st-century problems with 20th-century approaches.

Especially from a future historical perspective, sufficient forward-looking feasibility studies on global unification led by the U.S. and China and on the unification of the Korean Peninsula have not been conducted. Regarding global unification, the issue of Korea's participation in the U.S.-led Quad or Quad Plus has passed the time for answers but remains unresolved. On the other hand, the peace and unification issues of the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea's denuclearization, are not properly prepared but are being approached with premature urgency. To properly solve the Korean Peninsula issue, as evolutionary biology suggests, North Korea's spontaneous efforts and the surrounding countries' co-evolutionary efforts, including Korea, must continue to open the possibility of coexistence before unification can be realistically pursued.

- How will North Korea be evaluated?

▲ If the situation in 2021 is evaluated 100 years from now, Korean political forces' ability to understand the world order will receive low marks, but North Korean political forces will receive even more severe low marks. North Korea's basic horizon for viewing the world order in the 21st century remains largely within the framework of strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities from the 1960s. North Korea views the enhancement of international capabilities from an anti-foreign and autonomous perspective. However, as I mentioned, survival in the 21st century cannot be achieved by anti-foreign autonomy alone. The 21st century is entering a city of co-sovereigns where everyone is an owner. Therefore, complex logic and insight beyond dichotomous views are increasingly important.

From this perspective, North Korea's nuclear force enhancement will paradoxically threaten its survival rather than guarantee it as time passes because genuine high-level economic growth without denuclearization is realistically impossible. Although unification is a modern task that must be solved by our nation, it should not be blindly pursued as simple modern unification. When the historical event of unification approaches according to the evolution of domestic and international conditions, preparations to address it in a 21st-century manner are necessary.

Hayoungseon, Chairman of the East Asia Research Institute. / Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- I strongly resonated with your use of the term 'linker' country in your book and interviews. According to you, a linker country connects great powers and small countries. Historically, which country has come closest to this role?

▲ In modern history, Finland's role during the dismantling of the Cold War order in Europe is a good example. In 1975, to transcend the post-war Cold War order in Europe, the Helsinki Process was agreed upon, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was launched, and later evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Finland played a central role in this process. Today, the Helsinki Process is highly regarded as an effort to end the Cold War and build trust in Europe. Although the final success of the Helsinki Process required the consent of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Finland played an important role throughout the process despite being a small Nordic country not representing Eastern or Western Europe. This case exemplifies how a middle or small power can exert international influence.

- You run a Sarangbang (study room) program for the younger generation at the East Asia Institute. Having taught young people for the past forty years, how do you see the international politics perspective of today's 20s and 30s? What would you like to say to them?

▲ Compared to the older generation, who rushed through modern Korean history accustomed to dichotomous thinking such as conflict and war, the younger generation responsible for the 21st-century future history relatively accepts complex thinking such as competition, cooperation, and coexistence without much resistance. Just as Park Gyu-su's Sarangbang in the late 19th century taught young people to read the new Western modern international order with a clear eye and prepare countermeasures, the East Asia Institute's Sarangbang helps today's youth properly understand the future of 21st-century complex world politics and devise survival and prosperity strategies through study and overseas field trips. We especially emphasize that for the Korean Peninsula and the world in the 21st century, young people must quickly grow into complex individuals suitable for the 21st century and design and build a new order to replace the outdated simple-minded 20th-century individuals.

Professor Jaeho Hwang, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Photo by Hyunmin Kim kimhyun81@

- If you could summarize yourself in one word, what would it be? I understand your pen name is Mancheong (晩靑).

▲ Mancheong means 'old young,' a pen name given to me by my Chinese teacher who said that even after turning sixty, I do not notice the passage of time and prefer looking forward and dreaming rather than looking back and organizing. A few years ago, when I reached my seventieth birthday, my junior scholars, with whom I study, urged me not to run forward blindly but to look back and organize the journey of studying international politics over the past half-century to help those who walk the same path. So, I gave a semester-long lecture titled 'The World Politics of Love.' This theme first came to my mind during my university days in the late 1960s when I was wandering between adaptation and rebellion, finding a third way. Since then, I have sought world politics of love where I and others live together, rather than the hateful international politics dividing us into 'us' and 'them.'

As a mid-term summary of this journey, I have emphasized complex world politics instead of simple international politics after the Cold War. When I retired from university, my last graduate seminar lecture was titled 'Love and War.' In short, my dream is to be a geopolitician of love who finds a way to save the Korean Peninsula and the world from hateful international politics.

Summary / Reporter Lee Ji-eun

Transcription / Shin Ui-chan, Researcher at the Global Strategy Cooperation Institute