Verification of Transfer of Operational Control Delayed Again... 'Transition Timing' Uncertain Within This Year

[Asia Economy Reporter Lim Chun-han] The South Korean and U.S. military authorities announced on the 7th that they will proceed with the first half joint command post exercise as planned from the 8th for a period of nine days, despite strong calls for postponement due to the restoration of inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations. Although the training schedule was quite fluid due to the COVID-19 situation, it is observed that they agreed to proceed as planned as conditions improved somewhat, such as U.S. troops stationed in Korea receiving vaccinations since the end of last year.

The future Combined Forces Command (CFC) Full Operational Capability (FOC) verification exercise for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), which was expected to be conducted during this first half joint exercise, has been postponed again to the second half of the year. The possibility that South Korea's intention to determine the timing of OPCON transfer within this year will not be realized has increased. South Korea had planned to complete the FOC verification in the first half of this year and determine the 'timing of OPCON transfer' within the year. However, the U.S. side insists on applying strict evaluation criteria for the OPCON transfer conditions.

The transfer conditions include both objective and subjective elements, so if either side disagrees with the evaluation result of even one condition, an agreement cannot be reached. The agreement between South Korea and the U.S. to include some theater-level operational rehearsal exercises led by the future CFC during this first half exercise appears to reflect partial acceptance of South Korea's claims by the U.S. side. Although a normal FOC verification cannot be conducted, the U.S. side has shown willingness to partially verify the 'theater operational command capability of a South Korean general.' Consequently, some view this as partial progress in the OPCON transfer process.

The future CFC, where a South Korean general serves as commander and a U.S. general as deputy commander, will be the organization exercising the transferred OPCON in the future. It will command theater operations on the Korean Peninsula, including U.S. reinforcements (excluding the Air Force) during wartime. Since the operational area may expand to the maritime domain around the Korean Peninsula during wartime, theater operational capability is essential.

In the second half of 2019, during the joint command post exercise, the basic operational capability (IOC) of the future CFC and the mission performance capability of its subordinate component commands were verified. Partial FOC verification was conducted during last year's second half exercise, but due to COVID-19, U.S. reinforcement troops could not enter, resulting in a 'half measure.'

With the change of the U.S. administration and the continued stalemate in inter-Korean relations, whether to conduct the first half joint exercise this year became a hot issue. Attention was focused on whether the joint exercise policy adjusted during the Donald Trump administration would change with the inauguration of the Joe Biden administration.

With the new administration's inauguration, voices calling for the normal conduct of joint exercises emerged in the U.S., mainly from the U.S. military side. It is reported that General Robert Abrams, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, also expressed dissatisfaction with the joint exercises conducted via computer simulation.

In particular, General Abrams has continuously advocated for the Fight Tonight posture of U.S. Forces Korea and strengthening the ROK-U.S. combined readiness. It is observed that the decision to proceed with the first half joint exercise as originally planned reflects his strong influence.

Within South Korea, there were also considerable voices calling for postponement or adjustment of the joint exercises to revive momentum for the Korean Peninsula peace process. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un also stated in the report on the summary of the 8th Party Congress business in January that depending on the South's attitude, it could return to the 'spring days three years ago,' demanding the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint exercises as a precondition.

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the schedule for the first half joint command post exercise on the day, they mentioned that "the ROK-U.S. alliance comprehensively considered various conditions such as the COVID-19 situation, maintenance of combat readiness posture, and support for diplomatic efforts for denuclearization and peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula," which is interpreted as reflecting this complex environment. In conclusion, the training schedule and scale were determined by comprehensively considering the infectious disease situation, the Fight Tonight demands of U.S. Forces Korea, and the South Korean government's will for the Korean Peninsula peace process.

Attention is also drawn to what actions North Korea might take during or after the joint exercise period. The North Korean military is currently conducting winter training. Some experts suggest that during or after the joint exercise, North Korea may reveal a new submarine under construction by modifying the Romeo-class (1,800-ton class) or conduct a test launch of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). However, many argue that North Korea will not take premature military actions before the new North Korea policy planned by the Biden administration is disclosed.