[Viewpoint] When Should South Korea Join the Quad Plus?

[Asia Economy]

On February 18, the first Quad foreign ministers' virtual meeting under the Joe Biden administration in the United States was held.

The Quad, composed of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, is the core of the Indo-Pacific (Indo-Pac) strategy. Recently, some domestic voices have grown louder, demanding South Korea's immediate participation in the Quad Plus.

However, is South Korea truly excluded from the new framework by the United States as some voices suggest? Will South Korea be marginalized within the Western camp if it does not join the Quad Plus? Is now the right timing to join the Quad Plus to strengthen the South Korea-US alliance?

The Indo-Pac strategy can be interpreted in various ways terminologically. It has become a 'proper noun' meaning all anti-China pressure activities in the diplomatic, security, military, quarantine, and economic fields by participating countries.

The United States hopes that all regional countries except China will join the Indo-Pac strategy, but the countries it wants to deploy immediately in 'real action' are the Quad and Quad Plus, which are useful for pressuring China.

The reason China is wary of the Quad is due to its clear intent to isolate China, and the Quad Plus signifies practical actions to deepen this isolation. Paradoxically, the Indo-Pac also indicates that China's national power has expanded beyond the Asia-Pacific region to the Indian Ocean.

However, the government should observe the unfolding situation more cautiously rather than rushing to join the Quad Plus.

The first reason is the cohesion of the Quad. Currently, there are differing intentions and degrees of participation among members, akin to 'different dreams while sleeping together.' The United States emphasizes democratic values, alliances, and multilateral cooperation but finds it difficult to make large-scale material investments related to the Quad and expects more 'voluntary' participation from member countries.

Japan has a general framework but has not clearly defined its methodology. India takes an opportunistic stance to increase its bargaining power between the US and China and prefers a non-China (Bi-Zhong) network rather than an anti-China alliance. Australia has differing domestic views on China policy between ruling and opposition parties and is limited in national power, making it difficult to be a major force.

The second reason is institutionalization. Regular meetings of political and security leadership among Quad countries, pressure on China in advanced technology sectors, and military training and cooperation are expected, but nothing beyond that.

There is potential for an Asian version of NATO, but so far, it is a kind of 'union of will.' Institutionalizing the Quad will take a long time, and since its substance is not yet clear, the direction should be observed further.

The third reason concerns the participation of other countries in the Quad Plus. Whether in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia is the geographical center, but the participation of these countries in the Indo-Pac strategy is not optimistic.

So far, ASEAN has led in Southeast Asia with a format of ASEAN+1 involving major powers, but the Quad centers on four countries, and since ASEAN countries' participation would reduce their voice, active participation from ASEAN is difficult.

Vietnam, mentioned as a possible member of the Quad Plus, might consider joining if the US offers enormous incentives, but as an ASEAN member, solo participation is difficult, and neighboring ASEAN countries are pro-China. Moreover, tensions with China in the South China Sea must be anticipated.

There is much criticism of our 'strategic ambiguity' strategy, but it is an inevitable choice given our diplomatic reality, and it is difficult to satisfy both the US and China 100%. If we believe this is in our national interest, we must bear opportunity and selection costs and respond within the broader framework of foreign strategy and North Korea policy rather than being swayed by domestic criticism.

Hwang Jae-ho, Professor, Department of International Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies