[Asia Economy Reporter Hyunwoo Lee] After Toyotomi Hideyoshi unified Japan in 1590 and notified Joseon of this, the Joseon court sent a communication envoy as a congratulatory delegation. Although nominally a congratulatory envoy, the actual mission was to spy on whether Japan truly planned to invade Joseon.
Joseon also received intelligence that Japan was gathering a large army in Nagoya and building tens of thousands of ships in Tsushima, fueling rampant rumors that war was imminent, making the envoy's mission even more critical. King Seonjo was also cautious in selecting the envoys. Considering the reality of Joseon divided into factions called Dongin and Seoin, there was a possibility of biased opinions if the envoys were all from the same faction. Therefore, the chief envoy was chosen from the Seoin faction, and the deputy envoy from the Dongin faction.
The envoy who departed in March 1590 returned to Joseon only in February of the following year, nearly a year later. As expected, they presented differing opinions according to their factional affiliations. The chief envoy Hwang Yun-gil strongly asserted, following the Seoin faction's view, that Hideyoshi would start a war, while the deputy envoy Kim Seong-il, reflecting the Dongin faction's stance, belittled him as not someone who would wage war. When King Seonjo asked about Hideyoshi's impression, Hwang Yun-gil evaluated him as "having sparkling eyes and possessing courage and strategy," whereas Kim Seong-il replied, "He is like a rat, not a figure to be feared."
Although it seemed they had predetermined answers based on their political colors, the difference in their perceptions was clear. Kim Seong-il claimed that Hideyoshi behaved disgracefully during the reception of the Joseon envoys, arguing that he was an incompetent figure. It is known that Hideyoshi appeared barefoot, holding his young child, and even performed an embarrassing dance. Kim Seong-il argued that someone who behaves like that even in an official diplomatic meeting lacks the leadership to lead a war.
Despite witnessing the same situation, Hwang Yun-gil interpreted it completely differently. During the envoy's schedule, he closely examined Japan's population, military strength, and economic situation, and was particularly astonished by the new weapon called the arquebus, which he even brought back himself. Hwang Yun-gil argued that Japan's national power already overwhelmed Joseon, and Hideyoshi deliberately maintained a haughty attitude as if the Joseon delegation was invisible.
Hwang Yun-gil's interpretation was proven correct only after experiencing the flames of the seven-year war. The Dongin faction later revealed and regretted that they had obstructed national interests to appease the collective resistance of their support base, the Yeongnam Confucian scholars, against the conscription order, but by then it was too late.
At least the Joseon envoys at the time had seen Hideyoshi's face, and the Joseon court could hear the judgments of two envoys with different political colors. However, South Korean diplomats now, standing in the aftermath of the storm of the U.S. presidential election that will determine the fate of the Korean Peninsula, have not even seen the face of the president-elect. How can those who have not even observed the impression of a seasoned diplomat of decades possibly understand the incoming administration's North Korea policy?
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![[War & Business] Hideyoshi's Face](https://cphoto.asiae.co.kr/listimglink/1/2020111614404113332_1605505240.jpg)

