[Opinion] A Declaration of the End of War Is Not Necessarily 'Peace'

Lee Yong-jun, Former Ambassador for North Korean Nuclear Affairs and Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The languages and concepts used by communist countries differ significantly from the conventional meanings in the human world, often cleverly concealing different intentions beneath the surface. Therefore, it is difficult for anyone other than experts to accurately understand their meanings. One representative example is the term 'peace.' According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, both 'war' and 'peace' are merely means to achieve the policy goal of overthrowing capitalism, and "peace is possible only when the contradiction between capitalism and communism is overcome by the extinction of capitalism." Vladimir Lenin defined "a peace agreement as a means to gather strength." This means that a peace agreement is not the end of war but merely a means to prepare for a new war. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which ended the Vietnam War, are a representative example.

North Korea, encouraged by the Vietnam peace agreement, proposed a 'peace agreement with the United States' in 1974 and has been persistently demanding it ever since. However, the 'peace' and 'peace agreement' that North Korea talks about are entirely different from their meanings in the outside world. The reason North Korea insists on a peace agreement with the United States is to achieve the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, the dissolution of the United Nations Command in South Korea, the abolition of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, and to complete the unification of the Korean Peninsula in the North Korean way. This intention of North Korea was confirmed several times through the 'Four-Party Talks on the Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula,' held over two years during the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations among South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and China. At those talks, North Korea strongly demanded that 'withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea' and 'U.S.-North Korea peace agreement (excluding South Korea)' be set as the two main agenda items, insisting that no substantive discussions could begin until these were agreed upon. Ultimately, the two-year talks broke down without even setting the agenda.

Against the backdrop of these trial and error experiences, the Roh Moo-hyun administration's 2007 'end-of-war declaration' plan was born. Since the Korean Peninsula peace agreement contains many difficult issues that are impossible to agree upon, and moreover, North Korea denies South Korea's very qualification to sign, the purpose of the end-of-war declaration proposal was to omit all these difficult contentious elements and have the four countries briefly agree and announce only the introductory part stating "the war has ended." It was also a product of political impatience aiming to achieve domestic political goals early by postponing all complex and lengthy negotiations to the future and announcing only the fundamental matter of 'end of war' early. The issue of the end-of-war declaration was inherited by the Moon Jae-in administration and is still being strongly pursued.

However, North Korea is actually passive about the end-of-war declaration, and the U.S. also thinks that an end-of-war declaration without North Korea's denuclearization is risky. Although the 2007 'October 4 Declaration' and the 2018 'April 27 Panmunjom Declaration' between South and North Korea include the phrase 'end-of-war declaration,' this appears to be a compromise product that was difficultly included as a major concession accepting North Korea's demand for a 'peace agreement.' The reason both the U.S. and North Korea are lukewarm about the end-of-war declaration is simple. If the end-of-war declaration acquires legal binding force equivalent to a peace agreement, North Korea would use it as justification for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, abolition of the United Nations Command, and abolition of the NLL, which the U.S. cannot agree to. In particular, the NLL is merely a 'maritime armistice line' that will automatically disappear upon the international legal end of the Korean War. Conversely, if the end-of-war declaration is merely a symbolic declaration without legal effect, North Korea has no practical benefit in accepting it. What North Korea wants is not the end of war or peace but the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and the abolition of the NLL.

Changes to the status quo on the Korean Peninsula must be pursued very cautiously based on national consensus. A peace agreement cannot create peace that does not exist, and an end-of-war declaration cannot end the existing military confrontation. Although the armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula for 70 years is abnormal, it has nonetheless been the foundation that has maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula for 70 years. Both the peace regime and the end-of-war declaration sound plausible in principle, but a wrong agreement lacking genuine will for peace could destroy the peace on the Korean Peninsula that has been maintained for 70 years.