[Sisibibi] Memories of Remittance, Will They Be Recreated?

Young-gi Cho, Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of Political Science, Kookmin University · Chairman of the Advanced Unification Research Association, Hanseon Foundation

Last month, North Korea toyed with South Korea through the sibling politics of Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong. The tactic of dividing roles between the older brother as the good cop and the younger sister as the bad cop was a dual strategy of both hard and soft approaches.

Kim Yo-jong's statement (June 4) marked the start of a hardline stance, using the excuse of anti-North Korea leaflets. She mentioned the "closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and dismantling of the Mount Kumgang facilities," "closure of the inter-Korean joint liaison office," and "nullification of the September 19 military agreement," forcing the Moon Jae-in administration into submission. Within four hours of the statement, the government and ruling party hastily rolled out policies such as "legislation to ban anti-North Korea leaflets," "prosecution of related defector organizations," and "arrest of leaflet distributors in border areas." In the rush to ban leaflets, the nation's pride and citizens' dignity disappeared, leaving no space for freedom or reason. The government was solely focused on appeasing North Korea. Despite this submissiveness, North Korea's blatant aggression resembled a runaway train. On June 9, it shifted its inter-Korean projects into hostile actions, and with the explosion of the liaison office and military actions against the South on June 16, tensions reached their peak.

This peak tension abruptly shifted to a conciliatory mode with Kim Jong-un's order to "suspend military actions against the South" on June 24. The switch to a conciliatory mode was partly due to practical assessments such as difficulties in mobilizing military personnel during the farming season and concerns over COVID-19 spread within the military. However, the urgency to establish a pipeline to prevent a second "Arduous March," exacerbated by international sanctions and the border closure since January this year, was also a significant factor. After the "suspension of military actions" order, North Korea's tone concealed silent pressure on South Korea for insufficient ethnic cooperation and the need for US-North Korea dialogue.

The government's replacement of the North Korea and security line on the 3rd is seen as a response (?) to the pressure for ethnic cooperation. Most of the new appointees are either pro-North Korea ethnic cooperation advocates or conciliatory factions. Therefore, this replacement can be interpreted as a regime-level intention to move away from "pro-American subservience" and toward ethnic cooperation. Ultimately, it reveals an intention to break through the wall of international economic sanctions through ethnic cooperation. However, the difference lies in the fact that North Korea's ethnicity lacks sovereignty, while South Korea's ethnicity is sovereignty of the people. Talking about ethnic cooperation with such fundamentally different concepts of ethnicity is wishful thinking, and ignoring this will prevent the establishment of a proper framework for ethnic cooperation.

Moreover, observing this replacement raises a foreboding suspicion that illegal remittances to North Korea might be revived. The main figures behind illegal remittances 20 years ago have reappeared, and the June 15, 2000 inter-Korean joint declaration was significantly driven by remittances to North Korea. Of course, compared to 20 years ago, the dense sanction network including secondary boycotts makes illegal remittances highly unlikely. However, the possibility that the massive special activity funds of the North Korea and security departments could be illegally transferred in the form of cryptocurrency cannot be entirely ruled out.

The lifespan of the opaque June 15 declaration was not long. The initial political rhetoric that the door to peace had been wide open was dashed by the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002. In other words, while the peace promised by the June 15 declaration disappeared, the ethnic cooperation federal unification has been exploited as a propaganda tool by North Korea. Since the June 15 declaration, peace on the Korean Peninsula has become much more fragile due to the North Korean nuclear threat, and North Korea's reform and opening have been perceived as threats to regime survival, resulting in no progress. Planning a second June 15 declaration while ignoring these harsh realities is bound to repeat past mistakes. This means a new, practical approach to North Korea policy is necessary.

Currently, North Korea is diagnosed to be facing a second Arduous March crisis due to international economic sanctions and the North Korea-China border closure. North Korea's recent emphasis on the urgency of securing the livelihood of Pyongyang residents is also a sign of crisis. History teaches us that economic crises act as drivers of social change, and North Korea is no exception. Ultimately, whether the North Korean economic crisis becomes a driver of social change depends on our policy direction. Therefore, now is not the time to repeat the mistake of relying on premature ethnic cooperation-based North Korea policies. Rather, it is time to shift the direction of North Korea policy to enable social change in North Korea. A change in government perception appears urgent.