[How About This Book] Why America Can't Stop War

William D. Hartung and Ben Freeman’s "Why America Can’t Stop War"

A world where war continues not because it can’t be stopped, but because no one thinks to stop it

America’s war machine runs on inertia, not decision

War has not ended; it is merely being continuously updated

War is always spoken of as if it were a matter of “decision.” Someone is said to have started it, and someone else is expected to be able to stop it. The outbreak and end of war, victory and defeat, are all summarized as the determinations of political leaders. However, as you follow this book, such language becomes increasingly unfamiliar. War appears less as the result of a single decision, and more as a structure that, once set in motion, sustains itself-a system driven by its own inertia.

The United States spends more on national defense than any other country in the world. Each year, the defense budget breaks new records. When you add the costs of homeland security, veterans’ affairs, and interest payments on past wars, the funds flowing in the name of “security” have already reached the scale of an industry. What this book persistently reveals is not so much the numbers themselves, but the pathways through which the money flows. Within a tightly interwoven network of the military, Congress, defense contractors, lobbyists, think tanks, media, and universities, war is managed as a constant state, not an emergency.

The author revisits the old concept of the “military-industrial complex,” but does not use it as a tired slogan of criticism. Instead, he depicts it as a kind of lived world. Retired generals move to the boards of defense contractors, which in turn seek to influence congressional budget decisions. Former high-ranking officials become lobbyists, who then produce policy papers. This is the so-called revolving door structure. The problem with this structure goes beyond mere conflicts of interest.

Even when a policy or project that has been launched proves to be a failure, the incentive to correct that failure disappears. Large weapons systems may go over budget and underperform, but the projects are rarely canceled. This is because most of those involved have already moved to other positions or are preparing for the next contract. Failure is not subject to accountability; instead, it becomes the rationale for requesting the next budget. The scene of defense contractors spending enormous sums on lobbying each year, with several lobbyists assigned to each member of Congress, also illustrates this structure. It is no longer unusual for retired senior generals to take positions in the defense industry or financial sector.

What makes this book especially relevant to the present is the moment Silicon Valley fuses with the war machine. War is no longer confined to the industries of steel and gunpowder. Artificial intelligence, data analytics, cloud computing, satellite technology, autonomous weapons, and surveillance systems have become central elements on the battlefield. Technology companies sign contracts with the Department of Defense, and the battlefield becomes a testing ground for advanced technology. Some entrepreneurs dismiss traditional defense contractors as outdated hardware industries, calling themselves “innovators reopening the arsenal of democracy.” However, this competition is not about taking market share from existing contractors; it is about expanding the overall defense budget so that both new and old players survive. Only the face of war has changed-the structure remains intact.

AI and automation technologies make war more precise, but at the same time blur the lines of accountability. Mistaken judgments are attributed to system errors, and those with decision-making authority retreat behind screens. The logic of Silicon Valley now meets the entrenched inertia of the military-industrial complex. Instead of admitting failure, the conversation moves to the next stage under the guise of updates and improvements. War becomes not an event to put an end to, but a project to be continuously managed and refined.

The intervention of technology changes the very sensibility of war. As troop casualties decrease, the political burden lessens, making war an easier choice. Drones and AI systems translate killing and destruction into data on a screen. War becomes increasingly distant and quiet, fading from daily life. As a result, war is no longer seen as an event that must end, but as a condition to be maintained and managed. Weapons are consumed, new orders are placed, and budgets are renewed annually. War is not concluded; it is updated.

What is striking is that this structure cannot be reduced to the product of any particular administration. It does not distinguish between Trump and Biden, Democrats and Republicans. The war machine is largely unaffected by changes in government. Regardless of who is in power, the budget has grown, and overseas military interventions have continued. In this sense, war is less a political choice than a condition of politics itself. The question “Why can’t we stop?” in truth becomes “Who can stop it?”

The more you read, the more unsettling it becomes. Is this structure unique to the United States? Consider the vast sums spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan-money that could have solved many other problems in American society. This leads to questions about the autonomy of our own security decisions, which are tied together under the name of alliance. Is the process of defense cost-sharing, weapons procurement, and reliance on military technology, at some point, simply becoming part of a larger system?

The author does not offer answers. Instead, he calmly shows how war has been explained and how it has been maintained. After closing the book, the words surrounding war sound a little different. Terms like decision, responsibility, and conclusion begin to reveal what they actually obscure. Perhaps war is less an event that could not be stopped, and more a state for which there is no compelling reason to stop. That is the impression that lingers at the end.

Why America Can’t Stop War | William D. Hartung, Ben Freeman | Translated by Paek Woojin | Bookie | 425 pages

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.