US Security Breach Due to Group Chat Delivery Accident... 'Signalgate' Controversy [AK Radio]

Journalist Accidentally Invited to Secret Chatroom
Military Secrets Including Operation Times Exposed

The U.S. government accidentally invited a journalist to a messenger chatroom used by senior officials containing sensitive diplomatic and security information, resulting in a military secret leak. In the U.S., the messenger app involved, Signal, has led to a major uproar and is being dubbed "Signalgate."

Mike Waltz, the White House National Security Advisor, mistakenly invited Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of the American current affairs magazine The Atlantic, to a secret chatroom used by senior U.S. diplomatic and security officials. He had intended to invite another official with a similar name but failed to verify properly and invited the wrong person. The problem is that military secrets, including discussions about retaliatory airstrikes against Yemen's Houthi rebels, were discussed in this chatroom. The chatroom included all key senior U.S. security officials except President Trump, such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.

The Atlantic gave this story prominent coverage, sparking significant controversy within the U.S. President Trump defended Waltz shortly after the leak, saying, "Waltz is a good person," and "No major secrets were leaked in this room." However, as the chatroom contents gradually became public, it was revealed that detailed military operational secrets were exposed, such as which specific fighter jets took off from which command at what time. Operational times, fighter jet specifications, and launch locations are highly classified information that must not be discussed on general messenger platforms.

Originally, such information must be discussed offline only in specific locations called "Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities" (SCIFs). In these facilities, the use of smartphones and all electronic devices is prohibited, and jamming technology is employed to disrupt electronic device operation to prevent eavesdropping devices from entering. Officials normally conduct offline meetings here and then handle the meeting contents as classified information.

Mike Waltz, U.S. National Security Advisor at the White House. Photo by Reuters and Yonhap News Agency

Another issue is that the leaked chat contents included derogatory remarks about European countries, escalating into a diplomatic problem. Senior officials were found to have used expressions such as "European countries are shamefully free-riding on security and defense costs," provoking strong backlash from the European Union and various European countries.

At the center of this controversy is the messenger app Signal, developed in 2014 by a nonprofit organization called the Signal Technology Foundation with the help of IT experts and companies in the U.S. The goal was to create a messenger free from political bias and corporate influence with enhanced security. Developed with about $50 million (approximately 7.3 billion KRW) in funding, the messenger's most notable feature is its "end-to-end encryption" technology. This technology ensures that even if hackers intercept the messenger during message transmission, the content remains encrypted and unreadable. Moreover, it is known that not even server administrators can verify who sent each message or when it was sent, except for the parties involved.

Since the Biden administration, there have been security warnings that federal government and White House servers are vulnerable to hacking by China and Russia, leading to increased use of Signal within the government. Especially, President Trump, having experienced court trials before his inauguration, was reluctant to communicate via official channels that leave government records, which led senior officials in the Trump administration to widely use Signal.

Such cases of national secret leaks via SNS are not unique to the U.S. In Russia, which is at war with Ukraine, Telegram is widely used across civilians, government, and military alike. In Russia, not only senior government officials but also frontline commanders and soldiers exchange operational orders and reports via Telegram.

Reuters·Yonhap News

Last August, Pavel Durov, CEO of Telegram, was detained and held for five days during a visit to France, after which numerous Russian military secrets reportedly leaked to the West. Shortly thereafter, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise attack on Russia's Kursk region, capturing many areas. Russia temporarily banned Telegram use but the issue remains unresolved.

Middle Eastern terrorist organizations also face security issues due to SNS use. When the Israeli military engaged Hamas, SNS played a crucial role in locating tunnels. Young Hamas members in their 20s posted their photos on Instagram, which the Israeli military analyzed to pinpoint locations. Israeli intelligence currently allocates the most personnel to SNS and Instagram reconnaissance operations.

Similar cases have occurred in South Korea. Recently, some soldiers were punished for mistakenly sending classified information about joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises to their girlfriends. This has led to calls for banning smartphone use among the military, key facilities, and senior officials. However, the Ukraine war has shown that banning smartphone use in modern warfare is difficult. Most operational communications already occur via messengers, and the GPS function of smartphones is essential for soldiers to navigate when communication networks are destroyed. Additionally, smartphones' connectivity and compatibility with advanced weapons like drones make modern combat difficult without them.

Ultimately, despite security concerns, smartphones have become indispensable tools, making it unlikely for government agencies or the military to ban their use. For now, there is no clear alternative other than strengthening normative education related to SNS and messenger security.

Meanwhile, messengers like Signal cannot intercept messages during transmission, but messages already sent to the recipient remain vulnerable to theft. Related companies are developing safer SNS and messengers that address these security weaknesses, and it is expected that future messengers with enhanced security performance could provide a fundamental solution.

No matter how advanced security technology is, the risk of information leaks due to human error, as seen in this incident, still exists. The U.S. "Signalgate" case demonstrates how the risks and impact can grow as technology advances.