[Inside Chodong] The Repeated Fear of Mass Crowd Congestion: Nothing Has Changed

Has the social disaster response system been properly reorganized after the Itaewon tragedy, which revealed gaps in crowd management?

Recent concerns about a mass gathering crowd accident at a performance venue in Seongsu-dong, Seongdong-gu, Seoul, show that our safety awareness has not significantly changed. With about 4,000 people crowded into a four-story steel prefabricated building, it may have been fortunate that the performance was stopped due to some audience members experiencing breathing difficulties.

On the 28th, the 'Boiler Room Seoul 2024' concert venue. [Image source=Yonhap News]

The government, Seoul city, and local districts have belatedly begun inspections, but for now, all they can do is check the disaster response plan submitted in advance by the event organizer. Comparing the expected number of attendees listed by the organizer with the actual number admitted to determine whether safety management was neglected and issuing suspension orders will likely mark the end of this situation. Considering the suspicion that the event organizer sold more tickets than the venue's capacity, our society's safety complacency, as if the Itaewon crowd crush accident has been forgotten, deserves renewed criticism.

After the 'Itaewon tragedy,' the government's large-scale 'Comprehensive Plan for National Safety System Reform' aimed at preventing crowd accidents at festivals and events still left blind spots. The Seongsu-dong performance venue incident was classified as a 'performance,' not a 'festival,' thus falling outside the scope of the relevant measures and managed under a separate Performance Act that only requires notification. Because there were no prior review regulations, the reason why only the notification procedures were re-examined when an accident occurred was due to this.

Just ten days before this incident, mass gathering crowd accidents were legally designated as social disasters, but this too focused more on post-incident management than prevention. The intense political 'responsibility' disputes that occurred during the Itaewon tragedy were directly reflected in the law, concentrating only on clarifying ambiguous parts of the disaster management authority.

The government also promised rapid response in its legislative amendment by stating that 'it was promoted to clarify the authority and responsibility of related agencies to promptly and systematically manage disasters,' and that 'the disaster management agency must promptly establish and operate a Central Accident Response Headquarters to manage disasters when a disaster of its jurisdiction occurs.'

Coincidentally, concerns about mass gathering crowd accidents have continued for several days at Seongsu Station, not far from the Seongsu-dong performance venue. This is the result of an increase in knowledge industry centers and so-called 'hot places' in the area, causing the average daily boarding and alighting numbers at Seongsu Station to rise sharply. However, the fundamental cause lies in the transportation system from the 1970s and 1980s when handmade shoe factories were concentrated there. Although the community has changed, administrative capacity has not kept up, and Seongsu Station still accommodates this volume of people through only four entrances and exits as before.

More than two years have passed since the Itaewon tragedy, but ultimately, our social disaster response system has not significantly moved forward. When checking the political promises to build a meticulous system, the reality is even more dismal. Except for the 'Itaewon Special Act,' which was agreed upon after much political wrangling, most related legislative amendments for prevention and post-management after the Itaewon tragedy were discarded due to the expiration of the last National Assembly's term.

Mass gathering crowd accidents occur unexpectedly, which also indicates that national administrative capacity is not keeping pace at all. If necessary, discussions on related laws should begin to guarantee bold administrative decisions as well as minimum regulations considering various safety demands. Instead of patchwork measures, detailed safety manuals to respond to crowd congestion must be prepared starting now. A system that becomes increasingly lax will inevitably lead to another Seongsu-dong or Seongsu Station incident. / Social Affairs Department Deputy Chief Reporter Baek Kyunghwan