[Initial Perspective] Why We Lost Even Though We Released, Built, and Fixed

It has now been well over ten days since the April 10 general election. As a reporter covering the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), the moment I feel the election is truly over is when I check the text messages from MOLIT. Before the election, MOLIT sent more than ten messages a day. Messages containing schedules for the president-led livelihood discussion forums, various development policy announcements, and press releases poured in nonstop. However, starting the day after the election, MOLIT suddenly stopped sending messages. On the day after the election, there were only three messages in total. Although MOLIT officials never mentioned it, everyone knew: this clearly proved that all these activities were for election purposes.

Since these were election-driven policies, their fate was inevitably tied to the election results. With the opposition party taking control of the political landscape, momentum was lost. The private sector gave up even faster than MOLIT. When the development policy to "rebuild apartments over 30 years old without safety inspections" was about to be nullified, apartments along the Han River in Dongjak-gu, Seoul immediately began applying for safety inspections. The repeal of the "excess profit recovery system for reconstruction," which was the biggest obstacle to reconstruction projects, also seemed likely to be undone. Even though the MOLIT minister attempted to bring the issue into public discussion, it was highly unlikely that the opposition party would cooperate in abolishing this system, which was established during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

Even if MOLIT promises to loosen regulations, build, and renovate, why did the public vote for the opposition party? It is not simply because the ruling party cannot implement election-driven policies due to a minority government. Instead of blaming anyone, the root causes must be examined.

One notable aspect of this election was that the ruling party lost in the very regions MOLIT had specifically targeted for development through livelihood discussion forums. Goyang City, which had secured promises for safety inspection exemptions and floor area ratio increases to redevelop the first-generation new towns, saw the opposition party win all four constituencies. The same pattern was observed in other first-generation new towns. Except for Bundang, Jungdong, Pyeongchon, and Sanbon all became seats for the Democratic Party of Korea.

Uijeongbu, where the second phase of the Seoul Metropolitan Area GTX (Great Train Express) plan was announced, also saw the opposition party win both the Gap and Eul constituencies. In Incheon, despite the undergrounding of the Gyeongin Line and Gyeongin Expressway, the Democratic Party secured 12 out of 14 constituencies. Yeongdeungpo-gu, selected as a target area for the "New Village" project to renovate old villa neighborhoods, was also won by the opposition party. Most regions where MOLIT-led livelihood discussion forums were held did not support the ruling party.

While the sentiment to judge the administration played a significant role, the hastily prepared policies were also problematic. Citizens, well-versed in local circumstances and concerned about property rights, quickly caught on. For example, when reconstruction costs reached 10 million KRW per 3.3㎡ (pyeong), making it unaffordable, the promise to "speed up deregulation of reconstruction" was criticized as mere armchair theorizing.

The same applied to the railway undergrounding projects, which were promised to be funded by private investment without secured budgets. The GTX line extension plan, which included the condition "construction will start within the term if local governments bear the cost," was also criticized in the same context. Public sentiment questioned, "When will this ever happen? With what money?"

From the moment MOLIT prepared materials for a livelihood discussion forum stating, "The illustrations are examples to aid understanding, and the development plans are not finalized at all (February 13, Busan railway undergrounding perspective explanation)," the credibility of development policies may have already hit rock bottom. If the practice of releasing unconfirmed development plans under election pressure continues, MOLIT's policy effectiveness will only weaken further.